# Conjuncted: Affine Schemes: How Would Functors Carry the Same Information?

If we go to the generality of schemes, the extra structure overshadows the topological points and leaves out crucial details so that we have little information, without the full knowledge of the sheaf. For example the evaluation of odd functions on topological points is always zero. This implies that the structure sheaf of a supermanifold cannot be reconstructed from its underlying topological space.

The functor of points is a categorical device to bring back our attention to the points of a scheme; however the notion of point needs to be suitably generalized to go beyond the points of the topological space underlying the scheme.

Grothendieck’s idea behind the definition of the functor of points associated to a scheme is the following. If X is a scheme, for each commutative ring A, we can define the set of the A-points of X in analogy to the way the classical geometers used to define the rational or integral points on a variety. The crucial difference is that we do not focus on just one commutative ring A, but we consider the A-points for all commutative rings A. In fact, the scheme we start from is completely recaptured only by the collection of the A-points for every commutative ring A, together with the admissible morphisms.

Let (rings) denote the category of commutative rings and (schemes) the category of schemes.

Let (|X|, OX) be a scheme and let T ∈ (schemes). We call the T-points of X, the set of all scheme morphisms {T → X}, that we denote by Hom(T, X). We then define the functor of points hX of the scheme X as the representable functor defined on the objects as

hX: (schemes)op → (sets), haX(A) = Hom(Spec A, X) = A-points of X

Notice that when X is affine, X ≅ Spec O(X) and we have

haX(A) = Hom(Spec A, O(X)) = Hom(O(X), A)

In this case the functor haX is again representable.

Consider the affine schemes X = Spec O(X) and Y = Spec O(Y). There is a one-to-one correspondence between the scheme morphisms X → Y and the ring morphisms O(X) → O(Y). Both hX and haare defined on morphisms in the natural way. If φ: T → S is a morphism and ƒ ∈ Hom(S, X), we define hX(φ)(ƒ) = ƒ ○ φ. Similarly, if ψ: A → Bis a ring morphism and g ∈ Hom(O(X), A), we define haX(ψ)(g) = ψ ○ g. The functors hX and haare for a given scheme X not really different but carry the same information. The functor of points hof a scheme X is completely determined by its restriction to the category of affine schemes, or equivalently by the functor

haX: (rings) → (sets), haX(A) = Hom(Spec A, X)

Let M = (|M|, OM) be a locally ringed space and let (rspaces) denote the category of locally ringed spaces. We define the functor of points of locally ringed spaces M as the representable functor

hM: (rspaces)op → (sets), hM(T) = Hom(T, M)

hM is defined on the manifold as

hM(φ)(g) = g ○ φ

If the locally ringed space M is a differentiable manifold, then

Hom(M, N) ≅ Hom(C(N), C(M))

This takes us to the theory of Yoneda’s Lemma.

Let C be a category, and let X, Y be objects in C and let hX: Cop → (sets) be the representable functors defined on the objects as hX(T) = Hom(T, X), and on the arrows as hX(φ)(ƒ) = ƒ . φ, for φ: T → S, ƒ ∈ Hom(T, X)

If F: Cop → (sets), then we have a one-to-one correspondence between sets:

{hX → F} ⇔ F(X)

The functor

h: C → Fun(Cop, (sets)), X ↦ hX,

is an equivalence of C with a full subcategory of functors. In particular, hX ≅ hY iff X ≅ Y and the natural transformations hX → hY are in one-to-one correspondence with the morphisms X → Y.

Two schemes (manifolds) are isomorphic iff their functors of points are isomorphic.

The advantages of using the functorial language are many. Morphisms of schemes are just maps between the sets of their A-points, respecting functorial properties. This often simplifies matters, allowing allowing for leaving the sheaves machinery in the background. The problem with such an approach, however, is that not all the functors from (schemes) to (sets) are the functors of points of a scheme, i.e., they are representable.

A functor F: (rings) → (sets) is of the form F(A) = Hom(Spec A, X) for a scheme X iff:

F is local or is a sheaf in Zariski Topology. This means that for each ring R and for every collection αi ∈ F(Rƒi), with (ƒi, i ∈ I) = R, so that αi and αj map to the same element in F(Rƒiƒj) ∀ i and j ∃ a unique element α ∈ F(R) mapping to each αi, and

F admits a cover by open affine subfunctors, which means that ∃ a family Ui of subfunctors of F, i.e. Ui(R) ⊂ F(R) ∀ R ∈ (rings), Ui = hSpec Ui, with the property that ∀ natural transformations ƒ: hSpec A  → F, the functors ƒ-1(Ui), defined as ƒ-1(Ui)(R) = ƒ-1(Ui(R)), are all representable, i.e. ƒ-1(Ui) = hVi, and the Vi form an open covering for Spec A.

