Margin Calls – Note Quote.

5220-Industrial-Commercial-services-City-Texture

Unlike FOREX margin, which is a single yet dynamic figure that constantly fluctuates based on the notional value of the contracts being traded, futures margin is relatively static. Although the exchange and brokerage firms have the right to increase, or decrease, margin requirements at any time, changes are typically infrequent.

The premise of margin is to mitigate risk exposure to the exchange and brokerage firms by ensuring that traders have enough funds on deposit to cover losses that might reasonably be seen within a trading session. Accordingly, futures exchanges set margin rates based on current market volatility and not necessarily the nominal value of the contract, which is the dominant method in FOREX. Nominal value is the total worth of the currency contract when leverage is eliminated. However, as the nominal value increases, the futures exchanges tend to increase margin simply because, at higher prices, currencies tend to see larger price moves and expose traders to additional risk.

When traders refer to their futures margin requirement, they are referring to the initial margin. In other words, “initial margin” and “margin” are often used synonymously. In detail, initial margin is the amount of capital the exchange requires a trader to have on deposit to hold a given currency futures contract beyond the close of trade on the session the order was executed. For example, if the initial margin for a standard-sized Euro futures contract is $5,400, a trader should have at least this much in a trading account to execute a trade that is intended to be held overnight. Day traders are not necessarily subject to the same requirements.

The minimum account balance that must be maintained at the close of trade to avoid a margin call is known as the maintenance margin. Futures exchanges typically set the maintenance margin at about 70% to 80% of the initial margin. Should an account balance dip below the maintenance margin requirement, as measured by the close of trade on any particular day, a margin call is generated and the trader is required to bring the account back above the initial margin. This can be done through position liquidation, adding funds to the trading account, or even mitigating margin using option hedges. Once an official margin call is triggered, it is no longer enough to bring the equity above the maintenance margin level; the account must meet the initial margin. A margin call is triggered only if the account is in violation at the close of a trading session. At any point intraday, it is nearly irrelevant. Therefore, it is quite possible for an account to experience a margin deficit in the middle of the trading day only to be off the hook by the close of trade, and vice versa. This differs from FOREX, where traders are commonly issued intraday margin calls. This is because their margin requirement is being consistently measured as opposed to solely at the end of the trading day, as is the protocol in futures.

Margin calls state account details such as open positions, required initial and maintenance margin, the margin deficiency, and current account value. In addition to a formal notice, brokerage firms display margin call details on the trader’s daily statements, including the number of days the margin call has been active. Futures brokers typically give traders two or three days to eliminate a margin call on their own accord, but each brokerage firm is different. Deep-discount brokers tend to be much less lenient when it comes to margin calls and forced account liquidation.

If a client goes one step beyond a simple margin call and is in danger of losing more than the funds on deposit, it is not uncommon for risk management clerks to force liquidate positions regardless of the brokerage firm and service type, and they have every right to do so.

If traders must have the initial margin on deposit to enter a trade, there are exceptions for those who enter a trade based on the premise of offsetting their risk and obligation by the end of that particular trading session. For those traders engaged in the practice of day trading, brokerage firms, and even individual brokers, will often negotiate a discounted margin rate offering more leverage than is granted to traders who are holding positions overnight. For the purpose of margin, day trading is any activity in which trades are entered and exited within a single trading session. In today’s world, the currency futures markets trade nearly 24 hours per day. Therefore, it is entirely possible for a trade to be entered in the evening, held overnight, and offset before the close of the day session to be treated as a “day trade.” Conversely, although this trade was held “overnight,” under the usual pretense of the phrase, both the entry and the exit occurred within a single trading session and, therefore, falls into the day-trading category in regard to margin.

Depending on a trader’s established relationship with his brokerage firm, or more importantly an individual broker, the margin charged on any intraday positions may be anywhere from 50% to 10% of the exchange’s stipulated overnight rate. Naturally, only those clients believed to be responsible enough to have access to excessively low margin requirements are awarded the privilege; irresponsible traders are viewed as a credit risk to the brokerage and might not be granted the same freedoms. This is similar to the threats posed by those with low credit scores to a credit card company. With that said, as a means of risk management implemented by brokerage firms, some platforms are now capable of automatically liquidating accounts in danger of losing more than what is currently deposited. In the case of auto-liquidation, brokers might extend even more lenient margin policies to day traders simply because the luxury of auto-liquidation mitigates risk to the firm. Similar to the way a trader analyzes the market in terms of risk and reward, brokerage firms assess clients on a risk/reward basis and proceed accordingly. Brokerage revenue is commission based; they want you to trade, but not if it isn’t worth the potential consequences.

