Genomic analysis of family data reveals additional genetic effects on intelligence and personality

H/T West Hunter.


The rare variants that affect IQ will generally decrease IQ – and since pleiotropy is the norm, usually they’ll be deleterious in other ways as well. Genetic load.


But, considering what is now known about the biological origins of cognition and intelligence, it is generally difficult to take claims of discrimination seriously when underrepresented groups also display relatively lower intelligence profiles. However, in this case there is no reason to think that conservatives as a group have an intellectual profile below the general population. Social conservatives tend to be a little lower in intelligence relative to liberals, but free-market conservatives (libertarians) tend to be smarter than liberals. Being very partisan, either liberal or conservative, tends to be associated with high IQ as well. Increased income levels, which are a proxy for IQ, also moves people right ideologically. In other words, there is nothing that biologically determined intelligence can do to explain the lack of conservatives, and even moderates, in the humanities….Race Hustling /r/science



Bad loan crisis continues: 56.4 per cent rise in NPAs of banks

Gross non-performing assets (NPAs), or bad loans, of state owned banks surged 56.4 per cent to Rs 614,872 crore during the 12-month period ended December 2016, and appear set to rise further in the next two quarters with many units, especially in the small and medium sectors, struggling to repay after being hit by the government’s decision to withdraw currency notes of Rs 500 and Rs 1,000 denomination………The RBI discontinued fresh corporate debt restructuring (CDR) with effect from April 1, 2016. Here, promoters’ equity was financed by the borrowed amount, that added the burden of debt servicing on banks. The CDR cell faced problems on account of delay in the sale of unproductive assets due to various legalities that were involved.


And despite the discontinuation, some strands of CDR are retained to say the least. Whats wrong and what must have gone wrong or perceived as such for the Central Bank to have withdrawn support to CDR. A small take follows.

15 per cent is still talking about minimalist valuations. The most important part of the whole report lies in CDR failing, and that too when promoters’ equity is getting funded on borrowed money, resulting in an intensification of burdens on banks’-directed debt financing. This directly cross-purposes with Sebi regulations regarding companies/corporations pledging their shares and then discovering that when such valuations compared with market capitalization slump down, this is really a fix, as companies where promoters have pledged a large share of their holdings are viewed with caution in that if a promoter defaults on this debt, the lender transfers the shares into their own hands on one hand, and when they need funds they dump this stock on the market on the other, leading to sharp movements in share prices. These fluctuations really nosedive when economy is on the downturn, forcing promoters to borrow against their shares (not that they do not do that otherwise) and all the more prompting them to go out and borrow to meet volatility checks denting the balance sheet health.

Frege’s Ontological Correlates of Propositions

For Frege there were only two ontological correlates of propositions: the True and the False. All true propositions denote the True, and all false prepositions denote the False. From an ontological point of view, if all true propositions denote exactly one and the same entity, then the underlying philosophical position is the absolute monism of facts.

Lets disprove what Suszko called ‘Frege’s axiom’: namely the assumption that there exist only two referents for propositions.

Frege’s position on propositions was part of a more general view. Indeed, Frege adopted a principle of homogeneity (Perzanowski) according to which there are two fundamental categories of signs (Bedeutungen and truth-values) and two fundamental categories of senses (Sinn and Gedanken).

Both categories of signs (names and propositions) have sense and reference. The sense of a name is its Sinn, that way in which its referent is given, while the referent itself, the Bedeutung, is the object named by the name. As for propositions, their sense is the Gedanke, while their reference is their logical value.

Since the two semiotic triangles are entirely similar in structure, we need analyze only one of them: that relative to propositions.


Here p is a proposition, s(p) is the sense of p, and r(p) is the referent of p. The functional composition states that s(p) is the way in which p yields r(p). The triangle has been drawn with the functions linking its vertexes explicitly shown. When the functions are composable, the triangle is said to commute, yielding

f(s(p)) = r(p), or f ° s(p) = r(p)

An interesting question now arises: is it possible to generalize the semiotic triangle? And if it is possible to do so, what is required? A first reorganization and generalization of the semiotic triangle therefore involves an explicit differentiation between the truth-value assigning function and the referent assigning function. We thus have the following double semiotic triangle:


where r stands for the referent assigning function and t for the truth-value assigning function. Extending the original semiotic triangle by also considering utterances:


Suszko uses the terms logical valuations for the procedures that assign truth-values, and algebraic valuations for those that assign referents. By arguing for the existence of only two referents, Frege ends up by collapsing logical and algebraic valuations together, thereby rendering them indistinguishable.

Having generalized the semiotic triangle into the double semiotic triangle, we must now address the following questions:

  1. when do two propositions have the same truth value?
  2. when do two propositions have the same referent?
  3. when do two propositions have the same sense?

