Ringed Spaces (2)


Let |M| be a topological space. A presheaf of commutative algebras F on X is an assignment

U ↦ F(U), U open in |M|, F(U) is a commutative algebra, such that the following holds,

(1) If U ⊂ V are two open sets in |M|, ∃ a morphism rV, U: F(V) → F(U), called the restriction morphism and often denoted by rV, U(ƒ) = ƒ|U, such that

(i) rU, U = id,

(ii) rW, U = rV, U ○ rW, V

A presheaf ƒ is called a sheaf if the following holds:

(2) Given an open covering {Ui}i∈I of U and a family {ƒi}i∈I, ƒi ∈ F(Ui) such that ƒi|Ui ∩ Uj = ƒj|Ui ∩ Uj ∀ i, j ∈ I, ∃ a unique ƒ ∈ F(U) with ƒ|Ui = ƒi

The elements in F(U) are called sections over U, and with U = |M|, these are termed global sections.

The assignments U ↦ C(U), U open in the differentiable manifold M and U ↦ OX(U), U open in algebraic variety X are examples of sheaves of functions on the topological spaces |M| and |X| underlying the differentiable manifold M and the algebraic variety X respectively.

In the language of categories, the above definition says that we have defined a functor, F, from top(M) to (alg), where top(M) is the category of the open sets in the topological space |M|, the arrows given by the inclusions of open sets while (alg) is the category of commutative algebras. In fact, the assignment U ↦ F(U) defines F on the objects while the assignment

U ⊂ V ↦ rV, U: F(V) → F(U)

defines F on the arrows.

Let |M| be a topological space. We define a presheaf of algebras on |M| to be a functor

F: top(M)op → (alg)

The suffix “op” denotes as usual the opposite category; in other words, F is a contravariant functor from top(M) to (alg). A presheaf is a sheaf if it satisfies the property (2) of the above definition.

If F is a (pre)sheaf on |M| and U is open in |M|, we define F|U, the (pre)sheaf F restricted to U, as the functor F restricted to the category of open sets in U (viewed as a topological space itself).

Let F be a presheaf on the topological space |M| and let x be a point in |M|. We define the stalk Fx of F, at the point x, as the direct limit

lim F(U)

where the direct limit is taken ∀ the U open neighbourhoods of x in |M|. Fx consists of the disjoint union of all pairs (U, s) with U open in |M|, x ∈ U, and s ∈ F(U), modulo the equivalence relation: (U, s) ≅ (V, t) iff ∃ a neighbourhood W of x, W ⊂ U ∩ V, such that s|W = t|W.

The elements in Fx are called germs of sections.

Let F and G be presheaves on |M|. A morphism of presheaves φ: F → G, for each open set U in |M|, such that ∀ V ⊂ U, the following diagram commutes


Equivalently and more elegantly, one can also say that a morphism of presheaves is a natural transformation between the two presheaves F and G viewed as functors.

A morphism of sheaves is just a morphism of the underlying presheaves.

Clearly any morphism of presheaves induces a morphism on the stalks: φx: Fx → Gx. The sheaf property, i.e., property (2) in the above definition, ensures that if we have two morphisms of sheaves φ and ψ, such that φx = ψx ∀ x, then φ = ψ.

We say that the morphism of sheaves is injective (resp. surjective) if x is injective (resp. surjective).

On the notion of surjectivity, however, one should exert some care, since we can have a surjective sheaf morphism φ: F → G such that φU: F(U) → G(U) is not surjective for some open sets U. This strange phenomenon is a consequence of the following fact. While the assignment U ↦ ker(φ(U)) always defines a sheaf, the assignment

U ↦ im( φ(U)) = F(U)/G(U)

defines in general only a presheaf and not all the presheaves are sheaves. A simple example is given by the assignment associating to an open set U in R, the algebra of constant real functions on U. Clearly this is a presheaf, but not a sheaf.

We can always associate, in a natural way, to any presheaf a sheaf called its sheafification. Intuitively, one may think of the sheafification as the sheaf that best “approximates” the given presheaf. For example, the sheafification of the presheaf of constant functions on open sets in R is the sheaf of locally constant functions on open sets in R. We construct the sheafification of a presheaf using the étalé space, which we also need in the sequel, since it gives an equivalent approach to sheaf theory.

Let F be a presheaf on |M|. We define the étalé space of F to be the disjoint union ⊔x∈|M| Fx. Let each open U ∈ |M| and each s ∈ F(U) define the map šU: U ⊔x∈|U| Fx, šU(x) = sx. We give to the étalé space the finest topology that makes the maps š continuous, ∀ open U ⊂ |M| and all sections s ∈ F(U). We define Fet to be the presheaf on |M|:

U ↦ Fet(U) = {šU: U → ⊔x∈|U| Fx, šU(x) = sx ∈ Fx}

Let F be a presheaf on |M|. A sheafification of F is a sheaf F~, together with a presheaf morphism α: F → Fsuch that

(1) any presheaf morphism ψ: F → G, G a sheaf factors via α, i.e. ψ: F →α F~ → G,

(2) F and Fare locally isomorphic, i.e., ∃ an open cover {Ui}i∈I of |M| such that F(Ui) ≅ F~(Ui) via α.

Let F and G be sheaves of rings on some topological space |M|. Assume that we have an injective morphism of sheaves G → F such that G(U) ⊂ F(U) ∀ U open in |M|. We define the quotient F/G to be the sheafification of the image presheaf: U ↦ F(U)/G(U). In general F/G (U) ≠ F(U)/G(U), however they are locally isomorphic.

Ringed space is a pair M = (|M|, F) consisting of a topological space |M| and a sheaf of commutative rings F on |M|. This is a locally ringed space, if the stalk Fx is a local ring ∀ x ∈ |M|. A morphism of ringed spaces φ: M = (|M|, F) → N = (|N|, G) consists of a morphism |φ|: |M| → |N| of the topological spaces and a sheaf morphism φ*: ON → φ*OM, where φ*OM is a sheaf on |N| and defined as follows:

*OM)(U) = OM-1(U)) ∀ U open in |N|

Morphism of ringed spaces induces a morphism on the stalks for each

x ∈ |M|: φx: ON,|φ|(x) → OM,x

If M and N are locally ringed spaces, we say that the morphism of ringed spaces φ is a morphism of locally ringed spaces if φx is local, i.e. φ-1x(mM,x) = mN,|φ|(x), where mN,|φ|(x) and mM,x are the maximal ideals in the local rings ON,|φ|(x) and OM,x respectively.