Futures brokers who have auto-liquidate capabilities often ask clients to sign a disclosure statement acknowledging they are aware that positions might be offset without prior consent to the client if the account is deemed to be in danger of going negative, although they technically have the right to do so even without the agreement. A common practice among futures brokers is to strategically place a stop order at a price that would prevent the account from losing more than is on deposit. However, as futures traders become more and more self-directed, this courtesy is slowly becoming less popular simply because in some ways it poses additional risk and potential liability to the broker. For example, “unruly” clients can easily cancel a stop order placed on their behalf to prevent a debit balance, and brokers simply don’t have time to babysit accounts to ensure clients don’t do so. In addition, if a stop order is placed for a specific number of contracts and the trader reduces the size of the position without adjusting the stop order, he might attempt to hold the brokerage firm liable for any erroneously resulting trades.

BASEL III: The Deflationary Symbiotic Alliance Between Governments and Banking Sector. Thought of the Day 139.0

basel_reforms

The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) is steering the banks to deal with government debt, since the governments have been running large deficits to deal with the catastrophe of BASEL 2-inspired mortgaged-backed securities collapse. The deficits are ranged anywhere between 3 to 7 per cent of the GDP, and in cases even higher. These deficits were being used to create a floor under growth by stimulating the economy and bailing out financial institutions that got carried away by the wholesale funding of real estate. And this is precisely what BASEL 2 promulgated, i.e. encouraging financial institutions to hold mortgage-backed securities for investments.

In comes the BASEL 3 rules that implore than banks must be in compliance with these regulations. But, who gets to decide these regulations? Actually, banks do, since they then come on board for discussions with the governments, and such negotiations are catered to bail banks out with government deficits in order to oil the engine of economic growth. The logic here underlines the fact that governments can continue to find a godown of sorts for their deficits, while the banks can buy government debt without any capital commitment and make a good spread without the risk, thus serving the interests of the both parties involved mutually. Moreover, for the government, the process is political, as no government would find it acceptable to be objective in its viewership of letting a bubble deflate, because any process of deleveraging would cause the banks to offset their lending orgy, which is detrimental to the engineered economic growth. Importantly, without these deficits, the financial system could go down the deflationary spiral, which might turn out to be a difficult proposition to recover if there isn’t any complicity in rhyme and reason accorded to this particular dysfunctional and symbiotic relationship. So, whats the implication of all this? The more government debt banks hold, the less overall capital they need. And who says so? BASEL 3.

But, the mesh just seems to be building up here. In the same way that banks engineered counterfeit AAA-backed securities that were in fact an improbable financial hoax, how can countries that have government debt/GDP ratio to the tune of 90 – 120 per cent get a Standard&Poor’s ratings of a double-A? They have these ratings because they belong to a apical club that gives their members exclusive rights to a high rating even if they are irresponsible with their issuing of debts. Well, is that this simple? Yes and no. Yes, as is above, and no is merely clothing itself in a bit of an economic jargon, in that these are the countries where the government debt can be held without any capital against it. In other words, if a debt cannot be held, it cannot be issued, and that is the reason why countries are striving for issuing debts that have a zero weighting.

