Textual Temporality. Note Quote.

InSolitude-Sister

Time is essentially a self-opening and an expanding into the world. Heidegger says that it is, therefore, difficult to go any further here by comparisons. The interpretation of Dasein as temporality in a universal ontological way is an undecidable question which remains “completely unclear” to him. Time as a philosophical problem is a kind of question which no one knows how to raise because of its inseparability from our nature. As Gadamer notes, we can say what time is in virtue of a self-evident preconception of what is, for what is present is always understood by that preconception. Insofar as it makes no claim to provide a valid universality, philosophical discussion is not a systematic determination of time, i.e., one which requires going back beyond time (in its connection with other categories).

In his doctrine of the productivity of the hermeneutical circle in temporal being, Heidegger develops the primacy of futurity for possible recollection and retention of what is already presented by history. History is present to us only in the light of futurity. In Gadamer’s interpretation, it is rather our prejudices that necessarily constitute our being. His view that prejudices are biases in our openness to the world does not signify the character of prejudices which in turn themselves are regarded as an a priori text in the terms already assumed. Based upon this, prejudices in this sense are not empty, but rather carry a significance which refers to being. Thus we can say that prejudices are our openness to the being-in-the-world. That is, being destined to different openness, we face the reference of our hermeneutical attributions. Therefore, the historicity of the temporal being is anything except what is past.

Clearly, the past is not some occurrence, not some incident in my Dasein, but its past; it is not some ‘what’ about Dasein, some event that happens to Dasein and alters it. This past is not a ‘what,’ but a ‘how,’ indeed it is the authentic ‘how’ (wie) of any temporal being. The past brings all ‘what,’ all taking care of and making plans, back into the ‘how’ which is the basic stand of a historical investigation.

Rather than encountering a past-oriented object, hermeneutical experience is a concern towards the text (or texts) which has been presented to us. Understanding is not possible merely because our part of interpretation is realized only when a “text” is read as a fulfillment of all the requirements of the tradition.

For Gadamer and Ricoeur the past as a text always changes its meaning in relation to the ever-developing world of texts; so it seems that the future is recognized as textual or the textual character of the future. In this sense the text itself is not tradition, but expectation. Upon this text the hermeneutical difference essentially can be extended. Consequently, philosophy is no history of hermeneutical events, but philosophical question evokes the historicity of our thinking and knowing. It is not by accident that Hegel, who tried to write the history of philosophy, raised history itself to the state of absolute mind.

What matters in the question concerning time is attaining an answer in terms in which the different ways of being temporal become comprehensible. What matters is allowing a possible connection between that which is in time and authentic temporality to become visible from the very beginning. However, the problem behind this theory still remains even after long exposure of the Heideggerian interpretation of whether Being-in-the-world can result from temporal being or vice versa. After the more hermeneutical investigation, it seems that Being-in-the-world must be comprehensive only through Being-in-time.

But, in The Concept of Time, Heidegger has already taken into consideration the broader grasp of the text by considering Being as the origin of the hermeneutics of time. If human Being is in time in a distinctive sense, so that we can read from it what time is, then this Dasein must be characterized by the fundamental determinations of its Being. Indeed, then being temporal, correctly understood, would be the fundamental assertion of Dasein with respect to its Being.

As a result, only the interpretation of being as its reference by way of temporality can make clear why and how this feature of being earlier, of apriority, pertains to being. The a priori character of being as the origin of temporalization calls for a specific kind of approach to being-a-priori whose basic components constitute a phenomenology which is hermeneutical.

Heidegger notes that with regard to Dasein, self-understanding reopens the possibility for a theory of time that is not self-enclosed. Dasein comes back to that which it is and takes over as the being that it is. In coming back to itself, it brings everything that it is back again into its own most peculiar chosen can-be. It makes it clear that, although ontologically the text is closest to each and any of its interpretations in its own event, ontically it is closest to itself. But it must be remembered that this phenomenology does not determine completely references of the text by characterizing the temporalization of the text. Through phenomenological research regarding the text, in hermeneutics we are informed only of how the text gets exhibited and unveiled.