Fallibilist a priori. Thought of the Day 127.0


Kant’s ‘transcendental subject’ is pragmatized in this notion in Peirce, transcending any delimitation of reason to the human mind: the ‘anybody’ is operational and refers to anything which is able to undertake reasoning’s formal procedures. In the same way, Kant’s synthetic a priori notion is pragmatized in Peirce’s account:

Kant declares that the question of his great work is ‘How are synthetical judgments a priori possible?’ By a priori he means universal; by synthetical, experiential (i.e., relating to experience, not necessarily derived wholly from experience). The true question for him should have been, ‘How are universal propositions relating to experience to be justified?’ But let me not be understood to speak with anything less than profound and almost unparalleled admiration for that wonderful achievement, that indispensable stepping-stone of philosophy. (The Essential Peirce Selected Philosophical Writings)

Synthetic a priori is interpreted as experiential and universal, or, to put it another way, observational and general – thus Peirce’s rationalism in demanding rational relations is connected to his scholastic realism posing the existence of real universals.

But we do not make a diagram simply to represent the relation of killer to killed, though it would not be impossible to represent this relation in a Graph-Instance; and the reason why we do not is that there is little or nothing in that relation that is rationally comprehensible. It is known as a fact, and that is all. I believe I may venture to affirm that an intelligible relation, that is, a relation of thought, is created only by the act of representing it. I do not mean to say that if we should some day find out the metaphysical nature of the relation of killing, that intelligible relation would thereby be created. [ ] No, for the intelligible relation has been signified, though not read by man, since the first killing was done, if not long before. (The New Elements of Mathematics)

Peirce’s pragmatizing Kant enables him to escape the threatening subjectivism: rational relations are inherent in the universe and are not our inventions, but we must know (some of) them in order to think. The relation of killer to killed, is not, however, given our present knowledge, one of those rational relations, even if we might later become able to produce a rational diagram of aspects of it. Yet, such a relation is, as Peirce says, a mere fact. On the other hand, rational relations are – even if inherent in the universe – not only facts. Their extension is rather that of mathematics as such, which can be seen from the fact that the rational relations are what make necessary reasoning possible – at the same time as Peirce subscribes to his father’s mathematics definition: Mathematics is the science that draws necessary conclusions – with Peirce’s addendum that these conclusions are always hypothetical. This conforms to Kant’s idea that the result of synthetic a priori judgments comprised mathematics as well as the sciences built on applied mathematics. Thus, in constructing diagrams, we have all the possible relations in mathematics (which is inexhaustible, following Gödel’s 1931 incompleteness theorem) at our disposal. Moreover, the idea that we might later learn about the rational relations involved in killing entails a historical, fallibilist rendering of the a priori notion. Unlike the case in Kant, the a priori is thus removed from a privileged connection to the knowing subject and its transcendental faculties. Thus, Peirce rather anticipates a fallibilist notion of the a priori.

The Second Trichotomy. Thought of the Day 120.0


The second trichotomy (here is the first) is probably the most well-known piece of Peirce’s semiotics: it distinguishes three possible relations between the sign and its (dynamical) object. This relation may be motivated by similarity, by actual connection, or by general habit – giving rise to the sign classes icon, index, and symbol, respectively.

According to the second trichotomy, a Sign may be termed an Icon, an Index, or a Symbol.

An Icon is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes merely by virtue of characters of its own, and which it possesses, just the same, whether any such Object actually exists or not. It is true that unless there really is such an Object, the Icon does not act as a sign; but this has nothing to do with its character as a sign. Anything whatever, be it quality, existent individual, or law, is an Icon of anything, in so far as it is like that thing and used as a sign of it.

An Index is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of being really affected by that Object. It cannot, therefore, be a Qualisign, because qualities are whatever they are independently of anything else. In so far as the Index is affected by the Object, it necessarily has some Quality in common with the Object, and it is in respect to these that it refers to the Object. It does, therefore, involve a sort of Icon, although an Icon of a peculiar kind; and it is not the mere resemblance of its Object, even in these respects which makes it a sign, but it is the actual modification of it by the Object. 

A Symbol is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association of general ideas, which operates to cause the Symbol to be interpreted as referring to that Object. It is thus itself a general type or law, that is, a Legisign. As such it acts through a Replica. Not only is it general in itself, but the Object to which it refers is of general nature. Now that which is general has its being in the instances it will determine. There must, therefore, be existent instances of what the Symbol denotes, although we must here understand by ‘existent’, existent in the possibly imaginary universe to which the Symbol refers. The Symbol will indirectly, through the association or other law, be affected by those instances; and thus the Symbol will involve a sort of Index, although an Index of a peculiar kind. It will not, however, be by any means true that the slight effect upon the Symbol of those instances accounts for the significant character of the Symbol.

The icon refers to its object solely by means of its own properties. This implies that an icon potentially refers to an indefinite class of objects, namely all those objects which have, in some respect, a relation of similarity to it. In recent semiotics, it has often been remarked by someone like Nelson Goodman that any phenomenon can be said to be like any other phenomenon in some respect, if the criterion of similarity is chosen sufficiently general, just like the establishment of any convention immediately implies a similarity relation. If Nelson Goodman picks out two otherwise very different objects, then they are immediately similar to the extent that they now have the same relation to Nelson Goodman. Goodman and others have for this reason deemed the similarity relation insignificant – and consequently put the whole burden of semiotics on the shoulders of conventional signs only. But the counterargument against this rejection of the relevance of the icon lies close at hand. Given a tertium comparationis, a measuring stick, it is no longer possible to make anything be like anything else. This lies in Peirce’s observation that ‘It is true that unless there really is such an Object, the Icon does not act as a sign ’ The icon only functions as a sign to the extent that it is, in fact, used to refer to some object – and when it does that, some criterion for similarity, a measuring stick (or, at least, a delimited bundle of possible measuring sticks) are given in and with the comparison. In the quote just given, it is of course the immediate object Peirce refers to – it is no claim that there should in fact exist such an object as the icon refers to. Goodman and others are of course right in claiming that as ‘Anything whatever ( ) is an Icon of anything ’, then the universe is pervaded by a continuum of possible similarity relations back and forth, but as soon as some phenomenon is in fact used as an icon for an object, then a specific bundle of similarity relations are picked out: ‘ in so far as it is like that thing.’