Let us take snippets across gradations of BASEL 1, 2 and 3. In BASEL 1, the unintended consequences were that banks were all buying equity in cross-owned companies. When the unwinding happened, equity just fell apart, since any beginning of a financial crisis is tailored to smash bank equities to begin with. Thats the first wound to rationality. In BASEL 2, banks were told to hold as much AAA-rated paper as they wanted with no capital against it. What happened if these ratings were downgraded? It would trigger a tsunami cutting through pension and insurance schemes to begin with forcing them to sell their papers and pile up huge losses meant to absorbed by capital, which doesn’t exist against these papers. So whatever gets sold is politically cushioned and buffered for by the governments, for the risks cannot be afforded to get any more denser as that explosion would sound the catastrophic death knell for the economy. BASEL 3 doesn’t really help, even if it mandated to hold a concentrated portfolio of government debt without any capital against it, for absorption of losses in case of a crisis hitting would have to exhumed through government bail-outs in scenarios where government debts are a century plus. So, are the banks in-stability, or given to more instability via BASEL 3?  The incentives to ever more hold government securities increase bank exposure to sovereign bonds, adding to existing exposure of government securities via repurchase transactions, investments and trading inventories. A ratings downgrade results in a fall in value of bonds triggering losses. Banks would then face calls for additional collateral, which would drain liquidity, and which would then require additional capital as way of compensation. where would this capital come in from, if not for the governments to source it? One way out would be recapitalization through government debt. On the other hand, the markets are required to hedge against the large holdings of government securities and so short stocks, currencies and insurance companies are all made to stare in the face of volatility that rips through them, of which the net resultant is falling liquidity. So, this vicious cycle would continue to cycle its way through any downgrades. And thats why the deflationary symbiotic alliance between the governments and banking sector isn’t anything more than high-fatigue tolerance….

Conjuncted: Balance of Payments in a Dirty Float System, or Why Central Banks Find It Ineligible to Conduct Independent Monetary Policies? Thought of the Day

Exchange_rate_arrangements_map

Screen Shot 2018-01-19 at 10.40.54 AM

If the rate of interest is partly a monetary phenomenon, money will have real effects working through variations in investment expenditure and the capital stock. Secondly, if there are unemployed resources, the impact of increases in the money supply will first be on output, and not on prices. It was, indeed, Keynes’s view expressed in his General Theory that throughout history the propensity to save has been greater than the propensity to invest, and that pervasive uncertainty and the desire for liquidity has in general kept the rate of interest too high. Given the prevailing economic conditions of the 1930s when Keynes was writing, it was no accident that he should have devoted part of the General Theory to a defence of mercantilism as containing important germs of truth:

What I want is to do justice to schools of thought which the classicals have treated as imbeciles for the last hundred years and, above all, to show that I am not really being so great an innovator, except as against the classical school, but have important predecessors, and am returning to an age-long tradition of common sense.

The mercantilists recognised, like Keynes, that the rate of interest is determined by monetary conditions, and that it could be too high to secure full employment, and in relation to the needs of growth. As Keynes put it in the General Theory:

mercantilist thought never supposed as later economists did [for example, Ricardo, and even Alfred Marshall] that there was a self-adjusting tendency by which the rate of interest would be established at the appropriate level [for full employment].

It was David Ricardo, in his The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, who accepted and developed Say’s law of markets that supply creates its own demand, and who for the first time expounded the theory of comparative advantage, which laid the early foundations for orthodox trade and growth theory that has prevailed ever since. Ricardian trade theory, however, is real theory relating to the reallocation of real resources through trade which ignores the monetary aspects of trade; that is, the balance between exports and imports as trade takes place. In other words, it ignores the balance of payments effects of trade that arises as a result of trade specialization, and the feedback effects that the balance of payments can have on the real economy. Moreover, continuous full employment is assumed because supply creates its own demand through variations in the real rate of interest. These aspects question the prevalence of Ricardian theory in orthodox trade and growth theory to a large extent in today’s scenario. But in relation to trade, as Keynes put it:

free trade assumes that if you throw men out of work in one direction you re-employ them in another. As soon as that link in the chain is broken the whole of the free trade argument breaks down.

In other words, the real income gains from specialization may be offset by the real income losses from unemployment. Now, suppose that payments deficits arise in the process of international specialization and the freeing of trade, and the rate of interest has to be raised to attract foreign capital inflows to finance them. Or suppose deficits cannot be financed and income has to be deflated to reduce imports. The balance of payments consequences of trade may offset the real income gains from trade.

This raises the question of why the orthodoxy ignores the balance of payments? There are several reasons, both old and new, that all relate to the balance of payments as a self-adjusting process, or simply as a mirror image of autonomous capital flows, with no income adjustment implied. Until the First World War, the mechanism was the gold standard. The balance of payments was supposed to be self-equilibrating because countries in surplus, accumulating gold, would lose competitiveness through rising prices (Hume’s quantity theory of money), and countries in deficit losing gold would gain competitiveness through falling prices. The balance of payments was assumed effectively to look after itself through relative price adjustments without any change in income or output. After the external gold standard collapsed in 1931, the theory of flexible exchange rates was developed, and it was shown that if the real exchange rate is flexible, and the so-called Marshall–Lerner condition is satisfied (i.e. the sum of the price elasticities of demand for exports and imports is greater than unity), the balance of payments will equilibrate; again, without income adjustment.

