Wittgenstein’s Form is the Possibility of Structure


For given two arbitrary objects x and y they can be understood as arguments for a basic ontological connection which, in turn, is either positive or negative. A priori there exist just four cases: the case of positive connection – MP, the case of negative connection – MI, the case that connection is both positive and negative, hence incoherent, denoted – MPI, and the most popular in combinatorial ontology the case of mutual neutrality – N( , ). The first case is taken here to be fundamental.

Explication for σ

Now we can offer the following, rather natural explication for a powerful, nearly omnipotent, synthesizer: y is synthetizable from x iff it is be made possible from x:

σ(x) = {y : MP(x,y)}

Notice that the above explication connects the second approach (operator one) with the third (internal) approach to a general theory of analysis and synthesis.

Quoting one of the most mysterious theses of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus:

(2.033) Form is the possibility of structure.

Ask now what the possibility means? It has been pointed out by Frank Ramsey in his famous review of the Tractatus that it cannot be read as a logical modality (i. e., form cannot be treated as an alternative structure), for this reading would immediately make Tractatus inconsistent.

But, rather ‘Form of x is what makes the structure of y possible’.

Formalization: MP(Form(x), Str(y)), hence – through suitable generalization – MP(x, y).

Wittgensteinian and Leibnizian clues make the nature of MP more clear: form of x is determined by its substance, whereas structurality of y means that y is a complex built up in such and such way. Using syntactical categorization of Lésniewski and Ajdukiewicz we obtain therefore that MP has the category of quantifier: s/n, s – which, as is easy to see, is of higher order and deeply modal.

Therefore M P is a modal quantifier, characterized after Wittgenstein’s clue by

MP(x, y) ↔ MP(S(x), y)


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