Just like the qualisign, the icon is a limit category. ‘A possibility alone is an Icon purely by virtue of its quality; and its object can only be a Firstness.’ (Charles S. PeirceThe Essential Peirce_ Selected Philosophical Writings). Strictly speaking, a pure icon may only refer one possible Firstness to another. The pure icon would be an identity relation between possibilities. Consequently, the icon must, as soon as it functions as a sign, be more than iconic. The icon is typically an aspect of a more complicated sign, even if very often a most important aspect, because providing the predicative aspect of that sign. This Peirce records by his notion of ‘hypoicon’: ‘But a sign may be iconic, that is, may represent its object mainly by its similarity, no matter what its mode of being. If a substantive is wanted, an iconic representamen may be termed a hypoicon’. Hypoicons are signs which to a large extent makes use of iconical means as meaning-givers: images, paintings, photos, diagrams, etc. But the iconic meaning realized in hypoicons have an immensely fundamental role in Peirce’s semiotics. As icons are the only signs that look-like, then they are at the same time the only signs realizing meaning. Thus any higher sign, index and symbol alike, must contain, or, by association or inference terminate in, an icon. If a symbol can not give an iconic interpretant as a result, it is empty. In that respect, Peirce’s doctrine parallels that of Husserl where merely signitive acts require fulfillment by intuitive (‘anschauliche’) acts. This is actually Peirce’s continuation of Kant’s famous claim that intuitions without concepts are blind, while concepts without intuitions are empty. When Peirce observes that ‘With the exception of knowledge, in the present instant, of the contents of consciousness in that instant (the existence of which knowledge is open to doubt) all our thought and knowledge is by signs’ (Letters to Lady Welby), then these signs necessarily involve iconic components. Peirce has often been attacked for his tendency towards a pan-semiotism which lets all mental and physical processes take place via signs – in the quote just given, he, analogous to Husserl, claims there must be a basic evidence anterior to the sign – just like Husserl this evidence before the sign must be based on a ‘metaphysics of presence’ – the ‘present instant’ provides what is not yet mediated by signs. But icons provide the connection of signs, logic and science to this foundation for Peirce’s phenomenology: the icon is the only sign providing evidence (Charles S. Peirce The New Elements of Mathematics Vol. 4). The icon is, through its timeless similarity, apt to communicate aspects of an experience ‘in the present instant’. Thus, the typical index contains an icon (more or less elaborated, it is true): any symbol intends an iconic interpretant. Continuity is at stake in relation to the icon to the extent that the icon, while not in itself general, is the bearer of a potential generality. The infinitesimal generality is decisive for the higher sign types’ possibility to give rise to thought: the symbol thus contains a bundle of general icons defining its meaning. A special icon providing the condition of possibility for general and rigorous thought is, of course, the diagram.

The index connects the sign directly with its object via connection in space and time; as an actual sign connected to its object, the index is turned towards the past: the action which has left the index as a mark must be located in time earlier than the sign, so that the index presupposes, at least, the continuity of time and space without which an index might occur spontaneously and without any connection to a preceding action. Maybe surprisingly, in the Peircean doctrine, the index falls in two subtypes: designators vs. reagents. Reagents are the simplest – here the sign is caused by its object in one way or another. Designators, on the other hand, are more complex: the index finger as pointing to an object or the demonstrative pronoun as the subject of a proposition are prototypical examples. Here, the index presupposes an intention – the will to point out the object for some receiver. Designators, it must be argued, presuppose reagents: it is only possible to designate an object if you have already been in reagent contact (simulated or not) with it (this forming the rational kernel of causal reference theories of meaning). The closer determination of the object of an index, however, invariably involves selection on the background of continuities.

On the level of the symbol, continuity and generality play a main role – as always when approaching issues defined by Thirdness. The symbol is, in itself a legisign, that is, it is a general object which exists only due to its actual instantiations. The symbol itself is a real and general recipe for the production of similar instantiations in the future. But apart from thus being a legisign, it is connected to its object thanks to a habit, or regularity. Sometimes, this is taken to mean ‘due to a convention’ – in an attempt to distinguish conventional as opposed to motivated sign types. This, however, rests on a misunderstanding of Peirce’s doctrine in which the trichotomies record aspects of sign, not mutually exclusive, independent classes of signs: symbols and icons do not form opposed, autonomous sign classes; rather, the content of the symbol is constructed from indices and general icons. The habit realized by a symbol connects it, as a legisign, to an object which is also general – an object which just like the symbol itself exists in instantiations, be they real or imagined. The symbol is thus a connection between two general objects, each of them being actualized through replicas, tokens – a connection between two continua, that is:

Definition 1. Any Blank is a symbol which could not be vaguer than it is (although it may be so connected with a definite symbol as to form with it, a part of another partially definite symbol), yet which has a purpose.

Axiom 1. It is the nature of every symbol to blank in part. [ ]

Definition 2. Any Sheet would be that element of an entire symbol which is the subject of whatever definiteness it may have, and any such element of an entire symbol would be a Sheet. (‘Sketch of Dichotomic Mathematics’ (The New Elements of Mathematics Vol. 4 Mathematical Philosophy)

The symbol’s generality can be described as it having always blanks having the character of being indefinite parts of its continuous sheet. Thus, the continuity of its blank parts is what grants its generality. The symbol determines its object according to some rule, granting the object satisfies that rule – but leaving the object indeterminate in all other respects. It is tempting to take the typical symbol to be a word, but it should rather be taken as the argument – the predicate and the proposition being degenerate versions of arguments with further continuous blanks inserted by erasure, so to speak, forming the third trichotomy of term, proposition, argument.