In modern theory, balance of payments deficits are assumed to be inherently temporary as the outcome of inter-temporal decisions by private agents concerning consumption. Deficits are the outcome of rational decisions to consume now and pay later. Deficits are merely a form of consumption smoothing, and present no difficulty for countries. And then there is the Panglossian view that the current account of the balance of payments is of no consequence at all because it simply reflects the desire of foreigners to invest in a country. Current account deficits should be seen as a sign of economic success, not as a weakness.

It is not difficult to question how balance of payments looks after itself, or does not have consequences for long-run growth. As far as the old gold standard mechanism is concerned, instead of the price levels of deficit and surplus countries moving in opposite directions, there was a tendency in the nineteenth century for the price levels of countries to move together in the same direction. In practice, it was not movements in relative prices that equilibrated the balance of payments but expenditure and output changes associated with interest rate differentials. Interest rates rose in deficit countries which deflated demand and output, and fell in surplus countries stimulating demand.

On the question of flexible exchange rates as an equilibrating device, a distinction first needs to be made between the nominal exchange rate and the real exchange rate. It is easy for countries to adjust the nominal rate, but not so easy to adjust the real rate because competitors may “price to market” or retaliate, and domestic prices may rise with a nominal devaluation. Secondly, the Marshall–Lerner condition then has to be satisfied for the balance of payments to equilibrate. This may not be the case in the short run, or because of the nature of goods exported and imported by a particular country. The international evidence over the past almost half a century years since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system suggests that exchange rate changes are not an efficient balance of payments adjustment weapon. Currencies appreciate and depreciate and still massive global imbalances of payments remain.

On the inter-temporal substitution effect, it is wrong to give the impression that inter-temporal shifts in consumption behaviour do not have real effects, particularly if interest rates have to rise to finance deficits caused by more consumption in the present if countries do not want their exchange rate to depreciate. On the view that deficits are a sign of success, an important distinction needs to be made between types of capital inflows. If the capital flows are autonomous, such as foreign direct investment, the argument is plausible, but if they are “accommodating” in the form of loans from the banking system or the sale of securities to foreign governments and international organizations, the probable need to raise interest rates will again have real effects by reducing investment and output domestically.

Synthetic Structured Financial Instruments. Note Quote.

Untitled

An option is common form of a derivative. It’s a contract, or a provision of a contract, that gives one party (the option holder) the right, but not the obligation to perform a specified transaction with another party (the option issuer or option writer) according to specified terms. Options can be embedded into many kinds of contracts. For example, a corporation might issue a bond with an option that will allow the company to buy the bonds back in ten years at a set price. Standalone options trade on exchanges or Over The Counter (OTC). They are linked to a variety of underlying assets. Most exchange-traded options have stocks as their underlying asset but OTC-traded options have a huge variety of underlying assets (bonds, currencies, commodities, swaps, or baskets of assets). There are two main types of options: calls and puts:

  • Call options provide the holder the right (but not the obligation) to purchase an underlying asset at a specified price (the strike price), for a certain period of time. If the stock fails to meet the strike price before the expiration date, the option expires and becomes worthless. Investors buy calls when they think the share price of the underlying security will rise or sell a call if they think it will fall. Selling an option is also referred to as ”writing” an option.
  • Put options give the holder the right to sell an underlying asset at a specified price (the strike price). The seller (or writer) of the put option is obligated to buy the stock at the strike price. Put options can be exercised at any time before the option expires. Investors buy puts if they think the share price of the underlying stock will fall, or sell one if they think it will rise. Put buyers – those who hold a “long” – put are either speculative buyers looking for leverage or “insurance” buyers who want to protect their long positions in a stock for the period of time covered by the option. Put sellers hold a “short” expecting the market to move upward (or at least stay stable) A worst-case scenario for a put seller is a downward market turn. The maximum profit is limited to the put premium received and is achieved when the price of the underlyer is at or above the option’s strike price at expiration. The maximum loss is unlimited for an uncovered put writer.