Conjuncted: Gadamer’s Dasein

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There is a temporal continuity in Dasein. This is required for the revelation of a work of art through interpretation, both as understanding which already was, and as the way in which understanding was. Understanding is possible only in the temporal revision of one’s standpoint through the mutual relations of author and interpreter which allow the subject-matter to emerge. Here, the prejudices held by the interpreter play an important part in opening an horizon of possible questions.

Subsequent understanding that is superior to the original production, does depend on the conscious realization, historical or not, that places the interpreter on the same level as the author (as Schleiermacher pointed out). But even more, it denotes and depends upon an inseparable difference between the interpreter and the text and this precisely in the temporal field provided by historical distance.

It may be argued that the historian tries to curb this historical distance by getting beyond the temporal text in order to force it to yield information that it does not intend and of itself is unable to give. With regard to the particular text in application, this would seem to be the case. For example, what makes the true historian is an understanding of the significance of what he finds. Thus, the testimony of history is like that given before a court. In the German language, and based on this reason, the same word is used for both in general, Zeugnis (testimony; witness).

Referring to Gadamer’s position, we can see that it is in view of the historical distance that understanding must reconcile itself with itself and that one recognize oneself in the other being. The body of this argument becomes completely firm through the idea of historical Bildung, since, for example, to have a theoretical stance is, as such, already alienation; namely, dealing with something that is not immediate, but is other, belonging to memory and to thought. Moreover, theoretical Bildung leads beyond what man knows and experiences immediately. It consists in learning to affirm what is different from oneself and to find universal viewpoints from which one can grasp the thing as “the objective thing in its freedom,” without selfish interest. This indicates that an aesthetic discovery of a thing is conditioned primarily on assuming the thing where it is no longer, i.e., from a distance.

In this connection, we can extend critically Gadamer’s concept of the dynamism of distanciation from the object of understanding which is bounded by the frame of effective consciousness. This is based on the fact that in spite of the general contrast between belonging and alienating distance, the consciousness of effective history itself contains an element of distance. The history of effects, for Ricoeur, contains what occurs under the condition of historical distance. Whether this is either the nearness of the remote or efficacy at a distance, there is a paradox in otherness, a tension between proximity and distance which is essential to historical consciousness.

The possibility of effective historical consciousness is grounded in the possibility of any specific present understanding of being futural; in contrast, the first principle of hermeneutics is the Being of Dasein, which is historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) itself. In Gadamer’s view, Dasein’s temporality, which is the basis for its historicity, grounds the tradition. The last sections of Being and Time claimed to indicate that the embodiment of temporality can be found in Dasein’s historicality. As a result of this, the tradition is circularly grounded in Dasein’s temporality, while also surpassing its borders in order to be provided by a hermeneutical reference in distance.

We must study the root of this dilemma in so far as it is related to the sense of time. This is presupposed by historical consciousness, which in turn is preceded essentially by temporality. This inherent enigma in the hermeneutics of Dasein’s time led Heidegger to distinguish between authenticity and inauthenticity in our relation to time. The current concept of time can never totally fulfill the hermeneutical requirements. Ricoeur considered that time can be understood only if grasped within its limit, namely, eternity, but because eternity escapes the totalization and closure of any particular time, it remains inscrutable.

On the other hand, a text can be seen as temporal with regard to historical consciousness since it speaks only in the present. The text cannot be made present totally within an historical moment fully present-to-itself. It is in its a venir that the presence of the text transpires, which can be thematized as revenir (or) return.

Based on this aspect, each word is absolutely complete in itself, yet, because of its temporality, its meaning is realized only in its historical application. Nevertheless, historical interpretation can serve as a means to understand a given and present text even when, from another perspective, it sees the text simply as a source which is part of the totality of an historical tradition.

For Heidegger, the past character of time, i.e., the ‘pastness’ (passétité) belongs to a world which no longer exists, while a world is always world for a Dasein. It is clear that the past would remain closed off from any present were present Dasein not itself to be historical. Dasein, however, is in itself historical insofar as it is a possibility of interpreting. In being futural Dasein is its past, which comes back to it in the ‘how’. This is the ontological question of a thing in contrast to the question of the ‘what.’ The manner of its coming back is, among other processes, conscience. This makes clear why only the ‘how’ can be repeated. According to Ricoeur, history presents a past that has been as if it were present, as a function of poetic imagination. On the other hand, fictive narration imitates history in that it presents events as if they had happened, i.e., as if they occurred in the past. This intersection between history and fiction constitutes human time (le temps humain) whence an historical consciousness develops, where time can be understood as a singular totality.