Many important spaces in topology and algebraic geometry have no odd-dimensional homology. For such spaces, functorial spatial homology truncation simplifies considerably. On the theory side, the simplification arises as follows: To define general spatial homology truncation, we used intermediate auxiliary structures, the n-truncation structures. For spaces that lack odd-dimensional homology, these structures can be replaced by a much simpler structure. Again every such space can be embedded in such a structure, which is the analogon of the general theory. On the application side, the crucial simplification is that the truncation functor t<n will not require that in truncating a given continuous map, the map preserve additional structure on the domain and codomain of the map. In general, t<n is defined on the category CWn⊃∂, meaning that a map must preserve chosen subgroups “Y ”. Such a condition is generally necessary on maps, for otherwise no truncation exists. So arbitrary continuous maps between spaces with trivial odd-dimensional homology can be functorially truncated. In particular the compression rigidity obstructions arising in the general theory will not arise for maps between such spaces.

Let ICW be the full subcategory of CW whose objects are simply connected CW-complexes K with finitely generated even-dimensional homology and vanishing odd-dimensional homology for any coefficient group. We call ICW the interleaf category.

For example, the space K = S22 e3 is simply connected and has vanishing integral homology in odd dimensions. However, H3(K;Z/2) = Z/2 ≠ 0.

Let X be a space whose odd-dimensional homology vanishes for any coefficient group. Then the even-dimensional integral homology of X is torsion-free.

Taking the coefficient group Q/Z, we have

Tor(H2k(X),Q/Z) = H2k+1(X) ⊗ Q/Z ⊕ Tor(H2k(X),Q/Z) = H2k+1(X;Q/Z) = 0.

Thus H2k(X) is torsion-free, since the group Tor(H2k(X),Q/Z) is isomorphic to the torsion subgroup of H2k(X).

Any simply connected closed 4-manifold is in ICW. Indeed, such a manifold is homotopy equivalent to a CW-complex of the form


where the homotopy class of the attaching map ƒ : S3 → Vi=1k Si2 may be viewed as a symmetric k × k matrix with integer entries, as π3(Vi=1kSi2) ≅ M(k), with M(k) the additive group of such matrices.

Any simply connected closed 6-manifold with vanishing integral middle homology group is in ICW. If G is any coefficient group, then H1(M;G) ≅ H1(M) ⊗ G ⊕ Tor(H0M,G) = 0, since H0(M) = Z. By Poincaré duality,

0 = H3(M) ≅ H3(M) ≅ Hom(H3M,Z) ⊕ Ext(H2M,Z),

so that H2(M) is free. This implies that Tor(H2M,G) = 0 and hence H3(M;G) ≅ H3(M) ⊗ G ⊕ Tor(H2M,G) = 0. Finally, by G-coefficient Poincaré duality,

H5(M;G) ≅ H1(M;G) ≅ Hom(H1M,G) ⊕ Ext(H0M,G) = Ext(Z,G) = 0

Any smooth, compact toric variety X is in ICW: Danilov’s Theorem implies that H(X;Z) is torsion-free and the map A(X) → H(X;Z) given by composing the canonical map from Chow groups to homology, Ak(X) = An−k(X) → H2n−2k(X;Z), where n is the complex dimension of X, with Poincaré duality H2n−2k(X;Z) ≅ H2k(X;Z), is an isomorphism. Since the odd-dimensional cohomology of X is not in the image of this map, this asserts in particular that Hodd(X;Z) = 0. By Poincaré duality, Heven(X;Z) is free and Hodd(X;Z) = 0. These two statements allow us to deduce from the universal coefficient theorem that Hodd(X;G) = 0 for any coefficient group G. If we only wanted to establish Hodd(X;Z) = 0, then it would of course have been enough to know that the canonical, degree-doubling map A(X) → H(X;Z) is onto. One may then immediately reduce to the case of projective toric varieties because every complete fan Δ has a projective subdivision Δ, the corresponding proper birational morphism X(Δ) → X(Δ) induces a surjection H(X(Δ);Z) → H(X(Δ);Z) and the diagram



Let G be a complex, simply connected, semisimple Lie group and P ⊂ G a connected parabolic subgroup. Then the homogeneous space G/P is in ICW. It is simply connected, since the fibration P → G → G/P induces an exact sequence

1 = π1(G) → π1(G/P) → π0(P) → π0(G) = 0,

which shows that π1(G/P) → π0(P) is a bijection. Accordingly, ∃ elements sw(P) ∈ H2l(w)(G/P;Z) (“Schubert classes,” given geometrically by Schubert cells), indexed by w ranging over a certain subset of the Weyl group of G, that form a basis for H(G/P;Z). (For w in the Weyl group, l(w) denotes the length of w when written as a reduced word in certain specified generators of the Weyl group.) In particular Heven(G/P;Z) is free and Hodd(G/P;Z) = 0. Thus Hodd(G/P;G) = 0 for any coefficient group G.

The linear groups SL(n, C), n ≥ 2, and the subgroups S p(2n, C) ⊂ SL(2n, C) of transformations preserving the alternating bilinear form

x1yn+1 +···+ xny2n −xn+1y1 −···−x2nyn

on C2n × C2n are examples of complex, simply connected, semisimple Lie groups. A parabolic subgroup is a closed subgroup that contains a Borel group B. For G = SL(n,C), B is the group of all upper-triangular matrices in SL(n,C). In this case, G/B is the complete flag manifold

G/B = {0 ⊂ V1 ⊂···⊂ Vn−1 ⊂ Cn}

of flags of subspaces Vi with dimVi = i. For G = Sp(2n,C), the Borel subgroups B are the subgroups preserving a half-flag of isotropic subspaces and the quotient G/B is the variety of all such flags. Any parabolic subgroup P may be described as the subgroup that preserves some partial flag. Thus (partial) flag manifolds are in ICW. A special case is that of a maximal parabolic subgroup, preserving a single subspace V. The corresponding quotient SL(n, C)/P is a Grassmannian G(k, n) of k-dimensional subspaces of Cn. For G = Sp(2n,C), one obtains Lagrangian Grassmannians of isotropic k-dimensional subspaces, 1 ≤ k ≤ n. So Grassmannians are objects in ICW. The interleaf category is closed under forming fibrations.

