Even if capitalist markets do have an inclusive aspect, open to exchange with anyone…as long as it is profitable, capitalism as a whole is predominantly and inherently a system of social exclusion, dividing people by property and excluding the non-profitable. a system of this kind is, of course, incapable of allowing the capabilities of all humankind to be realized. and currently the the system looks well fortified, even though new critical currents are hitting against it.
Carefully looking at the Brechtian article and unstitching it, herein lies the pence (this is reproduced via an email exchange and hence is too very basic in arguments!!):
When applied to generic fascism, the combined concepts of ideal type and ideological morphology have profound implications for both the traditional liberal and Marxist definitions of fascism. For one thing it means that fascism is no longer defined in terms of style, for e.g. spectacular politics, uniformed paramilitary forces, the pervasive use of symbols like fasces and Swastika, or organizational structure, but in terms of ideology. Moreover, the ideology is not seen as essentially nihilistic or negative (anti-liberalism, anti-Marxism, resistance to transcendence etc.), or as the mystification and aestheticization of capitalist power. Instead, it is constructed in the positive, but not apologetic or revisionist terms of the fascists’ own diagnosis of society’s structural crisis and the remedies they propose to solve it, paying particular attention to the need to separate out the ineliminable, definitional conceptions from time- or place- specific adjacent or peripheral ones. However, for decades the state of fascist studies would have made Michael Freeden’s analysis well-nigh impossible to apply to generic fascism, because precisely what was lacking was any conventional wisdom embedded in common-sense usage of the term about what constituted the ineliminable cluster of concepts at its non-essentialist core. Despite a handful of attempts to establish its definitional constituents that combined deep comparative historiographical knowledge of the subject with a high degree of conceptual sophistication, there was a conspicuous lack of scholarly consensus over what constituted the fascist minimum. Whether there was such an entity as generic fascism even was a question to think through. Or whether Nazism’s eugenic racism and the euthanasia campaign it led to, combined with a policy of physically eliminating racial enemies that led to the systematic persecution and mass murder, was simply unique, and too exceptional to be located within the generic category was another question to think through. Both these positions suggest a naivety about the epistemological and ontological status of generic concepts most regrettable among professional intellectuals, since every generic entity is a utopian heuristic construct, not a real thing and every historically singularity is by definition unique no matter how many generic terms can be applied to it. Other common positions that implied considerable naivety were the ones that dismissed fascism’s ideology as too irrational or nihilistic to be part of the fascist minimum, or generalized about its generic traits by blending fascism and nazism.
The reaction to degeneracy can sometimes happen within the spirit of degeneracy. Genocide is not the morally wholesome solution to whoredom. The Marxist-Lenninsts regard Fascism as form of bourgeois reaction. That is their frame, it is how they like to position their argument as it emphasises the difference between the two, but I think it is far better to think of Socialism as Left Modernism and Fascism as being Right Modernism. With Left and Right being dispositional/temperamental distinctions. They might be different teams but they’re both playing the same game.
A Generation X reader sent me this analysis of the Fake Right Clown Posse, which somehow manages to be both sympathetic of the plight being faced by the young men of today and contemptuous of what some of them have become in response. I think he is largely correct, and explains why their attempts to defend their race and their nations so often go awry.
We have no choice but to help them. The challenge is that the only answer to ignorance is information, and as we know, as we have witnessed, there are some who cannot be instructed by information.
Social pathologies, or the social pathologist undoubtedly. Orwell developed his Newspeak dictionary in order to explain the cognitive phenomenon he observed about him with regard to those committed to the left. Thats not to say that the cognitive phenomenon cannot be on the right, since many mass movement type ideologies are logically contradictory and to sustain themselves their adherents must engage themselves in mental gyrations to upkeep their belief. Orwell needed the Newspeak as part of the apparatus of totalitarian control, something forced on to an unwitting and unwilling public. It never occurred to Orwell that the masses would never care as long as their animal desires were being provided for. The party, much like the Juvenal before them, recognized that the public would not much care about the higher concepts such as truth or freedom as ling as their bread and circuses, in the form of the cynical statement Prolefeed were supplied. In fact, trying to pry them away from such materialities or ‘truth’ would likely cause them the to support the existing regime. This means that a capitalist totalitarianism, with its superior ability to provide for material goods would be harder to dislodge than a socialist one.