Since the text can be viewed temporally, interpretation, as the work of art, is temporal and the best model for hermeneutical understanding is the one most adequate to the experience of time. Nevertheless, against Ricoeur, Gadamer found the identity of understanding not to be fixed in eternity. Instead, it is the continuity of our becoming-other in every response and in every application of pre-understanding that we have of ourselves in new and unpredictable situations. On this issue, it can be asked whether there is a way to reconcile Gadamer and Ricoeur on the issue of hermeneutical temporality.

The authentic source in the eternal return to Being can be discovered in Heidegger’s position: the eternal repetition of that which is known as that which is unknown, the familiar as the unfamiliar. The eternal return introduces difference which is disruptive to our conceptions of temporal movement. However, identity and difference must be destabilised in favor of the performance of a new concept of hermeneutics. In this a temporal event requires that one cross over to another hermeneutics of time that cannot be thought restricted only in temporalization since it is beyond when one begins. This concept is called by Heidegger the nearness of what lies after.

In addition, understanding is to be taken not as reconstruction, but as mediation in so far as it conveys the past into the present. Even when we grasp the past “in itself,” understanding remains essentially a mediation or translation of past meaning into the present situation. As Gadamer states, understanding itself is not to be thought of so much as an action of subjectivity, but rather as the entering into an event of transmission in which past and present are constantly mediated. This requires not detaching temporality from the ontological preconception of the present-at-hand, but trying to distinguish that from the simple horizon phenomenon of temporal consciousness. The event of hermeneutics never takes place if understanding is considered to be defined in the arena of the temporalization of time in the past in itself. 

Gadamer sees one of the most fundamental experiences of time as that of discontinuity or becoming-other. This stands in contrast to the “flowing” nature of time. According to Gadamer, there are at least three “epochal” experiences that introduce temporal discontinuity into our self-understanding: first, the experience of old age; second, the transition from one generation to another; and finally, the “absolute epoch” or the new age occasioned by the advent of Christianity, where history is understood in a new sense. 

The Greek understanding of history as deviation from the order of things was changed in medieval philosophy to accept that there is no recognizable order within history except temporality itself. (Nonetheless, the absolute epoch is not to be taken merely as similar to a Christian understanding of time, which would result in a technological conception of time in terms of which the future is unable to be planned or controlled.) The new in temporality comes to be as the old is recalled in dissolution. In recollection, the dissolution of the old becomes provocative, i.e., an opening of possibilities for the new. The dissolution of the old is not a non-temporal characteristic of temporalization.

Conjuncted: Hobbes’ Authoritarianism (2)

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Hobbes built up a theory of most thorough going collectivism but a rationale of such a collectivism was the peace and the security of the person and property of the individual, which gives a tinge of individualism to the theory of Hobbes. He even allowed his individual the right to resist his Sovereign if the latter attacked the individual’s life for whose preservation the contract was entered into. In certain contingencies the individual could withdraw the allegiance to the Sovereign who was not supporting the individual’s life. “The obligation of the subjects to the Sovereign is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them.” A man has a right to disobey his Sovereign if the latter commands to “kill, wound or maim himself; or not to resist those that assault him; or to abstain from the use of food, medicine or any other thing without which he cannot live.” An individual has the right to refuse allegiance to a deposed Sovereign. Hobbes is an individualist, since his entire system is based on the individual psychology of fear and self-defence. In so far as Hobbes equates the right of resistance of an individual to his capacity to resist, the right equally vanishes against the strength of the Sovereign. The right of the individual to resist the Sovereign if the individual’s life is endangered implies that the individual is the judge as to when his life is endangered. On the Hobbesian view of human nature, the individual will misuse this right and resist the Sovereign as often as he can. This will destroy what Hobbes wanted to create i.e. unlimited absolutism of the Sovereign.

