Stuxnet

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Stuxnet is a threat targeting a specific industrial control system likely in Iran, such as a gas pipeline or power plant. The ultimate goal of Stuxnet is to sabotage that facility by reprogramming programmable logic controllers (PLCs) to operate as the attackers intend them to, most likely out of their specified boundaries.

Stuxnet was discovered in July, but is confirmed to have existed at least one year prior and likely even before. The majority of infections were found in Iran. Stuxnet contains many features such as:

  • Self-replicates through removable drives exploiting a vulnerability allowing auto-execution. Microsoft Windows Shortcut ‘LNK/PIF’ Files Automatic File Execution Vulnerability (BID 41732)
  • Spreads in a LAN through a vulnerability in the Windows Print Spooler.
    Microsoft Windows Print Spooler Service Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (BID 43073)
  • Spreads through SMB by exploiting the Microsoft Windows Server Service RPC Handling Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (BID 31874).
  • Copies and executes itself on remote computers through network shares.
  • Copies and executes itself on remote computers running a WinCC database server.
  • Copies itself into Step 7 projects in such a way that it automatically executes when the Step 7 project is loaded.
  • Updates itself through a peer-to-peer mechanism within a LAN.
  • Exploits a total of four unpatched Microsoft vulnerabilities, two of which are previously mentioned vulnerabilities for self-replication and the other two are escalation of privilege vulnerabilities that have yet to be disclosed.
  • Contacts a command and control server that allows the hacker to download and execute code, including updated versions.
  • Contains a Windows rootkit that hide its binaries.
  • Attempts to bypass security products.
  • Fingerprints a specific industrial control system and modifies code on the Siemens PLCs to potentially sabotage the system.
  • Hides modified code on PLCs, essentially a rootkit for PLCs.

The following is a possible attack scenario. It is only speculation driven by the technical features of Stuxnet.

Industrial control systems (ICS) are operated by a specialized assembly like code on programmable logic controllers (PLCs). The PLCs are often programmed from Windows computers not connected to the Internet or even the internal network. In addition, the industrial control systems themselves are also unlikely to be connected to the Internet.

First, the attackers needed to conduct reconnaissance. As each PLC is configured in a unique manner, the attack- ers would first need the ICS’s schematics. These design documents may have been stolen by an insider or even retrieved by an early version of Stuxnet or other malicious binary. Once attackers had the design documents and potential knowledge of the computing environment in the facility, they would develop the latest version of Stuxnet. Each feature of Stuxnet was implemented for a specific reason and for the final goal of potentially sabotaging the ICS.

Attackers would need to setup a mirrored environment that would include the necessary ICS hardware, such as PLCs, modules, and peripherals in order to test their code. The full cycle may have taken six months and five to ten core developers not counting numerous other individuals, such as quality assurance and management.

In addition their malicious binaries contained driver files that needed to be digitally signed to avoid suspicion. The attackers compromised two digital certificates to achieve this task. The attackers would have needed to obtain the digital certificates from someone who may have physically entered the premises of the two companies and stole them, as the two companies are in close physical proximity.

To infect their target, Stuxnet would need to be introduced into the target environment. This may have occurred by infecting a willing or unknowing third party, such as a contractor who perhaps had access to the facility, or an insider. The original infection may have been introduced by removable drive.

Once Stuxnet had infected a computer within the organization it began to spread in search of Field PGs, which are typical Windows computers but used to program PLCs. Since most of these computers are non-networked, Stuxnet would first try to spread to other computers on the LAN through a zero-day vulnerability, a two year old vulnerability, infecting Step 7 projects, and through removable drives. Propagation through a LAN likely served as the first step and propagation through removable drives as a means to cover the last and final hop to a Field PG that is never connected to an untrusted network.

While attackers could control Stuxnet with a command and control server, as mentioned previously the key computer was unlikely to have outbound Internet access. Thus, all the functionality required to sabotage a system was embedded directly in the Stuxnet executable. Updates to this executable would be propagated throughout the facility through a peer-to-peer method established by Stuxnet.

When Stuxnet finally found a suitable computer, one that ran Step 7, it would then modify the code on the PLC. These modifications likely sabotaged the system, which was likely considered a high value target due to the large resources invested in the creation of Stuxnet.

Victims attempting to verify the issue would not see any rogue PLC code as Stuxnet hides its modifications.

While their choice of using self-replication methods may have been necessary to ensure they’d find a suitable Field PG, they also caused noticeable collateral damage by infecting machines outside the target organization. The attackers may have considered the collateral damage a necessity in order to effectively reach the intended target. Also, the attackers likely completed their initial attack by the time they were discovered.

Stuxnet dossier

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