Take for example the notion of Doublethink, the idea of keeping two mutually opposing ideas in one’s head without noticing the difference. Orwell saw this mode as an aberration with regard to normal thought but never realized the fact that this was in the common man a mode of cognition. Or the concept of Bellyfeel, which Orwell states,
Consider, for example, a typical sentence from a Times leading article as “Oldthinkers unbellyfeel Ingsoc”. the shortest rendering one could make of this in Oldspeak would be: “Those whose ideas formed before the revolution cannot have a full understanding of the principle of English socialism.” But, this is not an adequate translation…only a person thoroughly grounded in Ingsoc could appreciate the full force of the word bellyful, which implied a blind, enthusiastic and casual acceptance difficult to imagine today.
“Gut-Instinct”, more than reason, is mass man’s mechanism of political orientation. This is why Fascism and Socialism is better understood as appeals to the gut-brain rather than logically and empirically justified modes of political thought. Totalitarian regimes cannot solely rely on oppression for their survival, they also need to rely on some of cooperation amongst the population, and they bring this about by exploiting the cognitive miserliness of the average man. Orwell, just like many other left-wing intellectuals never really appreciated the mindset of just outside the proletariat that he was. His fundamental misunderstanding of Newspeak lay in the assumption of rationalist fallacy, which assumes that the average man is rational when it counts, but the problem lies in the fact that for the average man cognitive miserliness is the norm. the problem is that a lot of mainstream conservative thought is based on this premise, which in turn undermines its own survival and helps feed the leftist beast. Any conservatives that believes in the right of the conservative miser to choose is a dead man walking. This criticism of the prole-mind is not based on any snobbery, rather it is of functional basis. Competency, not class should be the eligibility for decision-making, and thus no wonder left needs the stupid to survive.
Speed and Politics and (Popular Defense; Ecological Struggles) register the scope of the vast change in Virilio’s position. The problematic shifts from space to time, and from an expansive politics of mobilization and liberalization, to a defensive and conservative politics of resistance to acceleration and to a defence of the social. Responding to the appeals of theologians like Bonhoeffer, Virilio begins to warn of the dangers implied in the new state of the world, dangers to the experience of space of the city and of democracy, and of the new possibility of apocalypse brought about by new technologies and strategies available to and adopted by the military elite. In a sense the essay Speed and Politics, with its theory of power through control of movement a ‘dromocracy’, was the culmination of an analysis applicable to a world already passing away. If the proletariat still thinks in terms of the control of streets and physical movement, the military thinks otherwise: it thinks logistically in relation to new meeting points such as airports, highways and telecommunications. Communism died, fascism survives and has adapted. In this world, available in instantaneous communication and immediate information, a new permanent state of emergency is created which brings a sharp end to struggles in relative speed.
Virilio draws out these conclusions more dramatically in his book Popular Defense:
If… civilians could have resisted the assault of the war machine, gotten ahead of it, by creating a defence without a body, condensed nowhere, it is quite evident that today they don’t even realize that technology has surpassed this kind of defence.
This is because: ‘There is no need for an armed body to attack civilians, so long as the latter have been properly trained to turn on their radios or plug in their television sets’. In these conditions the political state declines, and where ‘hyper-communicability’ exists there grows totalitarian power. The right of armed defence by citizens is lost, while on the other hand ‘from now on’ the military power is so ‘shapeless’ it can no longer be identified as it installs itself in a regime of generalized security: an important and irreversible shift from a state of political and civil justice, to a state of logistical and military discipline. This is achieved through the systematic destruction of all the major forms of social solidarity which previously offered real resistance to the state: particularly the family, conceived by Virilio as essentially a combat unit. The liberation of women effectively weakens the solidarity of the family as a defensive form against the state. The resort to terrorism by ultra-left-wing groups again only serves to strengthen, not weaken, the war machine. This creates a paradox: the possibility that the revolution can succeed through control of the streets has been lost yet ‘there is no more revolution except in resistance’. Virilio returns to his bunker.
