Game Theory and Finite Strategies: Nash Equilibrium Takes Quantum Computations to Optimality.


Finite games of strategy, within the framework of noncooperative quantum game theory, can be approached from finite chain categories, where, by finite chain category, it is understood a category C(n;N) that is generated by n objects and N morphic chains, called primitive chains, linking the objects in a specific order, such that there is a single labelling. C(n;N) is, thus, generated by N primitive chains of the form:

x0 →f1 x1 →f2 x1 → … xn-1 →fn xn —– (1)

A finite chain category is interpreted as a finite game category as follows: to each morphism in a chain xi-1 →fi xi, there corresponds a strategy played by a player that occupies the position i, in this way, a chain corresponds to a sequence of strategic choices available to the players. A quantum formal theory, for a finite game category C(n;N), is defined as a formal structure such that each morphic fundament fi of the morphic relation xi-1 →fi xis a tuple of the form:

fi := (Hi, Pi, Pˆfi) —– (2)

where Hi is the i-th player’s Hilbert space, Pi is a complete set of projectors onto a basis that spans the Hilbert space, and Pˆfi ∈ Pi. This structure is interpreted as follows: from the strategic Hilbert space Hi, given the pure strategies’ projectors Pi, the player chooses to play Pˆfi .

From the morphic fundament (2), an assumption has to be made on composition in the finite category, we assume the following tensor product composition operation:

fj ◦ fi = fji —– (3)

fji = (Hji = Hj ⊗ Hi, Pji = Pj ⊗ Pi, Pˆfji = Pˆfj ⊗ Pˆfi) —– (4)

From here, a morphism for a game choice path could be introduced as:

x0 →fn…21 xn —– (5)

fn…21 = (HG = ⊗i=n1 Hi, PG = ⊗i=n1 Pi, Pˆ fn…21 = ⊗i=n1fi) —– (6)

in this way, the choices along the chain of players are completely encoded in the tensor product projectors Pˆfn…21. There are N = ∏i=1n dim(Hi) such morphisms, a number that coincides with the number of primitive chains in the category C(n;N).

Each projector can be addressed as a strategic marker of a game path, and leads to the matrix form of an Arrow-Debreu security, therefore, we call it game Arrow-Debreu projector. While, in traditional financial economics, the Arrow-Debreu securities pay one unit of numeraire per state of nature, in the present game setting, they pay one unit of payoff per game path at the beginning of the game, however this analogy may be taken it must be addressed with some care, since these are not securities, rather, they represent, projectively, strategic choice chains in the game, so that the price of a projector Pˆfn…21 (the Arrow-Debreu price) is the price of a strategic choice and, therefore, the result of the strategic evaluation of the game by the different players.

Now, let |Ψ⟩ be a ket vector in the game’s Hilbert space HG, such that:

|Ψ⟩ = ∑fn…21 ψ(fn…21)|(fn…21⟩ —– (7)

where ψ(fn…21) is the Arrow-Debreu price amplitude, with the condition:

fn…21 |ψ(fn…21)|2 = D —– (8)

for D > 0, then, the |ψ(fn…21)|corresponds to the Arrow-Debreu prices for the game path fn…21 and D is the discount factor in riskless borrowing, defining an economic scale for temporal connections between one unit of payoff now and one unit of payoff at the end of the game, such that one unit of payoff now can be capitalized to the end of the game (when the decision takes place) through a multiplication by 1/D, while one unit of payoff at the end of the game can be discounted to the beginning of the game through multiplication by D.

In this case, the unit operator, 1ˆ = ∑fn…21 Pˆfn…21 has a similar profile as that of a bond in standard financial economics, with ⟨Ψ|1ˆ|Ψ⟩ = D, on the other hand, the general payoff system, for each player, can be addressed from an operator expansion:

πiˆ = ∑fn…21 πi (fn…21) Pˆfn…21 —– (9)

where each weight πi(fn…21) corresponds to quantities associated with each Arrow-Debreu projector that can be interpreted as similar to the quantities of each Arrow-Debreu security for a general asset. Multiplying each weight by the corresponding Arrow-Debreu price, one obtains the payoff value for each alternative such that the total payoff for the player at the end of the game is given by:

⟨Ψ|1ˆ|Ψ⟩ = ∑fn…21 πi(fn…21) |ψ(fn…21)|2/D —– (10)

We can discount the total payoff to the beginning of the game using the discount factor D, leading to the present value payoff for the player:

