How and what is nothingness for Heidegger? Firstly, it is essentially un-grounding human existence. Secondly, it still is human-privileging. Why the second, when the first seems to rule out the second totally. This is where existentialism comes in: One dictum says that there are degrees of freedom associated with nothingness. So, in a state of un-groundedness, there are grounds of freedom that beckon humans still ruling the roost. So, nothingness dissolves into the nothing here, as far as I am concerned. Now, Sankara’s Brahman is nothing like the “it”. Why? “It” is not absolute to begin with. It swells, it contracts. It moves, it carves. It designates, it denominates, and it dominates. Domineering is the steering angle of “it”. It is the reason why I call it the “cosmic capitalism”. It is the all-pervasiveness of capitalism that is brutal to the point of driving humans to existential depravity. So, it is potent, it is flowing in the vastness of galactic spaces (remember Bataille’s “solar anus”), in the voids one cannot sense, but nevertheless ethereal.
How is rupture important to any discourse? Is it the waning of a line of discourse in that the impulsive impact is debilitating over temporality and even spatially or is it a sudden change of the direction altogether hitherto unknown or never before comprehended, a kind of digital break, a sudden change of phase or a sudden phase transition. The latter are called by me ‘ruptures’. But, why do I call it only debilitating to begin with, it could very well be the accelerated impact that could be thought out. a complete dislocation from one discourse to another, bridged by only a kind of conscious memory of the shift. the important factor to be taken into consideration is the determination of the ‘threshold’, where the rupture occurs. This could be cataclysmic as in the case of the extinction of dinosaurs. What is cataclysmic is the eventality of this threshold, a cross over of which is the rupture that is being thought about.
These deliberations are indeed painful. When I was caught up in a paradox in logic (Goodman’s paradox), I could comprehend only to land up in this soup, the thoughts collapse into thinking as if there is a flattening out of the hierarchy between the thought and thinking. Elevation is possible when there is a pre-ordained depression.
For me, suddenly, philosophically, rupture has gained prominence. I am very convinced, if it could be achieved, majority of the philosophical systems in vogue would just annihilate themselves.
I was wondering about the assistance that could come from the field of chaos theory. but then I dismissed it as soon as it had sprung. Chaos Theory is so damn dependent of the sensitivity to initial conditions that it becomes well nigh possible to simulate the results: it becomes deterministic, predictable and thereby, a continuity in what would come about in the future if there is at all a rupture in the sense I mentioned about. This dismisses the notion of a hitherto unthought of break with the past and the present. Knowing the infinitely unknown future based on the finitely known past!!!
Another thing that I thought about was the idea of Clinamen by Lucretius. if I am in a position to link up his idea with the Deleuzean one of the former’s notion of a slight movement in the angle of declination with the latter’s initiation of ‘turbulence’ in the laminar flow, I somehow see this as converging towards the Chaos (read Chaos Theory). This ‘Turbulence’ is still accounted for in that it is still deterministic and predictable. Therefore, a dismissal of Lucretius’ position is validated.
Hegel sees the family as the immediacy, civil society as the alienation and the state as the reconciliator of the two. The very presence of civil society in between the family and the state cries for institutionalizing for politics to happen. Civil society demands for the strict normativities for the other two to possess. Therefore, for Hegel, it is the negation and the withering away of civil society is compensated “today” by various simulators/simulations for eg. the media. (I am looking for the possibilities of media as the guarantor of a conflict-free Social, yet to comprehend it fully).
The family, as stated above guarantees immediacy, solidarity and this results in the first corruption of a kind in limiting the one that is guaranteed immediacy and solidarity. If, one is ever possible to escape the Scylla of family, one is caught in the Charybdis of civil society i.e. if the break from the limit is successfully negotiated, an imposing limit takes its place in the form of civil society.This is the second corruption. And the way to reach a rapprochement is through the mediator in “State”. Does this mean that “State” as the community is the only assurance of doing politics today? This is nothing short of twisting of the dialectic, a kind of trolling!!
Now, one thing is for certain and that being a trajectory to be followed to surpass the constraints imposed upon by the Hegelian pillars and the strictures these demand to be obeyed (lest ‘Anarchism’). Well, it isn’t really suitable to put the culpability on Hegel for these theses of bad notions, as for him, they only acted as progressions through dialectics. Mis-representations lie in ossifying or fixating these progressions as if forgetting the movement that started to initially define them.
So, it is not to be apathetic to these progressions that could never define the contours of politics today, but to rethink the terms and the relations that are derived between them. What is imperative is to think of: cross-individuality/multi-individuality and means to mitigate corruptions that for Hegel laid the basis for the Social.
As Kant claimed in his Critique of Pure Reason that it is not uniformity that is a necessary criteria of ‘in-itself’ or ‘things-in-themselves’, but the possibility of consciousness and representation that require the constancy of phenomena in nature leading in and out of the tautological presupposition of the constancy of phenomena on the one hand and constancy of nature on the other. This representation or as Brassier says the problematic of representation has been accepted by the continental tradition without putting up any challenge that has encouraged relinquishing epistemological considerations into the theoretical investigations of nature and conditions of cognition. Meillassoux, on the other hand identifies the ‘frequentialist implication’ argument in Kant that proves the impossibility of representation as due not to the contingency of laws. Having identified it, he proceeds to expound his ‘anti-frequentialist’ argument that demonstrates that the contingency of the laws of nature need not entail their frequent transformation and thereby the impossibility of their representation, as his principle concern is to show what he calls the principle of unreason is to be in perfect compatibility with the stability of appearances and the scientific representation of nature.
Meillassoux wants to challenge modern philosophy’s appropriation of facticity as a limit to revealing knowledge of the absolute. Facticity tells us about the nature of the absolute. If all we can know is the contingency of facticity, then there is no reason for things to remain so rather than otherwise. Yet saying ‘everything is equally possible’ is an absolute claim, thus metaphysical. The only claim that can be made is based upon our facticity, not as limit but as absolute: the absolute is the absolute impossibility of a necessary being. This is the absolute truth of the principle of unreason: this is an hypothetical principle, which is a proposition that could bot be deduced from another proposition, but could be proved by argument.
As against Kant’s dictum of the contingency of the laws of nature implying a frequency of transformation that render the impossibility of representation, Meillassoux concludes that the absolute contingency of the world’s physical structure is in perfect compatibility with the stability of the phenomena and thus the possibility of representation. Brassier discovers a fundamental flaw in Meillassoux’s invoking the anti-frequentialist argument. The flaw is in terms of leaving the ontological status of this stability unattended, despite the latter showing that that the ‘frequentialist implication’ argument unable to prove the reality as totalizable and that contingency is not necessarily incompatible with the appearance of stability, as the former thinks the ontological status of stability to be a cardinal issue in latter’s project of accounting for the ancestral claims to the conditions of possibility of science. Meillassoux is quite aware of this fact that reality in-itself is a non-totalizable multiplicity and as he says:
“We have not established the effectivity of this un-totalization – we have merely supposed it and drawn the consequences of the fact that such a supposition is possible.”
Thus he concedes to the fact of speculative argument, although subtle in his discourse, that would found the stability of appearances upon non-totalizability of absolute time.