You must create your life, as you’d create a work of art. It’s necessary that the life of an intellectual be artwork with him as the subject. True superiority is all here. At all costs, you must preserve liberty, to the point of intoxication. — Gabriele d’Annunzio
The complex relationship between fascism and modernity cannot be resolved all at once, and with a simple yes or no. It has to be developed in the unfolding story of fascism’s acquisition and exercise of power. The most satisfactory work on this matter shows how antimodernizing resentments were channeled and neutralized, step by step, in specific legislation, by more powerful pragmatic and intellectual forces working in the service of an alternate modernity.
The word fascism has its root in the Italian fascio, literally a bundle or sheaf. More remotely, the word recalled the Latin fasces, an axe encased in a bundle of rods that was carried before the magistrates in Roman public processions to signify the authority and unity of the state. Before 1914, the symbolism of the Roman fasces was usually appropriated by the Left. Marianne, symbol of the French Republic, was often portrayed in the nineteenth century carrying the fasces to represent the force of Republican solidarity against her aristocratic and clerical enemies. Italian revolutionaries used the term fascio in the late nineteenth century to evoke the solidarity of committed militants. The peasants who rose against their landlords in Sicily in 1893–94 called themselves the Fasci Siciliani. When in late 1914 a group of left-wing nationalists, soon joined by the socialist outcast Benito Mussolini, sought to bring Italy into World War I on the Allied side, they chose a name designed to communicate both the fervor and the solidarity of their campaign: the Fascio Rivoluzionario d’Azione Interventista (Revolutionary League for Interventionist Action). At the end of World War I, Mussolini coined the term fascismo to describe the mood of the little band of nationalist ex-soldiers and pro-war syndicalist revolutionaries that he was gathering around himself. Even then, he had no monopoly on the word fascio, which remained in general use for activist groups of various political hues. Officially, Fascism was born in Milan on Sunday, March 23, 1919. That morning, somewhat more than a hundred persons, including war veterans, syndicalists who had supported the war, and Futurist intellectuals, plus some reporters and the merely curious, gathered in the meeting room of the Milan Industrial and Commercial Alliance, overlooking the Piazza San Sepolcro, to “declare war against socialism . . . because it has opposed nationalism.” Now Mussolini called his movement the Fasci di Combattimento, which means, very approximately, “fraternities of combat.”
Definitions are inherently limiting. They frame a static picture of something that is better perceived in movement, and they portray as “frozen ‘statuary’” something that is better understood as a process. They succumb all too often to the intellectual’s temptation to take programmatic statements as constitutive, and to identify fascism more with what it said than with what it did. The quest for the perfect definition, by reducing fascism to one ever more finely honed phrase, seems to shut off questions about the origins and course of fascist development rather than open them up. Fascism, by contrast, was a new invention created afresh for the era of mass politics. It sought to appeal mainly to the emotions by the use of ritual, carefully stage-managed ceremonies, and intensely charged rhetoric. The role programs and doctrine play in it is, on closer inspection, fundamentally unlike the role they play in conservatism, liberalism, and socialism. Fascism does not rest explicitly upon an elaborated philosophical system, but rather upon popular feelings about master races, their unjust lot, and their rightful predominance over inferior peoples. It has not been given intellectual underpinnings by any system builder, like Marx, or by any major critical intelligence, like Mill, Burke, or Tocqueville. In a way utterly unlike the classical “isms,” the rightness of fascism does not depend on the truth of any of the propositions advanced in its name. Fascism is “true” insofar as it helps fulfill the destiny of a chosen race or people or blood, locked with other peoples in a Darwinian struggle, and not in the light of some abstract and universal reason.
For Žižek, we are not so much living in a post-ideological era as in an era dominated by the ideology of cynicism. Adapting from Marx and Sloterdijk, he sums up the cynical attitude as “they know that, in their activity, they are following an illusion, but still, they are doing it”. Ideology in this sense, is located in what we do and not in what we know. Our belief in an ideology is thus staged in advance of our acknowledging that belief in “belief machines”, such as Althusser’s Ideological State Apparatuses. It is “belief before belief.”