PVi = D ⟨Ψ|πiˆ|Ψ⟩ = D ∑fn…21 π (fn…21) |ψ(fn…21)|2/D —– (11)

, where π (fn…21) represents quantities, while the ratio |ψ(fn…21)|2/D represents the future value at the decision moment of the quantum Arrow- Debreu prices (capitalized quantum Arrow-Debreu prices). Introducing the ket

|Q⟩ ∈ HG, such that:

|Q⟩ = 1/√D |Ψ⟩ —– (12)

then, |Q⟩ is a normalized ket for which the price amplitudes are expressed in terms of their future value. Replacing in (11), we have:

PVi = D ⟨Q|πˆi|Q⟩ —– (13)

In the quantum game setting, the capitalized Arrow-Debreu price amplitudes ⟨fn…21|Q⟩ become quantum strategic configurations, resulting from the strategic cognition of the players with respect to the game. Given |Q⟩, each player’s strategic valuation of each pure strategy can be obtained by introducing the projector chains:

Cˆfi = ∑fn…i+1fi-1…1 Pˆfn…i+1 ⊗ Pˆfi ⊗ Pˆfi-1…1 —– (14)

with ∑fi Cˆfi = 1ˆ. For each alternative choice of the player i, the chain sums over all of the other choice paths for the rest of the players, such chains are called coarse-grained chains in the decoherent histories approach to quantum mechanics. Following this approach, one may introduce the pricing functional from the expression for the decoherence functional:

D (fi, gi : |Q⟩) = ⟨Q| Cˆfi Cgi|Q⟩  —– (15)

we, then have, for each player

D (fi, gi : |Q⟩) = 0, ∀ fi ≠ gi —– (16)

this is the usual quantum mechanics’ condition for an aditivity of measure (also known as decoherence condition), which means that the capitalized prices for two different alternative choices of player i are additive. Then, we can work with the pricing functional D(fi, fi :|Q⟩) as giving, for each player an Arrow-Debreu capitalized price associated with the pure strategy, expressed by fi. Given that (16) is satisfied, each player’s quantum Arrow-Debreu pricing matrix, defined analogously to the decoherence matrix from the decoherent histories approach, is a diagonal matrix and can be expanded as a linear combination of the projectors for each player’s pure strategies as follows:

Di (|Q⟩) = ∑fi D(fi, f: |Q⟩) Pˆfi —– (17)

which has the mathematical expression of a mixed strategy. Thus, each player chooses from all of the possible quantum computations, the one that maximizes the present value payoff function with all the other strategies held fixed, which is in agreement with Nash.

6 thoughts on “Game Theory and Finite Strategies: Nash Equilibrium Takes Quantum Computations to Optimality.

  1. Due to your posts with math that I have understood, I feel like I would appreciate the meaning of the ones that I am unable to understand due to the math-speak. Are you interested in being able to take the math-form and translate it for non-math-minded people ? 🙂

    But the question i was going to ask you I honk I asked you before but I couldn’t phrase it’s well enough:

    Is there a way to mathematically classify what is common to a set of outliers? Is there a way to analyze a set of outliers to their commonality to thus be able to speak of them in a way that excludes its correlative counterpart while communicating the situation of outliers as outliers, as a cardinal set in itself, non-dependent, so to speak? Does that make sense?

  2. …. is there a mathematical way to show a correlation of outliers to themselves, In the same way that statistically significant data are correlational, but to themselves as outliers ?

    Am I getting closer at communicating what I mean ?

      • Thanks. I looked it over. Perhaps I am
        Using the wrong lanaguage.

        Maybe you can help me with the situation.

        Say for example I am measuring the numbers of birds flying south and where they end up. I chart 97% confidence. My conclusion. Is that birds fly to X. But what about the set of birds that didn’t fly to X ?

      • Extreme outliers will affect the mean a lot, but will not affect the median. So you can include outliers (if there is no other compelling reason to remove them) if you are computing a median, or a mode. But, if an outlier is too extreme to be believable, such as being likely due to measurement error, then it is best to exclude it. If the outlier is plausible, it may be best to analyze the data both with and without the outliers. In your cited case, your confidence level is extremely high (97% as against 3%) and so one could be safely removed, and if not, it then perhaps fall into the domain of Navier-Stokes’ Theorem. On adding flesh to the bones, in logistic regression, it can be useful to show the risk factors that predict them. But including outliers in the data may also mask the effect of predictors on less-extreme data that are not outliers. In linear regression, outliers can greatly affect the regression.

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