“The Conceptual Penis as a Social Construct”: Sokal-Like Hoax Returns to Test Academic Left’s Moral (Architecture + Orthodox Gender Studies) and Cripples It.


Destructive, unsustainable hegemonically male approaches to pressing environmental policy and action are the predictable results of a raping of nature by a male-dominated mindset. This mindset is best captured by recognizing the role of [sic] the conceptual penis holds over masculine psychology. When it is applied to our natural environment, especially virgin environments that can be cheaply despoiled for their material resources and left dilapidated and diminished when our patriarchal approaches to economic gain have stolen their inherent worth, the extrapolation of the rape culture inherent in the conceptual penis becomes clear…….Toxic hypermasculinity derives its significance directly from the conceptual penis and applies itself to supporting neocapitalist materialism, which is a fundamental driver of climate change, especially in the rampant use of carbon-emitting fossil fuel technologies and careless domination of virgin natural environments. We need not delve deeply into criticisms of dialectic objectivism, or their relationships with masculine tropes like the conceptual penis to make effective criticism of (exclusionary) dialectic objectivism. All perspectives matter.

The androcentric scientific and meta-scientific evidence that the penis is the male reproductive organ is considered overwhelming and largely uncontroversial.”

That’s how we began. We used this preposterous sentence to open a “paper” consisting of 3,000 words of utter nonsense posing as academic scholarship. Then a peer-reviewed academic journal in the social sciences accepted and published it.

This paper should never have been published. Titled, “The Conceptual Penis as a Social Construct,” our paper “argues” that “The penis vis-à-vis maleness is an incoherent construct. We argue that the conceptual penis is better understood not as an anatomical organ but as a gender-performative, highly fluid social construct.” As if to prove philosopher David Hume’s claim that there is a deep gap between what is and what ought to be, our should-never-have-been-published paper was published in the open-access (meaning that articles are freely accessible and not behind a paywall), peer-reviewed journal Cogent Social Sciences.

Assuming the pen names “Jamie Lindsay” and “Peter Boyle,” and writing for the fictitious “Southeast Independent Social Research Group,” we wrote an absurd paper loosely composed in the style of post-structuralist discursive gender theory. The paper was ridiculous by intention, essentially arguing that penises shouldn’t be thought of as male genital organs but as damaging social constructions. We made no attempt to find out what “post-structuralist discursive gender theory” actually means. We assumed that if we were merely clear in our moral implications that maleness is intrinsically bad and that the penis is somehow at the root of it, we could get the paper published in a respectable journal.

This already damning characterization of our hoax understates our paper’s lack of fitness for academic publication by orders of magnitude. We didn’t try to make the paper coherent; instead, we stuffed it full of jargon (like “discursive” and “isomorphism”), nonsense (like arguing that hypermasculine men are both inside and outside of certain discourses at the same time), red-flag phrases (like “pre-post-patriarchal society”), lewd references to slang terms for the penis, insulting phrasing regarding men (including referring to some men who choose not to have children as being “unable to coerce a mate”), and allusions to rape (we stated that “manspreading,” a complaint levied against men for sitting with their legs spread wide, is “akin to raping the empty space around him”). After completing the paper, we read it carefully to ensure it didn’t say anything meaningful, and as neither one of us could determine what it is actually about, we deemed it a success.

Why did Boghossian and Lindsay do this?

Sokal exposed an infatuation with academic puffery that characterizes the entire project of academic postmodernism. Our aim was smaller yet more pointed. We intended to test the hypothesis that flattery of the academic Left’s moral architecture in general, and of the moral orthodoxy in gender studies in particular, is the overwhelming determiner of publication in an academic journal in the field. That is, we sought to demonstrate that a desire for a certain moral view of the world to be validated could overcome the critical assessment required for legitimate scholarship. Particularly, we suspected that gender studies is crippled academically by an overriding almost-religious belief that maleness is the root of all evil. On the evidence, our suspicion was justified.