One of the questions Žižek asks about ideology is: what keeps an ideological field of meaning consistent? Given that signifiers are unstable and liable to slippages of meaning, how does an ideology maintain its consistency? The answer to this problem is that any given ideological field is “quilted” by what, following lacan, he terms a point de capiton (literally an “upholstery button” though it has also been translated as “anchoring point”). In the same way that an upholstery button pins down stuffing inside a quilt and stops it from moving about, Žižek argues that a point de capiton is a signifier which stops meaning from sliding about inside the ideological quilt. A point de capiton unifies an ideological field and provides it with an identity. Freedom, i.e, is in itself an open-ended word, the meaning of which can slide about depending on the context of its use. A right-wing interpretation of the word might use it to designate the freedom to speculate on the market, whereas a left-wing interpretation of it might use it designate freedom from the inequalities of the market. The word “freedom” therefore does not mean the same thing in all possible worlds: what pins its meaning down is the point de capiton of “right-wing” or “left-wing”. What is at issue in a conflict of ideologies is precisely the point de capiton – which signifier (“communism”, “fascism”, “capitalism”, “market economy” and so on) will be entitled to quilt the ideological field (“freedom”, “democracy”, Human rights” and so on).
Žižek distinguishes three moments in the narrative of an ideology.
1. Doctrine – ideological doctrine concerns the ideas and theories of an ideology, i.e. liberalism partly developed from the ideas of John Locke.
2. Belief – ideological belief designates the material or external manifestations and apparatuses of its doctrine, i.e. liberalism is materialized in an independent press, democratic elections and the free market.
3. Ritual – ideological ritual refers to the internalization of a doctrine, the way it is experienced as spontaneous, i.e in liberalism subjects naturally think of themselves as free individuals.
These three aspects of ideology form a kind of narrative. In the first stage of ideological doctrine we find ideology in its “pure” state. Here ideology takes the form of a supposedly truthful proposition or set of arguments which, in reality, conceal a vested interest. Locke’s arguments about government served the interest of the revolutionary Americans rather than the colonizing British. In a second step, a successful ideology takes on the material form which generates belief in that ideology, most potently in the guise of Althusser’s State Apparatuses. Third, ideology assumes an almost spontaneous existence, becoming instinctive rather than realized either as an explicit set of arguments or as an institution. the supreme example of such spontaneity is, for Žižek, the notion of commodity fetishism.
In each of these three moments – a doctrine, its materialization in the form of belief and its manifestation as spontaneous ritual – as soon as we think we have assumed a position of truth from which to denounce the lie of an ideology, we find ourselves back in ideology again. This is so because our understanding of ideology is based on a binary structure, which contrasts reality with ideology. To solve this problem, Žižek suggests that we analyze ideology using a ternary structure. So, how can we distinguish reality from ideology? From what position, for example, is Žižek able to denounce the New Age reading of the universe as ideological mystification? It is not from the position in reality because reality is constituted by the Symbolic and the Symbolic is where fiction assumes the guise of truth. The only non-ideological position available is in the Real – the Real of the antagonism. Now, that is not a position we can actually occupy; it is rather “the extraideological point of reference that authorizes us to denounce the content of our immediate experience as ‘ideological.'” (Mapping Ideology) The antagonism of the Real is a constant that has to be assumed given the existence of social reality (the Symbolic Order). As this antagonism is part of the Real, it is not subject to ideological mystification; rather its effect is visible in ideological mystification. Here, ideology takes the form of the spectral supplement to reality, concealing the gap opened up by the failure of reality (the Symbolic) to account fully for the Real. While this model of the structure of reality does not allow us a position from which to assume an objective viewpoint, it does presuppose the existence of ideology and thus authorizes the validity of its critique. The distinction between reality and ideology exists as a theoretical given. Žižek does not claim that he can offer any access to the “objective truth of things” but that ideology must be assumed to exist if we grant that reality is structured upon a constitutive antagonism. And if ideology exists we must be able to subject it to critique. This is the aim of Žižek’s theory of ideology, namely an attempt to keep the project of ideological critique alive at all in an era in which we are said to have left ideology behind.
Why is revolution not possible? This is an old debate.