Category Theory of a Sketch. Thought of the Day 50.0


If a sketch can be thought of as an abstract concept, a model of a sketch is not so much an interpretation of a sketch, but a concrete or particular instantiation or realization of it. It is tempting to adopt a Kantian terminology here and say that a sketch is an abstract concept, a functor between a sketch and a category C a schema and the models of a sketch the constructions in the “intuition” of the concept.

The schema is not unique since a sketch can be realized in many different categories by many different functors. What varies from one category to the other is not the basic structure of the realizations, but the types of morphisms of the underlying category, e.g., arbitrary functions, continuous maps, etc. Thus, even though a sketch captures essential structural ingredients, others are given by the “environment” in which this structure will be realized, which can be thought of as being itself another structure. Hence, the “meaning” of some concepts cannot be uniquely given by a sketch, which is not to say that it cannot be given in a structuralist fashion.

We now distinguish the group as a structure, given by the sketch for the theory of groups, from the structure of groups, given by a category of groups, that is the category of models of the sketch for groups in a given category, be it Set or another category, e.g., the category of topological spaces with continuous maps. In the latter case, the structure is given by the exactness properties of the category, e.g., Cartesian closed, etc. This is an important improvement over the traditional framework in which one was unable to say whether we should talk about the structure common to all groups, usually taken to be given by the group axioms, or the structure generated by “all” groups. Indeed, one can now ask in a precise manner whether a category C of structures, e.g., the category of (small) groups, is sketchable, that is, whether there exists a sketch S such that Mod(S, Set) is equivalent as a category to C.

There is another category associated to a sketch, namely the theory of that sketch. The theory of a sketch S, denoted by Th(S), is in a sense “freely” constructed from S : the arrows of the underlying graph are freely composed and the diagrams are imposed as equations, and so are the cones and the cocones. Th(S) is in fact a model of S in the previous sense with the following universal property: for any other model M of S in a category C there is a unique functor F: Th(S) → C such that FU = M, where U: S → Th(S). Thus, for instance, the theory of groups is a category with a group object, the generic group, “freely” constructed from the sketch for groups. It is in a way the “universal” group in the sense that any other group in any category can be constructed from it. This is possible since it contains all possible arrows, i.e., all definable operations, obtained in a purely internal or abstract manner. It is debatable whether this category should be called the theory of the sketch. But that may be more a matter of terminology than anything else, since it is clear that the “free” category called the theory is there to stay in one way or another.

Cartographies of Disjunction’s Relational Dust. Thought of the Day 27.0


The biogrammatic interface, generates a political aesthetic in which action is felt through the affective modulations and/or tonalities it incites. A doubling occurs in the moving towards realization, the rearticulation, of the becoming-thing/gesture. This doubling divides in a central differentiation, referencing a voluminous vocabulary of the interstitial – fissure, gap, disjunction, in-between, crack, interface, fold, non-place – descriptors of a bifurcating rift between content and expression, necessary for realization. Deleuze sums up the crux of this Foucauldian argument:

Things can be realized only through doubling or dissociation, creating divergent forms among which they can be distributed. It is here that we see the great dualities: between different classes, or the governing and the governed, or the public and the private. But more than this, it is here that the two forms of realization diverge or become differentiated: a form of expression and a form of content, a discursive and a non- discursive form, the form of the visible and the form of the articulable. It is precisely because the immanent cause, in both its matter and its functions, disregards form, that it is realized on the basis of a central differentiation which, on the one hand will form visible matter, and on the other will formalize articulable functions.’ (Gilles Deleuze, Sean Hand-Foucault)

It can be argued that this central differentiation or interface distinguishes between the movements of two diagrammatic registers: outside from inside and the forms of realization. Transductive processes between these registers mark portals of entry through which all points of the diagram are in superposition, in passage as intensities of non-localizable relations from one point to another. The diagram distributes affective intensities within the context it maps.

Deleuze elasticizes Foucault’s reach by translating his oeuvre within the folding/unfolding of a knowledge-power-subjectivity continuum, mapping Foucault’s relays between the bifurcating polarities of content/expression, visibilities/statements as they differentiate and integrate through the folding ‘zone of subjectification’. The biogramming interface. The ‘event’ of rearticulation, of knowledge-capture and distribution, takes place through the perceptual filter of differential relations becoming-actual as a perception or thought. This is a topological dynamic mapped by the diagram, affected through the central differentiation (biogram) ‘or the ‘non-place’, as Foucault puts it, where the informal diagram is swallowed up and becomes embodied instead in two different directions that are necessarily divergent and irreducible. The concrete assemblages are therefore opened up by a crack that determines how the abstract machine performs’. It’s the process of swallowing up the relational intensities of a milieu and spitting back out certain selected somethings to be swallowed again that’s of particular interest to political aesthetics of the performative event. Foucault imagined a cartographic container of forces, affects, attractions and repulsions that modulate the diagram, excite the disjunction that separates forms of realization. The abstract machine begins to actualize its virtual potential as it distributes its relational dust.


Kenneth Knoespel notes that diagramma in the original Greek does ‘not simply mean something that is marked out by lines, a figure, a form or a plan, but also carries a second connotation of marking or crossing out,’ suggesting not only ephemerality but also an incompleteness that carries an expectation of potential. ‘What is interesting is that the diagram participates in a geneology of figures that moves from the wax tablet to the computer screen […] the Greek setting of diagram suggests that any figure that is drawn is accompanied by an expectancy that it will be redrawn […] Here a diagram may be thought of as a relay. While a diagram may have been used visually to reinforce an idea one moment, the next it may provide a means of seeing something never seen before. Diagrams As Piloting Devices…


Deleuzo-Foucauldian Ontological Overview From the Machine to the Archive. Thought of the Day 26.0

In his book on Foucault first published in 1986, Deleuze drew a diagram in the last chapter, Foldings, that depicts in overview the Outside as abstract machine, defined by the line of the outside (1), which separates the unformed interplay of forces and resistance from the strategies and strata that filter the affects of power relations to become “the world of knowledge”.