In the words of Graham Harman,

We kind of deserve it. There is still far too much empty jargon of this sort in the humanities and social sciences fields. Quite aside from whether or not you find the jargon off-putting, it leads to very bad writing, and when writing sounds bad it’s a much more serious sign of bad thinking than most people realize. (Nietzsche was on to this a long time ago, when he said that the only way to improve you writing is to improve your thoughts. Methodologically, I find the converse to be true as well. It is through trying to make your thoughts more readable that you make them better thoughts.) And again, I was one of the few people in the environs of continental philosophy who deeply enjoyed the original Sokal hoax. Until we stop writing (and thinking) like this, we will be repeatedly targeted by such hoaxes, and they will continue to sneak through. We ought to be embarrassed by this, and ought to ask ourselves some tough questions about our disciplinary norms, rather than pretending to be outraged at the “unethical behavior” of the hoax authors.

Endless turf war….

The authors worry that gender studies folk will believe that, “…men do often suffer from machismo braggadocio, and that there is an isomorphism between these concepts via some personal toxic hypermasculine conception of their penises.” But I don’t really see why a gender studies academic wouldn’t believe this… This is NOT a case of cognitive dissonance.

As much as the authors like to pretend like they have “no idea” what they are talking about, they clearly do. They are taking existing gender study ideas and just turning up the volume and adding more jargon. As if this proves a point against the field.

The author’s biases are on their sleeve. Their arguments are about as effective as a Men’s Rights Activist on Reddit. By using a backhanded approach in an attempt to give a coup de grace to gender studies academaniacs, all they’ve done is blow $625 and “exposed” the already well known issue of pay-to-play. If they wanted to make an actual case against the “feminazis” writ large, I suggest they “man” up and actually make a real argument rather than show a bunch of fancy words can fool some people. Ah!, but far from being a meta-analytical multiplier of defense, quantum homeomorphism slithers through the conceptual penis!

Phantom Originary Intentionality: Thought of the Day 16.0


Phantom limbs and anosognosias – cases of abnormal impressions of the presence or absence of parts of our body – seem like handy illustrations of an irreducible, first-person dimension of experience, of the sort that will delight the phenomenologist, who will say: aha! there is an empirical case of self-reference which externalist, third-person explanations of the type favoured by deflationary materialists, cannot explain away, cannot do away with. As Merleau-Ponty would say, and Varela after him, there is something about my body which makes it irreducibly my own (le corps propre). Whether illusory or not, such images (phantoms) have something about them such that we perceive them as our own, not someone else’s (well, some agnosias are different: thinking our paralyzed limb is precisely someone else’s, often a relative’s). One might then want to insist that phantom limbs testify to the transcendence of mental life! Indeed, in one of the more celebrated historical cases of phantom limb syndrome, Lord Horatio Nelson, having lost his right arm in a sea battle off of Tenerife, suffered from pains in his phantom hand. Most importantly, he apparently declared that this phantom experience was a “direct proof of the existence of the soul”. Although the materialist might agree with the (reformed) phenomenologist to reject dualism and accept that we are not in our bodies like a sailor in a ship, she might not want to go and declare, as Merleau-Ponty does, that “the mind does not use the body, but fulfills itself through it while at the same time transferring the body outside of physical space.” This way of talking goes back to the Husserlian distinction between Korper, ‘body’ in the sense of one body among others in a vast mechanistic universe of bodies, and Leib, ‘flesh’ in the sense of a subjectivity which is the locus of experience. Now, granted, in cognitivist terms one would want to say that a representation is always my representation, it is not ‘transferable’ like a neutral piece of information, since the way an object appear to me is always a function of my needs and interests. What my senses tell me at any given time relies on my interests as an agent and is determined by them, as described by Andy Clark, who appeals to the combined research traditions of the psychology of perception, new robotics, and Artificial Life. But the phenomenologist will take off from there and build a full-blown defense of intentionality, now recast as ‘motor intentionality’, a notion which goes back to Husserl’s claim in Ideas II that the way the body relates to the external world is crucially through “kinestheses”: all external motions which we perceive are first of all related to kinesthetic sensations, out of which we constitute a sense of space. On this view, our body thus already displays ‘originary intentionality’ in how it relates to the world.