Terms like “socialist” and “revolution”, and “right-wing groups” tend to mean different things to different people, according to their perspectives. which can be quite contradictory, in many regards. Revolutions don’t tend to resolve such contradictions as absolutely as idealists and ideologues tend to imagine. Counter-revolutionary tendencies persist in the society, and even among the revolutionaries, such that it’s never really “over”, and the struggle continues.
Technically, “socialism” is a theoretically “necessary” supposedly “interim” period, during which an elite vanguard seizes political power, “on behalf of” the proletariat, and struggles to transform society, toward the eventual emergence of communism, which is to say, democracy, the ultimate utopian communist dream. That transformation is essentially the suppression of counter-revolutionary (anti-democratic) tendencies, and inculcation and cultivation of revolutionary (democratic) tendencies among the masses.
Marxian concentration on capitalism was all about demonstrating how undemocratic, and thus unjust, irrational and inefficient capitalism tends to be, despite it’s claim to be, relatively speaking, “more democratic” than monarchy, say, or feudalism. He merely sought to show that it is not the ultimate, final stage of that evolution, as it’s proponents tend to assert, but that, like the “socialism” he proposed to supplant it with, an interim stage, which would, in fact, sow the seeds of it’s own destruction, even as previous socio-economic paradigms had done before them.
At the time he was doing all this theorizing, a hundred years ago, his premise of an educated working class, capable of democracy, seemed a virtually impossible utopian dream, considering conditions in the masses, steeped in centuries of ignorance, illiteracy, grinding poverty and religious indoctrination. Rather than second guess his conclusion, then, that further resort to elitism was “necessary” to change those conditions, I’d prefer to just point out that, in fact, those conditions have changed, profoundly, since then, such that the prospect of democracy is no longer such a distant utopian dream, but more feasible and viable a prospect than ever before in human history.
Technology, the engine of all socio-economic relations, has evolved, especially in terms of communications. Here and now, into the 21st Century, both capitalist and “socialist” elitism have become outmoded, I think, and need to “wither away” with the whole concept of the “State” as we now know it, as an externally imposed governor…as Marx predicted would some day be possible. Anymore, most of us aspire to democracy, and we realise that we aren’t there, yet. The issue is not whether anti-democratic rightwing reactionary conservative and fundamentalist counter-revolutionary elements of our society, will, or can, prevent democracy from ensuing. The issue is whether those, who tend to be staunchly opposed to racism, sexism, cultural chauvinism, eco-rape, murderous monopoly corporate fascist ripoffs, and imperialist warmongering, will call off the demoralized cynical defeatism of electoral boycott and excessive splitting, and will step up to actually seize the power, for a change…democratically, electorally…and then proceed to suppress counter-revolutionary anti-democratic tendencies legislatively and judicially, from now on…explicitly for justice and peace, to save the planet. Which, of course, is why the right is freaking out like they are, even now waging “low intensity” civil war, desperately trying to prevent that from happening. For Revolution to be at hand, we must not try and smash capitalism, or even right-wing resistance at that, as democracy is invested in and of itself with enough potency to destroy capitalism and its moribund form, fascism. But, the authorial point of exploiting freedom as against suppressing it is the Negri’s position on the corollaries of reaction to right-wing accelerationsim. So, whatever be the seductive power of neoliberalism, which indeed is undeniable, banking on the track record of proletariat would be stuck in the molasses of the past, or even getting to dynamically shift the agency to cognitariat be akin to letting the seduction of neoliberalism suck the agency in. The alternative is agency/ies, which someone like the obscure Agamben would call “Whatever Singularity” (even Gayatri Spivak flirts with the idea), or precariat, which is the umbrella term for the ones stripped of or dehumanised by the forces of neoliberalism. Unless, the left has this in vision, left is a position best avoided for excepting archival purposes. Yes, commoditising communism spells doom, and we are ideologically headed towards it.
On to Bureaucracy. Why do I say it is impersonal? This is an idea imported from Max Weber, probably the father of Bureaucracy Theory. Bureaucracy differed from other types of organisations by its nonlegal forms of authority. Weberian take was inclined on its being technical proficiency specialised expertise, certainty and continuity. The genesis of it lay in money-based economy, the forerunner to capitalism in its variegated disguises and attendant need to ensure rational, impersonal and legal transactions. So, that is the combination spoken about that has got inverted from its traditional schemata. Also, there is an accompaniment of historical roots in the statement.