Religion:

Hobbes always considered hereditary absolute monarchy as the best form of the State. He does consider the possibility of elected monarchy, under which the ‘people is sovereign in property’, but not ‘in use’. Hobbes always maintained the distinction between the natural and the artificial State. He distinguished between the ‘commonwealth by acquisition’ and the ‘commonwealth by institution’; the former being based on natural force and the latter on voluntary subjection to an elected Government. Hobbes stresses on the fact that the law of nature is obligatory not only on the basis of Sovereign command but also as delivered in the ‘word of God’. Hobbes mentions solicitude for the eternal salvation of the subjects. With dual intentions, Hobbes becomes an interpreter; of the Bible in the first place to make use of the authority of the scriptures themselves. He does criticize religion in his most important three discourses. We have seen how he answers the question, “on what authority does one believe that scriptures are the word of God?”

Historicity:

Hobbes turning to history is filled with philosophic intentions. Hobbes reiterated the fact that it is history and not philosophy that gives man, prudence. The study is concerned with the historicity of its material; that the clear knowledge of application of the norms which obtain for human actions is the knowledge of actions, which have taken place in the past. Philosophy seeks general precepts, while the study seeks the application and realization of the precepts, the conditions and results of those precepts.

Through history a reader is to be taught which kinds of aims are salutary or destructive. History is often taken up to remedy man’s disobedience. It can be stated that the development, at least in the 16th century, justifies the assertion that the reason why philosophy turned to history is the repression of the morality of obedience.

Contribution to political philosophy:

The cardinal contribution made by Hobbes in the field of political philosophy was his doctrine of sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty had begun to develop in the hands of Machiavelli, Bodin and Grotius, but Hobbes was facile princeps to give it the shape and content, which sovereignty holds today. He was one of the first to see that the idea of sovereignty lay at the root of any State. His Leviathan aroused the indignation of almost all-important interests in England. His Erastianism (adherence of the supposed doctrine of Erastus. Subordinating ecclesiastical to secular power), was distasteful to the Church. Devoted churchmen found it absolutely intolerable that the Church was a mere department of the State. The monarchists, who adhered to the belief in the Divine Right of Kings, did not appreciate his secular theory based on a social contract. The Royalists on the other hand did not like the Hobbesian view of sovereignty because it justified the de facto Government of a successful dictator as much as that of a legitimate monarchy, and justified the absolutism of a Parliament as much as that of a King. Hobbes thought of the Divine Right of the State as compared to the Divine Right of the King. The parliamentarians viewed with scorn the opposition of Hobbes to mixed Government and constitutional checks. Although his political philosophy was little noticed in England, it created a stir on the continent. While Machiavelli had separated politics from religion and morals, Hobbes not only kept them separate but subordinated religion and morals to politics. Hobbes scored over Machiavelli in his exaltation of the State; for Machiavelli was never so absolutist as to declare that the laws of nature and the laws of God were to find their expression only through the interpretation and the will of the sovereign. The sovereignty of Hobbes was indivisible and unlimited. Hobbes knew that the basis of moral and legal right was reason, but to Hobbes, this reason was the reason of the sovereign expressed through his will only. Hobbes was an individualist in so far as he believed in the natural equality of men. His cardinality as a political philosopher lies in his deriving logically from a mass of free and equal individuals the concept of an omnipotent State. The brilliance of Hobbes was that he turned the theory of early liberalism to the defence of unlimited absolutism at a time when absolutism, born of Divine Right of Kings, was quickly losing its theoretical applications and practical implications.

CRITICISM OF HOBBES AS A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHER

The Hobbesian theory of social contract implies that man brings with him to the social contract ‘rights’ of the State of nature, which are devoid of social function, social recognition and hence they could only be powers. Hobbes proceeds to evolve his civil society on the basis of social contract, which suddenly transforms the chaos of the State of nature into the ordered civil society. Social contract is itself made in the State of nature. The Hobbesian sovereign is the representative of the people. But what guarantee is there that this ‘representative’ of the people will ‘represent’ the people by following public opinion and looking after the public welfare. John Locke attacked Hobbesian social contract according to which, when men quitting the State of nature entered into society, they agreed that all of them but one should be under the restraint of laws; but that he should still retain all the liberty of the State of nature, increased with power and made licentious by impunity. This is to think that men are so foolish that they take care to avoid what mischief polecats and foxes, may do them, but are content, nay, think it safety, to be devoured by lions. Hobbes builds up his theory on the basis of pleasure-pain theory and evolves a master slave relationship. Hobbes regards matter and motion alone as real. His dogmatic materialism lives him little scope for freedom of human will. He is neither fully utilitarian, nor fully an idealist.