Lyotard and Disruption at the Limits of Reason


Delegitimation shook the centric stronghold of authority and legitimacy, while dedifferentiation sought out to shake the foundations of hitherto known differences between centers and margins by erosive action within these differences themselves.

Initially, Lyotard made an attempt to fuse the Freudian libido, the fictional/theoretical energy with philosophy, through which he understated the transformations wrought out in the social-political realm, that he managed to free himself of the totalizing aspect of Marxism. His commitment to ontology of events that mingles with the multiplicities of forces and desires at work in any social, political and economic scenarios.

Lyotard’s main thesis revolves around the fact that representations always lag behind events, and this is where he tries to establish the relationship between reason and representation. He has always doubted reason’s efficacy for it operates within the confines of structures, wherein sensual perceptions and psychological factors like emotions and sentiments are always ostracized. The fact of the matter is that one could never work with reasons with such factors stringently kept aside. What is discursive is reason and representation, and what is figural is rational representation. The figural is what encompasses sensual perceptions and psychological factors like emotions and sentiments. Furthermore, he gets metaphorical with flatness and depth mapping onto discourse and the figural respectively. Subsequently, what is aimed at is the deconstruction of the two categories of discourse and figural that happen to be opposites, since, doing this would break the shackles of logic of discourse and strip the status of prerogativeness from discourse. With difference corresponding to the figural, the difference between discourse and figural is measured in difference rather than in opposition. What distinguishes difference from opposition is that in the former, the binary is characterized by strict opposites, whereas in the latter, two terms in the binary are mutually implicated, but ultimately irreconcilable. Disruption at the limits of reason is what characterizes difference implying that no rational system of representation can ever enjoy the status of being closed or complete, and cannot escape the impacts of the figural that it tries so hard to keep out.



For Žižek, we are not so much living in a post-ideological era as in an era dominated by the ideology of cynicism. Adapting from Marx and Sloterdijk, he sums up the cynical attitude as “they know that, in their activity, they are following an illusion, but still, they are doing it”. Ideology in this sense, is located in what we do and not in what we know. Our belief in an ideology is thus staged in advance of our acknowledging that belief in “belief machines”, such as Althusser’s Ideological State Apparatuses. It is “belief before belief.”

One of the questions Žižek asks about ideology is: what keeps an ideological field of meaning consistent? Given that signifiers are unstable and liable to slippages of meaning, how does an ideology maintain its consistency? The answer to this problem is that any given ideological field is “quilted” by what, following lacan, he terms a point de capiton (literally an “upholstery button” though it has also been translated as “anchoring point”). In the same way that an upholstery button pins down stuffing inside a quilt and stops it from moving about, Žižek argues that a point de capiton is a signifier which stops meaning from sliding about inside the ideological quilt. A point de capiton unifies an ideological field and provides it with an identity. Freedom, i.e, is in itself an open-ended word, the meaning of which can slide about depending on the context of its use. A right-wing interpretation of the word might use it to designate the freedom to speculate on the market, whereas a left-wing interpretation of it might use it designate freedom from the inequalities of the market. The word “freedom” therefore does not mean the same thing in all possible worlds: what pins its meaning down is the point de capiton of “right-wing” or “left-wing”. What is at issue in a conflict of ideologies is precisely the point de capiton – which signifier (“communism”, “fascism”, “capitalism”, “market economy” and so on) will be entitled to quilt the ideological field (“freedom”, “democracy”, Human rights” and so on).

Žižek distinguishes three moments in the narrative of an ideology.

1. Doctrine – ideological doctrine concerns the ideas and theories of an ideology, i.e. liberalism partly developed from the ideas of John Locke.