Fascism: it is absolutely necessary to insist on this essential aspect of the definition of fascism, for one can scarcely understand the emergence of the fundamental concepts of fascism and of the Fascist philosophy and mythology if one does not recognize, at the same time, that it arose from an originally Marxist revolt against materialism. It was the French and Italian Sorelians, the theoreticians of revolutionary syndicalism, who made this new and original revision of Marxism, and precisely this was their contribution to the birth of the Fascist ideology. Zeev Sternhell has amazingly outlined the history of Fascism in his “The birth of Fascist Ideology: From Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution“. Sternhell further says, ‘From the standpoint of the temporal structure of the project, fascism is a particularly radical form of conservative revolution.
Some of the traits that will be offered by a populist leader who affirms fascism is a rebirth of a strong National Identity, making a nation strong again, reviving culture, industry, education, and the middle-class values that have sustained it. It is always a populist authoritarian movement that seeks to preserve and restore a former glory to the nation as well as military, social, and religious values based on strong patriarchal roots that center on community of nation, race, and faith. It will treat any opposition as it sees fit to the point of utter abandonment of the norms and laws of the land, seeing in them hindrances that must be circumvented under dire emergencies, etc.. It will seek to cleanse the nation of foreign and domestic threats it perceives as outside the mainstream socio-cultural order it seeks to revive and promote. It will seek to revive an organic wholeness and totality, and expunge and expel those it perceives as outsiders: immigrants, refugees, or aliens in its midst. It will begin by attacking the insiders or establishment who it perceives as decadent, corrupt, and a parasite upon the body of the Nation as a whole. It will also incarcerate and expunge the poor and poverty stricken, enforcing codes of distrust and victimization. It seeks only to bolster up the vast majority of the middle-class workers of all diverse forms. From this point of view, BJP’s rule is perfectly congruent with fascism.
On the Adanis and Guptas, why is it not a collusion of corporate and state power of the past? It is, but with a vectoral shift in axis. The Fascist revolution sought to change the nature of the relationships between the individual and the collective without destroying the impetus of economic activity-the profit motive, or its foundation-private property, or its necessary framework-the market economy. This was one aspect of the novelty of fascism; the Fascist revolution was supported by an economy determined by the laws of-the free-market ideology. The shift in the axis lies precisely in the prerogative the financial capital has over decisions political. The shift in the axis has inverted the priorities of politics and capital. So, the Adanis and Guptas decide the politics rather than the other way round. This is a journey back to some of the basic tenets of political economy, which were seemingly eroded in the first phase of neoliberal era, thanks in large part to Thatcherism and Reaganomics.
Police before the state: This is a complicated relationship and is best understood if one were to dissolve the colloquial use of the word police. Allow me another recourse here to the French Political Philosopher, Ranciere, who puts it most aptly, “I do to identify the police with what is termed the state apparatus. The notion of state apparatus is in fact bound up with the presupposition of an opposition between state and society in which the state is portrayed as a machine, a cold ‘monster’ imposing rigid order on the life of society. This representation already presupposes a certain ‘political philosophy’, that is, a certain confusion of politics and the police. The distribution of places and roles that defines a police regime stems as much from the assumed spontaneity of social relations as from the rigidity of state functions. The police is essentially the law, generally implicit, that defines a party’s share or lack of it. The police is thus first an order of bodies that defines the allocation of ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of saying, and sees those bodies are assigned by the name to a particular place and task; it is an order of the visible and the sayable that sees that a particular activity is visible and another is not, that this speech is understood as discourse and another as noise. Policing is not so much the ‘disciplining’ of bodies as a rule governing their appearing, a configuration of occupations and the properties of the spaces where these occupations are distributed.” Therefore, by this logic the latency of police’s requisition for running the state is guaranteed. And, do we see any other way, if policing is extended to the notions of ‘moral policing’? I bet not.