The central Fold of subjectification, of ‘Life’ is “hollowed out” and ignored by the forces of the outside as they are realized in the strata fulfilling the obligation of the diagram to “come to fruition in the archive.” This is dual process of integration and differentiation. The residual dust of the affective relations produced by force upon force, integrate into the strata even as they differentiate to forms of realization – visible or articulable. The ‘empty’ fissure/fold attracts and repels these moving curvilinear strategies as they differentiate and ”hop over” it. Ostensibly, the Fold of subjectification effectuates change as both continuously topological, and as discontinuously catastrophic (as in leaping over). So, the process of crystallization from informal to formal paradoxically integrates as it differentiates. Deleuze’s somewhat paradoxical description follows:

The informal relations between forces differentiate from one another by creating heterogeneous curves which pass through the neighborhood of particular features (statements) and that of the scenes which distribute them into figures of light (visibilities). And at the same time the relations between forces became integrated, precisely in the formal relations between the two, from one side to the other of differentiation. This is because the relations between forces ignored the fissure within the strata, which begins only below them. They are apt to hollow out the fissure by being actualized in the strata, but also to hop over it in both senses of the term by becoming differentiated even as they become integrated. Gilles Deleuze, Sean Hand-Foucault

So this “pineal gland” figure of the Fold is the “center of the cyclone”, where life is lived “par excellence” as a “slow Being”.

As clarifying as Deleuze’s diagram is in summarizing the layered dimensionality of the Foucauldian/Deleuzian hybrid, some modifications will be drawn off to alternatively express the realizations of the play of informal forces as this diagram takes on the particular features of a Research Creation praxis. True to the originating wax tablet diagramma, the relations are drawn and redrawn, in recognition, after Bergson’s notion of recognition as the intensive point where memory meets action of the contemporary social field that situates it. The shifts from the 19C to 20C disciplinary diagram of Foucault’s focus modulates with the late 20C society of control diagram formulated by Deleuze. The shorthand for the force field relevant to the research creation diagram of practice-led arts research today is a transdisciplinary diagram, the gamespace of just-in-time capitalism, which necessarily elicits mutations in the Foucault/Deleuze model. Generating the power-resistance relations in this outside qua gamespace are, among others, the revitalized forces of the military-academic-entertainment complex that fuel economic models such as the Creative Industries that pervade the conditions of play in artistic research. McKenzie Wark concludes his book GAMER THEORY, with prescient comments on the black hole quality of a topology of the outside qua contemporary “gamespace” from Deleuze and Guattari (ATP) and Guy Debord. “Only by going further and further into gamespace might one come out the other side of it, to realize a topology beyond the limiting forms of the game. Deleuze and Guattari: “… one can never go far enough in the direction of [topology]: you haven’t seen anything yet — an irreversible process. And when we consider what there is of a profoundly artificial nature […] we cry out, ‘More perversion! More artifice!’ — to a point where the earth becomes so artificial that the movement of [topology] creates of necessity and by itself a new earth.”

RAPL (Right Adjoint Preserve Limits) Theorem. Part 8a.

To prove the RAPL theorem we must first translate the definition of limit/colimit into a language that is compatible with the definition of adjoint functors.

Recall that a diagram is a functor D ∶ I → C from a small category I. If C is locally small then we have a locally small category CI consisting of diagrams and natural transformations between them. For each object c ∈ C we also have the constant diagram cI ∶ I → C that sends each object i ∈ Obj(I) to cI(i) ∶= c and each arrow δ ∈ Arr(I) to cI(δ) ∶= idc.

It is a general phenomenon that many categorical properties of CI are inherited from C. The next lemma collects a few of these properties that we will need later.

Diagram Lemma. Fix a small category I and locally small categories C, D. Then:

(i) For any category C, the mapping c ↦ cI defines a fully faithful functor (−)I ∶ C → CI which we call the diagonal embedding.

(ii)  For any functor F ∶ C → D the mapping FI(D)∶= F ○ D defines a functor FI ∶ CI → DI with the property that F (−)I = FI((−)I).

(iii)  Any adjunction L ∶ C ⇄ D ∶ R induces an adjunction LI ∶ CI ⇄ DI ∶ RI That is, we have a natural isomorphism of bifunctors

HomCI (−, RI(−)) ≅ HomDI (LI(−), −)

from (CI)op × DI to Set.

(iv) In particular, naturality in DI tells us that for all objects l ∈ C and all natural transformations Λ ∶ lI ⇒ D we have a commutative square:



(i): For any arrow α ∶ c1 → c2 in C we want to define a natural transformation of diagrams αI ∶ cI1 ⇒ cI2, and there is only one way to do this. Since (cI1)i = c1 and (cI2)i = c2 ∀ i ∈ I, the arrow I)i ∶= (cI1)i → (cI2)i must be defined by I)i ∶= α. Then for any arrow δ ∶ i → j in I we have cI1(δ) = idc1 and cI2(δ) = idc2, so that

I)i ○ (cI1) (δ) = (α ○ idc1) = (idc2 ○ α) = (cI2)i (δ) ○ (αI)i

and hence we obtain a natural transformation αI ∶ cI1 ⇒ cI2. The assignment α ↦ αI is functorial since for all arrows α, β such that α ○ β exists and ∀ i ∈ I we have (α ○ β)Ii = α ○ β = (αI)i ○ (βI)i = (αI ○ βI)i,

and hence (α ○ β)I = αI ○ βI. Finally, note that we have a bijection of hom sets HomC (c1, c2) ↔ HomCI (cI1, cI2given by α ↔ αI, and hence the functor (−)I ∶ C → CI is fully faithful.