Coupon is the annual interest rate paid on a bond, expressed as percentage of the face value.

Coupon rate or nominal yield = annual payments ÷ face value of the bond

Current yield = annual payments ÷ market value of the bond

The reason for these terms to be briefed here through their definitions from investopedia lies in the fact that these happen to be pillars of synthetic financial instruments, to which we now take a detour.

According to the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), a synthetic instrument is a financial product designed, acquired, and held to emulate the characteristics of another instrument. For example, such is the case of a floating-rate long-term debt combined with an interest rate swap. This involves

  • Receiving floating payments
  • Making fixed payments, thereby synthesizing a fixed-rate long-term debt

Another example of a synthetic is the output of an option strategy followed by dealers who are selling synthetic futures for a commodity that they hold by using a combination of put and call options. By simultaneously buying a put option in a given commodity, say, gold, and selling the corresponding call option, a trader can construct a position analogous to a short sale in the commodity’s futures market.

Because the synthetic short sale seeks to take advantage of price disparities between call and put options, it tends to be more profitable when call premiums are greater than comparable put premiums. For example, the holder of a synthetic short future will profit if gold prices decrease and incur losses if gold prices increase.

By analogy, a long position in a given commodity’s call option combined with a short sale of the same commodity’s futures creates price protection that is similar to that gained through purchasing put options. A synthetic put seeks to capitalize on disparities between call and put premiums.

Basically, synthetic products are covered options and certificates characterized by identical or similar profit and loss structures when compared with traditional financial instruments, such as equities or bonds. Basket certificates in equities are based on a specific number of selected stocks.

A covered option involves the purchase of an underlying asset, such as equity, bond, currency, or other commodity, and the writing of a call option on that same asset. The writer is paid a premium, which limits his or her loss in the event of a fall in the market value of the underlying. However, his or her potential return from any increase in the asset’s market value is conditioned by gains limited by the option’s strike price.

The concept underpinning synthetic covered options is that of duplicating traditional covered options, which can be achieved by both purchase of the underlying asset and writing of the call option. The purchase price of such a product is that of the underlying, less the premium received for the sale of the call option.

Moreover, synthetic covered options do not contain a hedge against losses in market value of the underlying. A hedge might be emulated by writing a call option or by calculating the return from the sale of a call option into the product price. The option premium, however, tends to limit possible losses in the market value of the underlying.

Alternatively, a synthetic financial instrument is done through a certificate that accords a right, based on either a number of underlyings or on having a value derived from several indicators. This presents a sense of diversification over a range of risk factors. The main types are

  • Index certificates
  • Region certificates
  • Basket certificates

By being based on an official index, index certificates reflect a given market’s behavior. Region certificates are derived from a number of indexes or companies from a given region, usually involving developing countries. Basket certificates are derived from a selection of companies active in a certain industry sector.

An investment in index, region, or basket certificates fundamentally involves the same level of potential loss as a direct investment in the corresponding assets themselves. Their relative advantage is diversification within a given specified range; but risk is not eliminated. Moreover, certificates also carry credit risk associated to the issuer.

Also available in the market are compound financial instruments, a frequently encountered form being that of a debt product with an embedded conversion option. An example of a compound financial instrument is a bond that is convertible into ordinary shares of the issuer. As an accounting standard, the IFRS requires the issuer of such a financial instrument to present separately on the balance sheet the

  • Equity component
  • Liability component

On initial recognition, the fair value of the liability component is the present value of the contractually determined stream of future cash flows, discounted at the rate of interest applied at that time by the market to substantially similar cash flows. These should be characterized by practically the same terms, albeit without a conversion option. The fair value of the option comprises its

  • Time value
  • Intrinsic value (if any)

The IFRS requires that on conversion of a convertible instrument at maturity, the reporting company derecognizes the liability component and recognizes it as equity. Embedded derivatives are an interesting issue inasmuch as some contracts that themselves are not financial instruments may have financial instruments embedded in them. This is the case of a contract to purchase a commodity at a fixed price for delivery at a future date.

