….the axiology involved in this analysis is not intrinsically determined by considerations that are merely logical. What logician, what theoretician in general, would have dared to say: B depends logically on A, therefore B is parasitic, nonserious, abnormal, etc.?…All of [those attributes] mark a decline or a pathology, an ethical-ontological determination: i.e. more or less than a mere logical derivation.
What is it, if not an Austinian invocation of Derrida against Searle in trying to portray adjectives like non-serious and abnormal as pathological of language. This is all the more implicated in the language of aetiolation and contagion as pathological in nature. Setting aside the question of logicality, what bothers is the status of ontological-metaphysical questions concerning strategical or methodological operations on a discourse. Derrida answers in the affirmative regarding such a status, for he is firm on the argument of such methodological operations involving decisions as necessarily metaphysical. If this is a metaphysical concern, then it obviously follows that such an exclusion happens to be ontological. This is further criticized by Derrida in terms of a binary of concepts, where invariably one term of the binary gets a higher prerogative, and also in terms of a positive, ideal sense attached to these metaphysical binary oppositions that are regarded as simple, pure, normal and self-identical in themselves. Clearly, the serious/parasitic distinction wrought by Austin is descriptive. But is it axiological and/or evaluative? Yes, since adjectives like aetiolated are rarely used without any evaluative components. Now, if Austin is culpable of metaphysical exclusion, so is Searle, for he fails to expound a general theory of speech acts that would be inclusive of parasitic utterances.