(ii): Let F ∶ C → D be any functor. Then for any diagram D ∶ I → C we obtain a diagram FI(D) ∶ I → D by composition: FI(D) ∶= F ○ D. This assignment is functorial in D ∈ CI. To see this, consider any natural transformation Φ ∶ D1 ⇒ D2 in the category CI. Then for any arrow δ ∶ i → j in I we can apply F to the naturality square for Φ to obtain another commutative square:


If we define FI(Φ)i ∶= F(Φi) ∀ i ∈ I then this second commutative square says that FI(Φ) ∶ FI(D1) ⇒ FI(D2) is a natural transformation in DI. If Φ and Ψ are two arrows (natural transformations) in CI such that Φ ○ Ψ is defined, then ∀ i ∈ I we have FI(Φ ○ Ψ)i = F((Φ ○ Ψ)i) = F(Φi ○ Ψi) = F(Φi) ○ F(Ψi) = FI(Φ)i ○ FI(Ψ)i = (FI(Φ) ○ FI(Ψ))i and hence FI(Φ ○ Ψ) = FI(Φ) ○ FI(Ψ). Thus we have defined a functor FI ∶ CI → DI. Finally, note that ∀ i ∈ I, c ∈ C, and α ∈ Arr(C) we have

FI(cI)i = F((cI)i) = F(c) = ((F(c))I)i FII)i = F((αI)i) = F(α) = ((F(α))I)i

and hence we have an equality of functors FI((−)I) = F (−)I from C to DI

(iii): Let L ∶ C ⇄ D ∶ R be any adjunction. We will denote each bijection HomC(−,R(−)) ↔ HomC(L(−), −) by φ ↦ φ, so that φ= = φ. Now we want to define a natural family of bijections HomCI (−, RI (−)) ≅ HomDI (LI(−), −)

To do this, consider diagrams C ∈ CI, D ∈ DI, and a natural transformation Φ ∶ C ⇒ RI(D). Then for each index i ∈ I we have an arrow Φi ∶ C(i) → R(D(i)), which determines an arrow Φi ∶ L(C(i)) → D(i) by adjunction. The arrows Φi assemble into a natural transformation Φ ∶ LI(C) ⇒ D. To see this, consider any arrow δ ∶ i ∈ j in I. Then from the naturality of Φ and the adjunction L ⊣ R we have

D(δ) ○ Φi = (R(D(δ)) ○ Φi)                             naturality of L ⊣ R

= (Φj ○ C(δ))                                                        naturality of Φ

= Φj ○ L(C(δ))                                                     naturality of L ⊣ R

as desired. In a similar way one can check that for each natural transformation Ψ ∶ LI(C) ⇒ D, the arrows Ψi ∶ C(i) → R(D(i)) assemble into a natural transformation Ψ ∶ C ⇒ RI(D). Thus we have established the desired bijection of hom sets HomCI (C, RI (D)) ↔ HomDI (LI (C), D).

To prove that this bijection is natural in (C, D) ∈ (CI)op × DI, consider any pair of natural transformations Γ∶ C2 ⇒ C1 in CI and ∆ ∶ D1 ⇒ D2 in DI. We need to show that a certain cube of functions commutes. For a fixed diagram C ∈ CI the following square commutes:


First, recall that the natural transformation RI(∆) ∶ RI(D1) ⇒ RI(D2) is defined pointwise by RI(∆)i ∶= R(∆i) ∶ R(D1(i)) → R(D2(i)). Now consider any Φ ∶ C ⇒ RI(D1). The naturality of the original adjunction tells us that (R(∆i) ○ Φi) = ∆i ○ Φi, and hence we have

((RI(∆) ○ Φ)i) = (RI(∆)i ○ Φi)

= (R(∆i) ○ Φi)

= ∆i ○ Φi

= (∆ ○ Φ)i

∀ i ∈ I. By definition this means that (RI(∆) ○ Φ) = ∆ ○ Φ, and hence the desired square commutes. It remains only to check that the cube is natural in (CI)op. This follows from a similar pointwise computation.

(iv): Now fix an element l ∈ C, a diagram D ∈ DI, and a natural transformation Λ ∶ lI ⇒ D. By substituting C = R(l)I, D1 = lI, D2 = D, and ∆ = Λ into the above commutative square and using part (ii), we obtain the commutative square from the statement of the lemma. In particular, following the identity arrow idIR(l) around the square in two ways gives

(RI(Λ) ○ idIR(l)) = Λ ○ (idIR(l))

Finally, one can check pointwise that (idIR(l)) = ((idR(l))I) and hence we obtain the identity

(RI(Λ) ○ idIR(l)) = ((idR(l))I)

Now we will reformulate the definition of limit/colimit in terms of adjoint functors. If all limits/colimits of shape I exist in some category C then it turns out (surprisingly) that we can think of limits/colimits as right/left adjoints to the diagonal embedding (−)I ∶ C → CI : colimI ⊣(−)I ⊣ limI

In the next section/part’s lemma we will prove something slightly more general. We will characterize a specific limit/colimit of shape I, without assuming that all limits/colimits of shape I exist.

Marching Along Categories, Groups and Rings. Part 2

A category C consists of the following data:

A collection Obj(C) of objects. We will write “x ∈ C” to mean that “x ∈ Obj(C)

For each ordered pair x, y ∈ C there is a collection HomC (x, y) of arrows. We will write α∶x→y to mean that α ∈ HomC(x,y). Each collection HomC(x,x) has a special element called the identity arrow idx ∶ x → x. We let Arr(C) denote the collection of all arrows in C.

For each ordered triple of objects x, y, z ∈ C there is a function

○ ∶ HomC (x, y) × HomC(y, z) → HomC (x, z), which is called composition of  arrows. If  α ∶ x → y and β ∶ y → z then we denote the composite arrow by β ○ α ∶ x → z.

If each collection of arrows HomC(x,y) is a set then we say that the category C is locally small. If in addition the collection Obj(C) is a set then we say that C is small.

Identitiy: For each arrow α ∶ x → y the following diagram commutes:


Associative: For all arrows α ∶ x → y, β ∶ y → z, γ ∶ z → w, the following diagram commutes:


We say that C′ ⊆ C is a subcategory if Obj(C′) ⊆ Obj(C) and if ∀ x,y ∈ Obj(C′) we have HomC′(x,y) ⊆ HomC(x,y). We say that the subcategory is full if each inclusion of hom sets is an equality.

Let C be a category. A diagram D ⊆ C is a collection of objects in C with some arrows between them. Repetition of objects and arrows is allowed. OR. Let I be any small category, which we think of as an “index category”. Then any functor D ∶ I → C is called a diagram of shape I in C. In either case, we say that the diagram D commutes if for all pairs of objects x,y in D, any two directed paths in D from x to y yield the same arrow under composition.

Identity arrows generalize the reflexive property of posets, and composition of arrows generalizes the transitive property of posets. But whatever happened to the antisymmetric property? Well, it’s the same issue we had before: we should really define equivalence of objects in terms of antisymmetry.