Sameness of logical value will be denoted by (logical equivalence), while sameness of referent will be indicated with (not to be confused with the equiform to express indiscernibility) and sameness of sense (synonymy) by . Two propositions are synonymous when they have the same sense:

(p ≈ q) = 1 iff (s(p) = s(q)) = 1

Two propositions are identical when they have the same referent:

(p ≡ q) = 1 iff (r(p) = r(q)) = 1

Two propositions are equivalent when they have the same truth value:

(p ↔ q) = 1 iff (t(p) = t(q)) = 1

These various concepts are functionally connected as follows:

s(p) = s(q) implies r(p) = r(q), r(p) = r(q) implies t(p) = t(q)

In general, the constraints that we impose on referents correspond to the ontological assumptions that characterize the theory. The most general logic of all is the one that imposes no restriction at all on r valuations. Just as Fregean logic recognizes only two referents so the most general logic recognizes more than numerable set of them. Between these two extremes, of course, there are numerous intermediate cases. Pure non-Fregean logic is extremely weak, a chaos. If it is to yield something, it has to be strengthened.



Theory of parts and the whole concern both formal and material ontologies. It pertains to the former as a pure theory of independence and non-independence, and to the latter as regards the particular laws of non-independence that apply in the various ontological regions.


Mereologies are generally classified into extensional and intensional, where the former are ontologically monistic: every object that exists is an object; the parts of objects are objects; and the compositions of objects are objects as well. This is the position put forward by Stanisław Leśniewski, who starts from his definition of ontology where he gives formal definition of the concept of ‘object’ and then extends it in his concert of mereology based on the concept of being a ‘proper part of’, then developing it further in his theory of space and time. Intensional mereologies, by contrast distinguish the parts of an entity into independent and non-independent parts. The former are termed ‘pieces’, and they are those that effectively assume the denomination ‘part’, while the latter are called ‘moments’. From an ontological point of view, parts are objects in the same sense that the entities of which they are parts are objects. Moments have a different ontological valence. they are secondary objectualities and solely in the translated and subjective sense. Which, however, do not mean arbitrary. Note the formulation employed by Husserl, who speaks of the independence of parts and the non-independence of moments, not of independence and dependence. The difference is a subtle one, but it is deliberately introduced. The reason for it resides in Husserl’s mathematical training, where the use of negation is that these cases signify that equality is possible. where a is said to be not greater than b, this means that a is less than b or is equal to b. Translated into the present scenario, when one says that a is non-independent of b, the intention is to say that a is dependent on b or that a is equal to b. Moments, may therefore be equal to the whole of which they are moments, where, however, the concept of equality should be understood in the sense of indiscernibility. The possible indiscernibility of the moments from the whole should not be confused with the possible identity of the part with the whole. A part may even be the whole itself, whereas the moment can at most coincide with the whole; or it may be indiscernible from the whole, but is nonetheless distinct from it.

Tensoring Heterotic Superstring Theories


The left-moving and right-moving modes of a string can be separated and treated as different theories. In 1984 it was realized that consistent string theories could be built by combining a bosonic string theory moving in one direction along the string, with a supersymmetric string theory with a single q1 moving in the opposite direction. These theories are called heterotic superstring theories. That sounds crazy — because bosonic strings live in 26 dimensions but supersymmetric string theories live in 10 dimensions. But the extra 16 dimensions of the bosonic side of the theory aren’t really spacetime dimensions. Heterotic string theories are supersymmetric string theories living in ten spacetime dimensions. Heterotic string theories are built by tensoring a left- and a right-  moving string which do not have the same base fields. More explicitly, it is constructed by tensoring the right-moving super string with 10 left-moving bosonic and 32 internal left-moving fermionic fields. Internal here means that the field does not transform under Lorentz-transformations, this implies that the boundary conditions on these allow for rotations. The two types of heterotic theories that are possible come from the two types of gauge symmetry that give rise to quantum mechanically consistent theories. The first is SO(32) and the second is the more exotic combination called E8XE8. The E8XE8 heterotic theory was previously regarded as the only string theory that could give realistic physics, until the mid-1990s, when additional possibilities based on the other theories were identified.



I might be now be better placed to outline my critique of the notion of Smart Cities and the political thereof. The example of China is valid, but more inclined towards the domestic sector where export-oriented growth imploded, leaving the realty estate in a vacuum. Assuming that these habitats lend values to their inhabitants, the point of rupture would lie in setting up ground for vendors and their allies and alliances with a techno-savvy cognitariat operating the digitally conceived spaces. These would be precisely license-free, for they would have ample expertise in architecture of infrastructure and communication lines. Such technological platforms with network connections would plug and play into monetising services involving access to subscriptions and the latest big-thing in town, ‘data analytics’. A successful implementation of such would mean economising any sharing applications with others venturing out to have their version of success involving a plethora of professions and professionals creating a viability gap between the cognitariat and the precariat. And this would be precisely the gap where political fires would be ignited, grounded, and without an across the gulf implementation, systems integration would only be diffused. Such a diffusion would do no politics any good, and only exacerbate the already fragile ecology. 