2. Belief – ideological belief designates the material or external manifestations and apparatuses of its doctrine, i.e. liberalism is materialized in an independent press, democratic elections and the free market.

3. Ritual – ideological ritual refers to the internalization of a doctrine, the way it is experienced as spontaneous, i.e in liberalism subjects naturally think of themselves as free individuals.

These three aspects of ideology form a kind of narrative. In the first stage of ideological doctrine we find ideology in its “pure” state. Here ideology takes the form of a supposedly truthful proposition or set of arguments which, in reality, conceal a vested interest. Locke’s arguments about government served the interest of the revolutionary Americans rather than the colonizing British. In a second step, a successful ideology takes on the material form which generates belief in that ideology, most potently in the guise of Althusser’s State Apparatuses. Third, ideology assumes an almost spontaneous existence, becoming instinctive rather than realized either as an explicit set of arguments or as an institution. the supreme example of such spontaneity is, for Žižek, the notion of commodity fetishism.

In each of these three moments – a doctrine, its materialization in the form of belief and its manifestation as spontaneous ritual – as soon as we think we have assumed a position of truth from which to denounce the lie of an ideology, we find ourselves back in ideology again. This is so because our understanding of ideology is based on a binary structure, which contrasts reality with ideology. To solve this problem, Žižek suggests that we analyze ideology using a ternary structure. So, how can we distinguish reality from ideology? From what position, for example, is Žižek able to denounce the New Age reading of the universe as ideological mystification? It is not from the position in reality because reality is constituted by the Symbolic and the Symbolic is where fiction assumes the guise of truth. The only non-ideological position available is in the Real – the Real of the antagonism. Now, that is not a position we can actually occupy; it is rather “the extraideological point of reference that authorizes us to denounce the content of our immediate experience as ‘ideological.'” (Mapping Ideology) The antagonism of the Real is a constant that has to be assumed given the existence of social reality (the Symbolic Order). As this antagonism is part of the Real, it is not subject to ideological mystification; rather its effect is visible in ideological mystification. Here, ideology takes the form of the spectral supplement to reality, concealing the gap opened up by the failure of reality (the Symbolic) to account fully for the Real. While this model of the structure of reality does not allow us a position from which to assume an objective viewpoint, it does presuppose the existence of ideology and thus authorizes the validity of its critique. The distinction between reality and ideology exists as a theoretical given. Žižek does not claim that he can offer any access to the “objective truth of things” but that ideology must be assumed to exist if we grant that reality is structured upon a constitutive antagonism. And if ideology exists we must be able to subject it to critique. This is the aim of Žižek’s theory of ideology, namely an attempt to keep the project of ideological critique alive at all in an era in which we are said to have left ideology behind.

Genomic analysis of family data reveals additional genetic effects on intelligence and personality

H/T West Hunter.


The rare variants that affect IQ will generally decrease IQ – and since pleiotropy is the norm, usually they’ll be deleterious in other ways as well. Genetic load.


But, considering what is now known about the biological origins of cognition and intelligence, it is generally difficult to take claims of discrimination seriously when underrepresented groups also display relatively lower intelligence profiles. However, in this case there is no reason to think that conservatives as a group have an intellectual profile below the general population. Social conservatives tend to be a little lower in intelligence relative to liberals, but free-market conservatives (libertarians) tend to be smarter than liberals. Being very partisan, either liberal or conservative, tends to be associated with high IQ as well. Increased income levels, which are a proxy for IQ, also moves people right ideologically. In other words, there is nothing that biologically determined intelligence can do to explain the lack of conservatives, and even moderates, in the humanities….Race Hustling /r/science


Morphology via Adaptive Mutations in Evolutionary Biology

Biologists in the tradition of Development Systems Theorists (DST) and Evodevo challenge the neo-Darwinian focus on genes as the sole agency defining development, as well as the inflationary claims of evolutionary psychologists. Instead, they argue for parity of explanation, treating genes, proteins, cells, and environment as forming a developmental system, where all factors contribute to what the phenotype would become. An important tenet of Evodevo biology is that adaptive mutations affecting morphology are more likely to occur in the cis-regulatory regions than in the protein-coding regions of genes. This argument rests on two claims: (1) the modular nature of cis-regulatory elements largely frees them from deleterious pleiotropic effects, and (2) a growing body of empirical evidence appears to support the predominant role of gene regulatory change in adaptation, especially morphological adaptation.