The unsoundness of Hobbes’ State of nature was a State of war of all against all in which the cardinal virtues are force and fraud. So, its clear that Hobbes’ man is anti-social. How could such a man go against his own  nature and suddenly enter a State not of war, but of peace, a State in which force and fraud are deliberately set aside, a State which is founded upon the ideas of right and justice, and in which acts of wrong and injustice are put under the double ban of public disapproval and of positive prohibition? With Hobbes, the self-interest of an individual before the contract is suddenly changed into his duties towards the sovereign after the contract. If men are not all force and fraud, they do not need an absolute sovereign; if they are; they cannot render passive obedience to him for all time after the contract. With Hobbes, it was Absolutism or Anarchy. The only remedy for the good behaviour of men was the coercive power of the sovereign. Hobbes failed to realize that there were other characteristics besides the fear of law and punishment, which kept men from relapsing into anarchy, viz., reason, religion and public opinion based on the faculty of reason. The Leviathan of Hobbes essentially states, ‘This State is a necessary evil, an instrument to defend men against their savage instincts, not to achieve a free and a progressive civilization’. Hobbesian position is that in the case of sovereign, might is right. 

Hobbes was a materialist and a rationalist. His philosophy vindicated the absolute sovereignty of whatever Government happened to be in power. Hobbes believed that human nature was bad but he held that it could be rendered moral by the State, which must be preserved at all costs. It must be realized that Hobbesian State is authoritarian and not totalitarian.

Unlike the totalitarian system, it is based on contractual obligations. In his State, there is equality of all before law and there is no privileged ruling class. Unlike the totalitarian State, it insists on the outward conformity of the subjects to law and not inner conformity to opinions and beliefs. His State, unlike the totalitarian, does not swallow the individual. 

Brassier, Enlightenment & Nature: A Reciprocity

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A lapse back into nature is a tendency that is inherent in all living things, and the overcoming of this tendency is the hallmark of development. This lapse is more like a blind conformity to nature and in a way is reason’s own fatal submission to the dictates of nature. As Ray Brassier tries to juxtapose this reason with the Enlightenment’s reason (specifically taking his reading of Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment seriously), he calls this reason as a function of adaptational constraints. He does this precisely because as the two authors talk about the Enlightenment reason’s drive to conceptually subsume particularity, heterogeneity and multiplicity to universality, homogeneity and unity and in the process rendering everything equivalent to everything else, but in a way such that nothing is identical to itself. This is conceptual identification that stipulates differential commensurability and in their own words ‘amputating the incommensurable’. The evolution of this reason is undoubtedly the case of the confrontation between the dominated and the dominating powers that subjected the humans under the sway of the all-powerful nature. Brassier takes his reading of sacrifice from the Dialectic of Enlightenment as an attempt to propitiate these incommensurables. Adorno and Horkheimer claim in their book that enlightenment equates the living with the non-living, just as the mythical tales equated the non-living with the living.

The authors accord to reason a reflexivity that is capable of understanding and resolving the incommensurability that is generated as a result of the enlightenment science’s knowledge of the actual and the existence. This reflexivity of reason is purely centred on its own historicity. They claim that the reason is independent of nature by virtue of its reflexivity on its own dependence on nature and this is where science fails to reach for somehow it depicts its incapability of engaging with reflexivity. The subject that postulates absolutes is sick in their view, passively succumbing to the dazzlement of false immediacy and the only remedy to cure the ailment is by inaugurating a mediation in the form of remembrance that would encompass the human history in its socio-cultural milieu. This kind of nature is different in that now, we, the humans belong in it, as compared with the earlier version, where we were excluded from nature.