Instead, what needs to be done is not any replication of failed systems, but a cognisance of how such monopolistic citadels are recognised and how and what intensity-level of intervention is required. In the form of monetisation when it comes to providing services, my political take goes from the inhabitants being charged to a massive costs overhead involved in when others try and replicate this successful model across other cities. Thats where the related question of monopoly would get in, and thats going to be a war of the corporations that poses a scare for me. And this is a political battle We’d be up against.If Smart City is a dystopia, their planners are much smarter than we have thought of them hitherto. That unbundling is what I mean by flipping the coin. 

Capitalism’s Triumph or Commoditizing Communism


Why is revolution not possible? This is an old debate.

Terms like “socialist” and “revolution”, and “right-wing groups” tend to mean different things to different people, according to their perspectives. which can be quite contradictory, in many regards. Revolutions don’t tend to resolve such contradictions as absolutely as idealists and ideologues tend to imagine. Counter-revolutionary tendencies persist in the society, and even among the revolutionaries, such that it’s never really “over”, and the struggle continues.

Technically, “socialism” is a theoretically “necessary” supposedly “interim” period, during which an elite vanguard seizes political power, “on behalf of” the proletariat, and struggles to transform society, toward the eventual emergence of communism, which is to say, democracy, the ultimate utopian communist dream. That transformation is essentially the suppression of counter-revolutionary (anti-democratic) tendencies, and inculcation and cultivation of revolutionary (democratic) tendencies among the masses.

Marxian concentration on capitalism was all about demonstrating how undemocratic, and thus unjust, irrational and inefficient capitalism tends to be, despite it’s claim to be, relatively speaking, “more democratic” than monarchy, say, or feudalism. He merely sought to show that it is not the ultimate, final stage of that evolution, as it’s proponents tend to assert, but that, like the “socialism” he proposed to supplant it with, an interim stage, which would, in fact, sow the seeds of it’s own destruction, even as previous socio-economic paradigms had done before them.

At the time he was doing all this theorizing, a hundred years ago, his premise of an educated working class, capable of democracy, seemed a virtually impossible utopian dream, considering conditions in the masses, steeped in centuries of ignorance, illiteracy, grinding poverty and religious indoctrination. Rather than second guess his conclusion, then, that further resort to elitism was “necessary” to change those conditions, I’d prefer to just point out that, in fact, those conditions have changed, profoundly, since then, such that the prospect of democracy is no longer such a distant utopian dream, but more feasible and viable a prospect than ever before in human history.

Technology, the engine of all socio-economic relations, has evolved, especially in terms of communications. Here and now, into the 21st Century, both capitalist and “socialist” elitism have become outmoded, I think, and need to “wither away” with the whole concept of the “State” as we now know it, as an externally imposed governor…as Marx predicted would some day be possible. Anymore, most of us aspire to democracy, and we realise that we aren’t there, yet. The issue is not whether anti-democratic rightwing reactionary conservative and fundamentalist counter-revolutionary elements of our society, will, or can, prevent democracy from ensuing. The issue is whether those, who tend to be staunchly opposed to racism, sexism, cultural chauvinism, eco-rape, murderous monopoly corporate fascist ripoffs, and imperialist warmongering, will call off the demoralized cynical defeatism of electoral boycott and excessive splitting, and will step up to actually seize the power, for a change…democratically, electorally…and then proceed to suppress counter-revolutionary anti-democratic tendencies legislatively and judicially, from now on…explicitly for justice and peace, to save the planet. Which, of course, is why the right is freaking out like they are, even now waging “low intensity” civil war, desperately trying to prevent that from happening. For Revolution to be at hand, we must not try and smash capitalism, or even right-wing resistance at that, as democracy is invested in and of itself with enough potency to destroy capitalism and its moribund form, fascism. But, the authorial point of exploiting freedom as against suppressing it is the Negri’s position on the corollaries of reaction to right-wing accelerationsim. So, whatever be the seductive power of neoliberalism, which indeed is undeniable, banking on the track record of proletariat would be stuck in the molasses of the past, or even getting to dynamically shift the agency to cognitariat be akin to letting the seduction of neoliberalism suck the agency in. The alternative is agency/ies, which someone like the obscure Agamben would call “Whatever Singularity” (even Gayatri Spivak flirts with the idea), or precariat, which is the umbrella term for the ones stripped of or dehumanised by the forces of neoliberalism. Unless, the left has this in vision, left is a position best avoided for excepting archival purposes. Yes, commoditising communism spells doom, and we are ideologically headed towards it.