Psychological Approaches to Cognition and Rationality in Political Science

The theoretical basis of information processing in politics comes largely from psychologists studying other issues and from fields outside the realm of psychology. We assume that the task of translating available information into sets of focused, legally consistent beliefs, judgement and commitments is a subtle process, not at all a straightforward or an obvious issue, and furthermore, although political reasoning may take place largely outside a person’s awareness, political cognition is a very active mental process. Cognitive theories in politics are largely bent on understanding as to how people selectively attend to, interpret and organise information in ways that allow everyone to reach coherent understandings. For various reasons known or unknown to all of us now, such understandings may deviate substantially from the true set of affairs and from whatever mix of information or disinformation is available to be considered.

The two terms ‘belief’ and ‘system’ have been a familiar part of the language of attitude psychology for decades. Let us define ‘belief system’ in a three point structure:

  • a set of related beliefs, attitudes together
  • rules of how these contents of mind are linked to one another
  • linkages between the related beliefs and ideologies.

Now to model a belief system is an attempt to create an abstract representation of how someone’s set of related beliefs are formed, organised, maintained and modified.

In the cognition of psychology, or vice versa, a commonality of two terms is being used nowadays in the form of schemas and scripts with the former being the building blocks about peoples’ beliefs about the globe, and the latter being the working assemblages of those building blocks, with an adequate emphasis on sequences of actions involving various schematised objects. Scripts are our images of events routinely take place; events involve objects and activities for which schematic representations are available. For e.g., we might have a script of leadership in mixed age groups. Men routinely expect to exercise leadership over women and bristly at having to be subordinate, while women expect the same status differentiation and fear the wrath of others if women acquire leadership responsibilities. This hypothesised script incorporates schemas about the nature of leadership, about gender differences and about emotions such as resentment and fear. Just as schemas organise our understanding of concepts and objects, scripts organise our understanding about about activities and events  that involve and link those objects and concepts.

Much of the modern social psychology is concerned with the attribution processes. These refer to subjective connections people make between cause and effect. Attribution processes, by their nature involve going beyond the ‘information given’ in the direct observation of events. They are inferential process that allow us to understand what we think are the meaningful causes, observations and motivations underlying the observable behaviour directly. they are the central elements of the broader constructive processes through which people find meaning in ongoing events. Regardless of how well our attributive reasoning corresponds with objective reality, attribution process provide us with an enhanced sense of confidence that we understand what is going on around us. two kinds of attributive processes are heuristics and biases, when the former can be considered as mental short-cuts, by which one is able to circumvent the tediousness of logically exhaustive reasoning, or to fill in lacunae in our knowledge base and reach conclusions that make sense to our already made up assumptions.

Biases can be thought of as tendencies to come to some kind of conclusions more often than others. We have to often take the short cut of relying on representations of some bit of information, while ignoring other factors that also should be taken into account. We have to attach probabilities. Suppose a foreign service analyst anted to know whether a move by a foreign government to increase security at border was part of a larger plan to prepare for a surprise military attack across the border. the cue for the analyst is border clampdown; one possible meaning is that a military invasion is about to begin. The analyst must decide how likely it is. If the analyst uses the representativeness heuristic, she would decide how typical a border crackdown is as a early sign of a coming invasion. The more typically she feels the border clampdown is a sign of coming invasion, the more credibility she would attach to that interpretation of the change. In fact, representativeness, the degree to which some cue resembles or fits as part of the typical form of an interpretation, is an important and a legitimate aspect of assessing probabilities. The representativeness of heuristic however is the tendency to ignore other relevant information and thereby overemphasise the role of representativeness. Representativeness is one of the most prominently and actively investigated cognitive heuristics. Of course in most real life settings it cannot be proven that we credit or blame the actor too much for her behaviour or consequences. However, in carefully designed experiments in which hapless actors obviously have very little control over what happens to them, observers nonetheless hold the actors responsible for their actions and circumstances.