This states the conditions we expect for F to be the functor of points of a scheme. Namely, locally, F must look like the functor of points of a scheme, moreover F must be a sheaf, i.e. F must have a gluing property that allows us to patch together the open affine cover.

# Hypostatic Abstraction. Thought of the Day 138.0

Hypostatic abstraction is linguistically defined as the process of making a noun out of an adjective; logically as making a subject out of a predicate. The idea here is that in order to investigate a predicate – which other predicates it is connected to, which conditions it is subjected to, in short to test its possible consequences using Peirce’s famous pragmatic maxim – it is necessary to posit it as a subject for investigation.

Hypostatic abstraction is supposed to play a crucial role in the reasoning process for several reasons. The first is that by making a thing out of a thought, it facilitates the possibility for thought to reflect critically upon the distinctions with which it operates, to control them, reshape them, combine them. Thought becomes emancipated from the prison of the given, in which abstract properties exist only as Husserlian moments, and even if prescission may isolate those moments and induction may propose regularities between them, the road for thought to the possible establishment of abstract objects and the relations between them seems barred. The object created by a hypostatic abstraction is a thing, but it is of course no actually existing thing, rather it is a scholastic ens rationis, it is a figment of thought. It is a second intention thought about a thought – but this does not, in Peirce’s realism, imply that it is necessarily fictitious. In many cases it may indeed be, but in other cases we may hit upon an abstraction having real existence:

Putting aside precisive abstraction altogether, it is necessary to consider a little what is meant by saying that the product of subjectal abstraction is a creation of thought. (…) That the abstract subject is an ens rationis, or creation of thought does not mean that it is a fiction. The popular ridicule of it is one of the manifestations of that stoical (and Epicurean, but more marked in stoicism) doctrine that existence is the only mode of being which came in shortly before Descartes, in concsequence of the disgust and resentment which progressive minds felt for the Dunces, or Scotists. If one thinks of it, a possibility is a far more important fact than any actuality can be. (…) An abstraction is a creation of thought; but the real fact which is important in this connection is not that actual thinking has caused the predicate to be converted into a subject, but that this is possible. The abstraction, in any important sense, is not an actual thought but a general type to which thought may conform.

The seemingly scepticist pragmatic maxim never ceases to surprise: if we take all possible effects we can conceive an object to have, then our conception of those effects is identical with our conception of that object, the maxim claims – but if we can conceive of abstract properties of the objects to have effects, then they are part of our conception of it, and hence they must possess reality as well. An abstraction is a possible way for an object to behave – and if certain objects do in fact conform to this behavior, then that abstraction is real; it is a ‘real possibility’ or a general object. If not, it may still retain its character of possibility. Peirce’s definitions of hypostatic abstractions now and then confuse this point. When he claims that

An abstraction is a substance whose being consists in the truth of some proposition concerning a more primary substance,

then the abstraction’s existence depends on the truth of some claim concerning a less abstract substance. But if the less abstract substance in question does not exist, and the claim in question consequently will be meaningless or false, then the abstraction will – following that definition – cease to exist. The problem is only that Peirce does not sufficiently clearly distinguish between the really existing substances which abstractive expressions may refer to, on the one hand, and those expressions themselves, on the other. It is the same confusion which may make one shuttle between hypostatic abstraction as a deduction and as an abduction. The first case corresponds to there actually existing a thing with the quality abstracted, and where we consequently may expect the existence of a rational explanation for the quality, and, correlatively, the existence of an abstract substance corresponding to the supposed ens rationis – the second case corresponds to the case – or the phase – where no such rational explanation and corresponding abstract substance has yet been verified. It is of course always possible to make an abstraction symbol, given any predicate – whether that abstraction corresponds to any real possibility is an issue for further investigation to estimate. And Peirce’s scientific realism makes him demand that the connections to actual reality of any abstraction should always be estimated (The Essential Peirce):

every kind of proposition is either meaningless or has a Real Secondness as its object. This is a fact that every reader of philosophy should carefully bear in mind, translating every abstractly expressed proposition into its precise meaning in reference to an individual experience.

This warning is directed, of course, towards empirical abstractions which require the support of particular instances to be pragmatically relevant but could hardly hold for mathematical abstraction. But in any case hypostatic abstraction is necessary for the investigation, be it in pure or empirical scenarios.