Isomorphism: Let C be a category. We say that two objects x,y ∈ C are isomorphic in C if there exist arrows α ∶ x → y and β ∶ y → x such that the following diagram commutes:


In this case we write x ≅C y, or just x ≅ y if the category is understood.

If γ ∶ y → x is any other arrow satisfying the same diagram as β, then by the axioms of identity and associativity we must have

γ = γ ○ idy = γ ○ (α ○ β) = (γ ○ α) ○ β = idx ○ β = β

This allows us to refer to β as the inverse of the arrow α. We use the notations β = α−1 and

β−1 = α.

A category with one object is called a monoid. A monoid in which each arrow is invertible is called a group. A small category in which each arrow is invertible is called a groupoid.

Subcategories of Set are called concrete categories. Given a concrete category C ⊆ Set we can think of its objects as special kinds of sets and its arrows as special kinds of functions. Some famous examples of conrete categories are:

• Grp = groups & homomorphisms
• Ab = abelian groups & homomorphisms
• Rng = rings & homomorphisms
• CRng = commutative rings & homomorphisms

Note that Ab ⊆ Grp and CRng ⊆ Rng are both full subcategories. In general, the arrows of a concrete category are called morphisms or homomorphisms. This explains our notation of HomC.

Homotopy: The most famous example of a non-concrete category is the fundamental groupoid π1(X) of a topological space X. Here the objects are points and the arrows are homotopy classes of continuous directed paths. The skeleton is the set π0(X) of path components (really a discrete category, i.e., in which the only arrows are the identities). Categories like this are the reason we prefer the name “arrow” instead of “morphism”.

Limit/Colimit: Let D ∶ I → C be a diagram in a category C (thus D is a functor and I is a small “index” category). A cone under D consists of

• an object c ∈ C,

• a collection of arrows αi ∶ x → D(i), one for each index i ∈ I,

such that for each arrow δ ∶ i → j in I we have αj = D(δ) ○ α

In visualizing this:


The cone (c,(αi)i∈I) is called a limit of the diagram D if, for any cone (z,(βi)i∈I) under D, the following picture holds:


[This picture means that there exists a unique arrow υ ∶ z → c such that, for each arrow δ ∶ i → j in I (including the identity arrows), the following diagram commutes:


When δ = idi this diagram just says that βi = αi ○ υ. We do not assume that D itself is commutative. Dually, a cone over D consists of an object c ∈ C and a set of arrows αi ∶ D(i) → c satisfying αi = αj ○ D(δ) for each arrow δ ∶ i → j in I. This cone is called a colimit of the diagram D if, for any cone (z,(βi)i∈I) over D, the following picture holds:


When the (unique) limit or colimit of the diagram D ∶ I → C exists, we denote it by (limI D, (φi)i∈I) or (colimI D, (φi)i∈I), respectively. Sometimes we omit the canonical arrows φi from the notation and refer to the object limID ∈ C as “the limit of D”. However, we should not forget that the arrows are part of the structure, i.e., the limit is really a cone.

Posets: Let P be a poset. We have already seen that the product/coproduct in P (if they exist) are the meet/join, respectively, and that the final/initial objects in P (if they exist) are the top/bottom elements, respectively. The only poset with a zero object is the one element poset.

Sets: The empty set ∅ ∈ Set is an initial object and the one point set ∗ ∈ Set is a final object. Note that two sets are isomorphic in Set precisely when there is a bijection between them, i.e., when they have the same cardinality. Since initial/final objects are unique up to isomorphism, we can identify the initial object with the cardinal number 0 and the final object with the cardinal number 1. There is no zero object in Set.

Products and coproducts exist in Set. The product of S,T ∈ Set consists of the Cartesian product S × T together with the canonical projections πS ∶ S × T → S and πT ∶ S × T → T. The coproduct of S, T ∈ Set consists of the disjoint union S ∐ T together with the canonical injections ιS ∶ S → S ∐ T and ιT ∶ T → S ∐ T. After passing to the skeleton, the product and coproduct of sets become the product and sum of cardinal numbers.

[Note: The “external disjoint union” S ∐ T is a formal concept. The familiar “internal disjoint union” S ⊔ T is only defined when there exists a set U containing both S and T as subsets. Then the union S ∪ T is the join operation in the Boolean lattice 2U ; we call the union “disjoint” when S ∩ T = ∅.]

Groups: The trivial group 1 ∈ Grp is a zero object, and for any groups G, H ∈ Grp the zero homomorphism 1 ∶ G → H sends all elements of G to the identity element 1H ∈ H. The product of groups G, H ∈ Grp is their direct product G × H and the coproduct is their free product G ∗ H, along with the usual canonical morphisms.

Let Ab ⊆ Grp be the full subcategory of abelian groups. The zero object and product are inherited from Grp, but we give them new names: we denote the zero object by 0 ∈ Ab and for any A, B ∈ Ab we denote the zero arrow by 0 ∶ A → B. We denote the Cartesian product by A ⊕ B and we rename it the direct sum. The big difference between Grp and Ab appears when we consider coproducts: it turns out that the product group A ⊕ B is also the coproduct group. We emphasize this fact by calling A ⊕ B the biproduct in Ab. It comes equipped with four canonical homomorphisms πA, πB, ιA, ιB satisfying the usual properties, as well as the following commutative diagram:


This diagram is the ultimate reason for matrix notation. The universal properties of product and coproduct tell us that each endomorphism φ ∶ A ⊕ B → A ⊕ B is uniquely determined by its four components φij ∶= πi ○ φ ○ ιj for i, j ∈ {A,B},so we can represent it as a matrix:


Then the composition of endomorphisms becomes matrix multiplication.

Rings. We let Rng denote the category of rings with unity, together with their homomorphisms. The initial object is the ring of integers Z ∈ Rng and the final object is the zero ring 0 ∈ Rng, i.e., the unique ring in which 0R = 1R. There is no zero object. The product of two rings R, S ∈ Rng is the direct product R × S ∈ Rng with component wise addition and multiplication. Let CRng ⊆ Rng be the full subcategory of commutative rings. The initial/final objects and product in CRng are inherited from Rng. The difference between Rng and CRng again appears when considering coproducts. The coproduct of R,S ∈ CRng is denoted by R ⊗Z S and is called the tensor product over Z…..