Now moving on to integrative complexity, it is a combination of two distinct mental activities, differentiation and integration. Differentiation refers to person’s recognition of multiple issues or facets in thinking about a political problem. Undifferentiated thinking occurs when an individual sees a problem as involving very few distinct issues, or that all of the issues nearly lead to the same conclusion. Differentiating one’s understanding of political situation gives one a better grasp on that situation, but it can cause difficulties too. different aspects of a political problem may contradict each other or may lead to contradictory actions. differentiating a problem can also lead a decision maker to the discovery that she really does not have a full grasp on the relevant information, which can be an unpleasant awareness, especially when decisions are to made immediately.

Integration on the other hand refers to the careful consideration of the relationships among parts of the problem. as a political actor formulates opinions and possible choices, integrated thinking allows the person to see how various courses of action may lead to contradictory outcomes, how goals might be well set by actions that violate one’s presuppositions or outcomes. Integration moves the thinker away from all or nothing oversimplification of issues. thus it improves the chances for political compromise, the heart of successful diplomacy. furthermore, by opening up the eyes of the decision maker to the complex interconnections of many political problems, it enables her to anticipate the complicated consequences that may follow from her choices. Obviously, high levels of integration can occur when an individual or a group has successfully differentiated the various issues involved in a problem. without the identification of the issue, there is nothing to integrate. however, simple awareness of all of the potentially conflicting aspects of a problem does not guarantee that a decision maker will pull these elements meaningfully. On can recognise any number of ambiguous qualifications, contradictions and non-sequitors, yet ignore most of them in deciding what to believe and what to do. Thus integration requires differentiation, but generally vice versa does not follow.

Integrating complexity may affect the careers of political leaders. It may also help shape the outcome of entire political and military conflicts, not just the future carer of leaders. For e.g., intense diplomatic activity between the US and the USSR averted a potential WW3, which arose in 1962 when the US objected to the Soviet missile deployment in Cuba. Taking the above case, it was hypothesised that in very complex political situations, highly integrated thinking is necessary in order for leaders to discover the availability and superiority of non-military solutions.

Everyone knows that attitudes about a political problem influence our political actions. Exceptions are there, but people usually act in ways that further their beliefs avoid acting in ways that contradict their beliefs. We no longer claim that the causal link from beliefs to behaviour is simple; instead, attention is now directed towards understanding the complex and subtle ways in which beliefs influence decision-making. General beliefs are considered to be less general in predicting actions such as voting behaviour. Some also maintain that general beliefs are important influences on specific actions, though the influence is not a direct cause-effect link. Instead, general beliefs produce subtle tendencies to favour some interpretation of events over other plausible interpretations, and to favour some general styles of political action over others when choosing a specific political action. Talking of political actor’s operational code, there are diagnostic propensities which are tendencies to interpret ambiguous events in some ways rather that in others, to search for certain kinds of information rather than others, and to exaggerate or ignore the probable role of chance and uncontrollable events. For eg. one national leader may immediately look for the hostile intentions behind any important diplomatic move on the part of arrival nation. Such a person would search for other evidence confirming his or her initial presumption, by contrast, another leader might be aware that the rival nation has severe internal problems, and presume that any important foreign policy initiatives from that nation are attempts to distract its citizens from those problems. Choice propensities are tendencies to prefer certain modes of political action to others. Diagnostic propensities are the expressions in political reasoning of leader’s general views about how to act effectively in political arena.

