Why Deleuzean Philosophy Begins at Hegel and Becomes a Correctional Footnote Thereafter ? Note Quote.

That philosophy must be an ontology of sense is a bold claim on Deleuze’s part, and although he takes it from a Hegelian philosophy, the direction in which he develops it across the rest of his work is resolutely, if not infamously, opposed to Hegel. Whereas Hegel will construct a logic of sense which is fundamentally a logic of the concept, Deleuze will deny that sense is reducible to signification and its universal or general concepts. Deleuze will later provide his own logic of the concept, but for him, although the concept will posit itself, this will not be as the immanent thought of the sense or the content of the matter itself, but will rather function to extract or capture a pure event, or the sense at the surface of things. Similarly, although Deleuze will agree that “sense is becoming”, this will not be a becoming in an atemporal logical time, opposed to a historical time that would play it out, but a pure becoming without present, always divided between past and future, without arrow or telos, and actualised in the present while never strictly ‘happening’. The most distinctive difference, however, will be Deleuze’s invocation of a nonsense that cannot be simply incorporated within sense, that will not be sublated and subsumed in the folds of the dialectic, a nonsense that is itself productive of sense. Moving beyond Hegel, Deleuze will deny the reducibility of sense not only to the universal meanings of signification, but also to the functions of reference or denotation. Moreover, he will deny its reducibility to the dimension of manifestation, or the meanings of the subject of enunciation – the ‘I’ who speaks. Sense can neither be found in universal concepts, nor reference to the individual, nor in the intentions of the subject, but is rather that which grounds all three.

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