Politics as the last resort of scoundrels will defeat the entire purpose of this response, and evidently, there is a strain of polity running throughout this response. Moreover, communication theories across generations have believed in media as the message and politicians of the present-day ruling regime are dramaturgists precisely in their compositions. We have had numerous examples to prove the point in the last one month or so.
Why do I call the Left academicians and practitioners idiots? Substantial segments of the left are in danger of allowing their movement to degenerate into a trite, self-indulgent counter-culture, in which an angry anti-establishment posturing conceals a lack of a positive political programme, and obviously nothing to say about the economic programme. Have we forgotten about the frittered opportunity during the 2008 crash? Globalise Resistance is one of the most visibly popular left-wing campaigns, defined by what they’re against, not what they’re for. Many people on the left are far too ready to draw an artificial moral equivalence between true tyrannies overseas and the very real but usually much milder moral failings of their own leaders and institutions. This is perpetrated by academicians and practitioners, and I am speaking of a very personal set of experience here. And still nothing seems to have changed.
Techno-politics isn’t really a slippery terrain, and for a change is one way the left can bounce back with. Humanity is being processed as mindless organisms (i.e., through processes of de-education, cultural amnesia, de-programming, etc.) in a system of normative practices on a global scale that seek to install an ethos of domestication in a grand safety system to secure its own inhuman ends. This inhuman core is constructing secure, comfortable, and hedonistic bubbles of imprisonment that will allow it to design and further its own programmatic operations. Most of all through the pacification of the human species, and a controlled or modulated form of work and leisure; attenuated by the dictates of a global hierarchy of corporate capitalist institutions, no longer bound to ideological systems of a democracy, communism, or religious practice: the nexus of encoded cultural references that bind us to ethno-nationalists agendas, all the while seeking to envelope us in intelligent hypermedia reality machines and systems that will allay our fears and graft us into their own secret agendas of power and dominion. This is a scary proposition talked about.
There is no doubt in me when I oppose Industrial Corridors, and why Shouldn’t I? But, by electronic corridors, I mean are trading systems becoming the nerve centres of financial capitalism, say for instance, High Frequency Trading, HFTs in short. These are algorithmically powered and somehow dehumanistic by being capable of the pillars of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. One could look at the recently held World Economic Forum, where this topic was largely thrashed about. Yes, there are political ripples created against it, but as a personal friend of mine who was single handedly responsible for launching the #occupymovement told me, “such ripples are minute for they lack steam to bring on the alternative voices into a robust solidarity against corporatism.” For obvious reasons, I cannot reveal the name of this person. BTW, she is a hardcore neocon, right now. Strange, but true.
Electronic knowledge turning into digital ash is a reference given to surveillance technologies, the answer to which lies in sousveillance, but then do we have have enough resources. Sadly, in our country, the answer is a resounding no. During the cold war, East Germany was the most infamous surveillance society, but the shift is palpable to more advanced democracies including the upcoming economies. China is a bizarre case still.
The other two intervening points are largely agreed to, and thus I won’t venture there. On me being a socialist, the original writeup said, sciolist, a concert that talks of superficial pretender of knowledge. The words appear same through spellings, but are vastly different. On whether I am a socialist in the Marxian sense, I’d be short here: NO.
Socratic irony is a particular device often used in rhetoric in which one person pretends to be ignorant about an issue to lure the other person into explaining it. In a debate or argument, for example, two people may hold differing points of view about a particular subject. One of the two participants may then pretend that he or she does not understand an important aspect of the subject, and ask the other person to explain it. As the other person explains it, the first participant then comments on weaknesses inherent in the other person’s argument and has used Socratic irony to make him or her reveal them. The left needs it, as the right is weak in rhetoric, maybe, or not. But it is required.
State as a PR firm is necessarily a naive understanding of state, but fits the present-day context. Though, I must admit if it was made to look like a naive understanding. Public relations and state have been two firmly entwined concepts since the beginning of recorded history. For evidence from ancient times, take a look at Aristotle and his schools of rhetoric that taught the art of persuasive communication. In more recent times, the work of the man commonly thought of as the father of modern day public relations, Edward Bernays, and his belief that public relations is an art applied to a science provide a clear connection between the two.