Politics in its very essence is an impersonal activity. The vast bulk of political planning, commitment and actions take place among groups of people, whether these people come together to pool resources, squabble, or negotiate compromises among their conflicting group interests. What is then the psychology of rationality in political groups? But groups are different. Groups do not negate the picture about the nature of political cognition; they complicate it instead. Groups themselves do not think. It is still the individual people who share or hide their personal beliefs and goals.

What is a camel?
It’s a horse driven by a committee.

This old joke is a cynical comment on the creativity of committees. It is easy to point to mediocre decisions made by groups, but there is a more serious problem than middling decisions. Groups are capable of profoundly bad decisions. Some of the worst decisions in world history were made by groups that would seem to have been assembled in producing rational, creative policies and judgments.

What characteristics make groups particularly susceptible to poor decisions? First and foremost, the group is highly cohesive. Group members know, trust and like each other; they often share common or similar histories; they enjoy being part of the group and value working in it. Second, the group isolates itself from possible influencing of the others. A strong sense of identification with the group leads to lost ties with others who might have some valuable information to share. Third, the group lacks any systematic way of doing things. without formal guidelines for procedure, agenda decisions are made casually and are subject to influences that cut full deliberations. Fourth, the leader of such groups tend to be directive. Fifth, the group is experiencing stress, with a sense of urgency about some crises in which acting quickly seems critical. The choice may be among some unpleasant activities, the available information may be very confusing and incomplete and the group members may be fatigued. Thus solidarity, isolation, sloppy procedures and directive leadership in a stressful situation make some groups vulnerable to groupthink. Two features describe groupthink. First set contains working assumptions and styles of interacting that group members carry with them into the work setting. The second set features describe faulty deliberations as the group sets about its task. The group members lack adequate contingency plans to be prepared for quick response if the preferred course of action does not work as the group hopes and believes it will.

To avoid groupthink, first the leader of the group should actively encourage dissent; she should make it known that dissenting opinions are valued and they are valued not just for variety’s sake but because that they may be right. Second, the leader should avoid letting her own initials be known. Third, parallel subgroups can be set up early on to work separately on the same tasks. These subgroups will probably develop different assessments and plans, which can be brought to the whole group for consideration. This neatly disrupts the tendency of groups to focus on just option for the upcoming decision. A choice is rational if it follows certain careful procedures that lead to the selection of the course of action that offers the greatest expected value or benefit or utility for the chooser. The group members making a rational decision first identify the opportunity and need for a choice. They then identify every conceivable course of action available to them. They determine all possible consequences of each course of action available to them. They evaluate each possible consequence in terms of,

1) its likelihood of occurrence,
2) its value if it does occur.

Now the decision making group has a problem, and a set of possible solutions. This information is then distilled into a single choice by working backwards. The probability of each consequence is then multiplied by its value; the products of all consequences for each course of action are then added up. The resulting sums are the expected values of each possible consequence. The group then simply selects the option with the largest possible expected value (or smallest negative value if a choice is a no-win situation).

There is something called the posterior rationality, where the choice process is discovered after the choice is made. The world may be too unpredictable and complicated for most well intended plans to have much chance of success. If so, traditional rationality may be irrelevant as a model for complex organisations. However, goals and intentions can still be inferred in reverse, by reinterpreting earlier choices and redefining one’s original goals.

In conclusion, political actors, groups and institutions such as governments do not simply observe and understand political circumstances in some automatic fashion that accurately captures true political realities. Political realities are for most part social constructions and the construing process is built on the philosophy and psychology of human cognition. Political cognition like any other cognition is extremely complex. It is easy enough to find examples of poor political judgments: the wonder may be that politics often seems to be rational, given all the challenges and limitations. To the extent that we can find a sense of coherence in politics and government, we should acknowledge the importance of the social construction process in shaping that coherence. Although political activists devote much more time to the political agenda than does the average citizen, still they rely on the same cognitive resources and procedures and hence are subject to the same biases and distortions as any thinking person.