Contracts of this type have embedded in them a derivative that is indexed to the price of the commodity, which is essentially a derivative feature within a contract that is not a financial derivative. International Accounting Standard 39 (IAS 39) of the IFRS requires that under certain conditions an embedded derivative is separated from its host contract and treated as a derivative instrument. For instance, the IFRS specifies that each of the individual derivative instruments that together constitute a synthetic financial product represents a contractual right or obligation with its own terms and conditions. Under this perspective,

  • Each is exposed to risks that may differ from the risks to which other financial products are exposed.
  • Each may be transferred or settled separately.

Therefore, when one financial product in a synthetic instrument is an asset and another is a liability, these two do not offset each other. Consequently, they should be presented on an entity’s balance sheet on a net basis, unless they meet specific criteria outlined by the aforementioned accounting standards.

Like synthetics, structured financial products are derivatives. Many are custom-designed bonds, some of which (over the years) have presented a number of problems to their buyers and holders. This is particularly true for those investors who are not so versatile in modern complex instruments and their further-out impact.

Typically, instead of receiving a fixed coupon or principal, a person or company holding a structured note will receive an amount adjusted according to a fairly sophisticated formula. Structured instruments lack transparency; the market, however, seems to like them, the proof being that the amount of money invested in structured notes continues to increase. One of many examples of structured products is the principal exchange-rate-linked security (PERLS). These derivative instruments target changes in currency rates. They are disguised to look like bonds, by structuring them as if they were debt instruments, making it feasible for investors who are not permitted to play in currencies to place bets on the direction of exchange rates.

For instance, instead of just repaying principal, a PERLS may multiply such principal by the change in the value of the dollar against the euro; or twice the change in the value of the dollar against the Swiss franc or the British pound. The fact that this repayment is linked to the foreign exchange rate of different currencies sees to it that the investor might be receiving a lot more than an interest rate on the principal alone – but also a lot less, all the way to capital attrition. (Even capital protection notes involve capital attrition since, in certain cases, no interest is paid over their, say, five-year life cycle.)

Structured note trading is a concept that has been subject to several interpretations, depending on the time frame within which the product has been brought to the market. Many traders tend to distinguish between three different generations of structured notes. The elder, or first generation, usually consists of structured instruments based on just one index, including

  • Bull market vehicles, such as inverse floaters and cap floaters
  • Bear market instruments, which are characteristically more leveraged, an example being the superfloaters

Bear market products became popular in 1993 and 1994. A typical superfloater might pay twice the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) minus 7 percent for two years. At currently prevailing rates, this means that the superfloater has a small coupon at the beginning that improves only if the LIBOR rises. Theoretically, a coupon that is below current market levels until the LIBOR goes higher is much harder to sell than a big coupon that gets bigger every time rates drop. Still, bear plays find customers.

Second-generation structured notes are different types of exotic options; or, more precisely, they are yet more exotic than superfloaters, which are exotic enough in themselves. There exist serious risks embedded in these instruments, as such risks have never been fully appreciated. Second-generation examples are

  • Range notes, with embedded binary or digital options
  • Quanto notes, which allow investors to take a bet on, say, sterling London Interbank Offered Rates, but get paid in dollar.

There are different versions of such instruments, like you-choose range notes for a bear market. Every quarter the investor has to choose the “range,” a job that requires considerable market knowledge and skill. For instance, if the range width is set to 100 basis points, the investor has to determine at the start of the period the high and low limits within that range, which is far from being a straight job.

Surprisingly enough, there are investors who like this because sometimes they are given an option to change their mind; and they also figure their risk period is really only one quarter. In this, they are badly mistaken. In reality even for banks you-choose notes are much more difficult to hedge than regular range notes because, as very few people appreciate, the hedges are both

  • Dynamic
  • Imperfect

There are as well third-generation notes offering investors exposure to commodity or equity prices in a cross-category sense. Such notes usually appeal to a different class than fixed-income investors. For instance, third-generation notes are sometimes purchased by fund managers who are in the fixed-income market but want to diversify their exposure. In spite of the fact that the increasing sophistication and lack of transparency of structured financial instruments sees to it that they are too often misunderstood, and they are highly risky, a horde of equity-linked and commodity-linked notes are being structured and sold to investors. Examples are LIBOR floaters designed so that the coupon is “LIBOR plus”:

The pros say that flexibly structured options can be useful to sophisticated investors seeking to manage particular portfolio and trading risks. However, as a result of exposure being assumed, and also because of the likelihood that there is no secondary market, transactions in flexibly structured options are not suitable for investors who are not

  • In a position to understand the behavior of their intrinsic value
  • Financially able to bear the risks embedded in them when worst comes to worst

It is the price of novelty, customization, and flexibility offered by synthetic and structured financial instruments that can be expressed in one four-letter word: risk. Risk taking is welcome when we know how to manage our exposure, but it can be a disaster when we don’t – hence, the wisdom of learning ahead of investing the challenges posed by derivatives and how to be in charge of risk control.

Credit Bubbles. Thought of the Day 90.0

creditbubble

At the macro-economic level of the gross statistics of money and loan supply to the economy, the reserve banking system creates a complex interplay between money, debt, supply and demand for goods, and the general price level. Rather than being constant, as implied by theoretical descriptions, money and loan supplies are constantly changing at a rate dependent on the average loan period, and a complex of details buried in the implementation and regulation of any given banking system.

Since the majority of loans are made for years at a time, the results of these interactions play out over a long enough time scale that gross monetary features of regulatory failure, such as continuous asset price inflation, have come to be regarded as normal, e.g. ”House prices always go up”. The price level however is not only dependent on purely monetary factors, but also on the supply and demand for goods and services, including financial assets such as shares, which requires that estimates of the real price level versus production be used. As a simplification, if constant demand for goods and services is assumed as shown in the table below, then there are two possible causes of price inflation, either the money supply available to purchase the good in question has increased, or the supply of the good has been reduced. Critically, the former is simply a mathematical effect, whilst the latter is a useful signal, providing economic information on relative supply and demand levels that can be used locally by consumers and producers to adapt their behaviour. Purely arbitrary changes in both the money and the loan supply that are induced by the mechanical operation of the banking system fail to provide any economic benefit, and by distorting the actual supply and demand signal can be actively harmful.

Untitled

Credit bubbles are often explained as a phenomena of irrational demand, and crowd behaviour. However, this explanation ignores the question of why they aren’t throttled by limits on the loan supply? An alternate explanation which can be offered is that their root cause is periodic failures in the regulation of the loan and money supply within the commercial banking system. The introduction of widespread securitized lending allows a rapid increase in the total amount of lending available from the banking system and an accompanying if somewhat smaller growth in the money supply. Channeled predominantly into property lending, the increased availability of money from lending sources, acted to increase house prices creating rational speculation on their increase, and over time a sizeable disruption in the market pricing mechanisms for all goods and services purchased through loans. Monetary statistics of this effect such as the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for example, are however at least partially masked by production deflation from the sizeable productivity increases over decades. Absent any limit on the total amount of credit being supplied, the only practical limit on borrowing is the availability of borrowers and their ability to sustain the capital and interest repayments demanded for their loans.

Owing to the asymmetric nature of long term debt flows there is a tendency for money to become concentrated in the lending centres, which then causes liquidity problems for the rest of the economy. Eventually repayment problems surface, especially if the practice of further borrowing to repay existing loans is allowed, since the underlying mathematical process is exponential. As general insolvency as well as a consequent debt deflation occurs, the money and loan supply contracts as the banking system removes loan capacity from the economy either from loan repayment, or as a result of bank failure. This leads to a domino effect as businesses that have become dependent on continuously rolling over debt fail and trigger further defaults. Monetary expansion and further lending is also constrained by the absence of qualified borrowers, and by the general unwillingness to either lend or borrow that results from the ensuing economic collapse. Further complications, as described by Ben Bernanke and Harold James, can occur when interactions between currencies are considered, in particular in conjunction with gold-based capital regulation, because of the difficulties in establishing the correct ratio of gold for each individual currency and maintaining it, in a system where lending and the associated money supply are continually fluctuating and gold is also being used at a national level for international debt repayments.

The debt to money imbalance created by the widespread, and global, sale of Asset Backed securities may be unique to this particular crisis. Although asset backed security issuance dropped considerably in 2008, as the resale markets were temporarily frozen, current stated policy in several countries, including the USA and the United Kingdom, is to encourage further securitization to assist the recovery of the banking sector. Unfortunately this appears to be succeeding.