Transmission of Eventual Lending Rates: MCLRs. Note Quote.

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Given that capital market instruments are not subject to MCLR/base rate regulations, the issuances of Commercial Paper/bonds reflect the current interest rates as banks are able to buy/subscribe new deposits reflecting extant interest rates, making transmission instantaneous. 

The fundamental challenge we have here is that there is no true floating rate liability structure for banks. One can argue that banks themselves will have to develop the floating rate deposit product, but customer response, given the complexity and uncertainty for the depositor, has been at best lukewarm. In an environment where the banking system is fighting multiple battles – asset quality, weak growth, challenges on transition to Ind AS accounting practice, rapid digitization leading to new competition from non-bank players, vulnerability in the legacy IT systems –  creating a mindset for floating rate deposits hardly appears to be a priority. 

In this context, it is clear that Marginal Costs of Funds Based Lending Rates (MCLRs) have largely come down in line with policy rates. MCLR is built on four components – marginal cost of funds, negative carry on account of cash reserve ratio (CRR), operating costs and tenor premium. Marginal cost of funds is the marginal cost of borrowing and return on net worth for banks. The operating cost includes cost of providing the loan product including cost of raising funds. Tenor premium arises from loan commitments with longer tenors. Some data indicate that while MCLR has indeed tracked policy rates (especially post-demonetization), as liquidity has been abundant, average leading rates have not yet reflected the fall in MCLR rates. This is simply because MCLR reset happens over a period of time depending on the benchmark MCLR used for sanctioning the loans. 

Before jumping the gun that this is a flaw in the structure as the benefit of lower interest rates is significantly lagging, the benefit will be to the borrower when the interest cycle turns. In fact, given that MCLR benchmarks vary from one month to one year, unlike base rate, banks are in a better situation to cut MCLRs, as not the entire book resets immediately. The stakeholders must therefore want for a few more months before concluding on the effectiveness of transmission on eventual lending rates. 

Conjuncted: Balance of Payments in a Dirty Float System, or Why Central Banks Find It Ineligible to Conduct Independent Monetary Policies? Thought of the Day

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If the rate of interest is partly a monetary phenomenon, money will have real effects working through variations in investment expenditure and the capital stock. Secondly, if there are unemployed resources, the impact of increases in the money supply will first be on output, and not on prices. It was, indeed, Keynes’s view expressed in his General Theory that throughout history the propensity to save has been greater than the propensity to invest, and that pervasive uncertainty and the desire for liquidity has in general kept the rate of interest too high. Given the prevailing economic conditions of the 1930s when Keynes was writing, it was no accident that he should have devoted part of the General Theory to a defence of mercantilism as containing important germs of truth:

What I want is to do justice to schools of thought which the classicals have treated as imbeciles for the last hundred years and, above all, to show that I am not really being so great an innovator, except as against the classical school, but have important predecessors, and am returning to an age-long tradition of common sense.

The mercantilists recognised, like Keynes, that the rate of interest is determined by monetary conditions, and that it could be too high to secure full employment, and in relation to the needs of growth. As Keynes put it in the General Theory:

mercantilist thought never supposed as later economists did [for example, Ricardo, and even Alfred Marshall] that there was a self-adjusting tendency by which the rate of interest would be established at the appropriate level [for full employment].

It was David Ricardo, in his The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, who accepted and developed Say’s law of markets that supply creates its own demand, and who for the first time expounded the theory of comparative advantage, which laid the early foundations for orthodox trade and growth theory that has prevailed ever since. Ricardian trade theory, however, is real theory relating to the reallocation of real resources through trade which ignores the monetary aspects of trade; that is, the balance between exports and imports as trade takes place. In other words, it ignores the balance of payments effects of trade that arises as a result of trade specialization, and the feedback effects that the balance of payments can have on the real economy. Moreover, continuous full employment is assumed because supply creates its own demand through variations in the real rate of interest. These aspects question the prevalence of Ricardian theory in orthodox trade and growth theory to a large extent in today’s scenario. But in relation to trade, as Keynes put it:

free trade assumes that if you throw men out of work in one direction you re-employ them in another. As soon as that link in the chain is broken the whole of the free trade argument breaks down.

In other words, the real income gains from specialization may be offset by the real income losses from unemployment. Now, suppose that payments deficits arise in the process of international specialization and the freeing of trade, and the rate of interest has to be raised to attract foreign capital inflows to finance them. Or suppose deficits cannot be financed and income has to be deflated to reduce imports. The balance of payments consequences of trade may offset the real income gains from trade.

This raises the question of why the orthodoxy ignores the balance of payments? There are several reasons, both old and new, that all relate to the balance of payments as a self-adjusting process, or simply as a mirror image of autonomous capital flows, with no income adjustment implied. Until the First World War, the mechanism was the gold standard. The balance of payments was supposed to be self-equilibrating because countries in surplus, accumulating gold, would lose competitiveness through rising prices (Hume’s quantity theory of money), and countries in deficit losing gold would gain competitiveness through falling prices. The balance of payments was assumed effectively to look after itself through relative price adjustments without any change in income or output. After the external gold standard collapsed in 1931, the theory of flexible exchange rates was developed, and it was shown that if the real exchange rate is flexible, and the so-called Marshall–Lerner condition is satisfied (i.e. the sum of the price elasticities of demand for exports and imports is greater than unity), the balance of payments will equilibrate; again, without income adjustment.

In modern theory, balance of payments deficits are assumed to be inherently temporary as the outcome of inter-temporal decisions by private agents concerning consumption. Deficits are the outcome of rational decisions to consume now and pay later. Deficits are merely a form of consumption smoothing, and present no difficulty for countries. And then there is the Panglossian view that the current account of the balance of payments is of no consequence at all because it simply reflects the desire of foreigners to invest in a country. Current account deficits should be seen as a sign of economic success, not as a weakness.

It is not difficult to question how balance of payments looks after itself, or does not have consequences for long-run growth. As far as the old gold standard mechanism is concerned, instead of the price levels of deficit and surplus countries moving in opposite directions, there was a tendency in the nineteenth century for the price levels of countries to move together in the same direction. In practice, it was not movements in relative prices that equilibrated the balance of payments but expenditure and output changes associated with interest rate differentials. Interest rates rose in deficit countries which deflated demand and output, and fell in surplus countries stimulating demand.

On the question of flexible exchange rates as an equilibrating device, a distinction first needs to be made between the nominal exchange rate and the real exchange rate. It is easy for countries to adjust the nominal rate, but not so easy to adjust the real rate because competitors may “price to market” or retaliate, and domestic prices may rise with a nominal devaluation. Secondly, the Marshall–Lerner condition then has to be satisfied for the balance of payments to equilibrate. This may not be the case in the short run, or because of the nature of goods exported and imported by a particular country. The international evidence over the past almost half a century years since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system suggests that exchange rate changes are not an efficient balance of payments adjustment weapon. Currencies appreciate and depreciate and still massive global imbalances of payments remain.

On the inter-temporal substitution effect, it is wrong to give the impression that inter-temporal shifts in consumption behaviour do not have real effects, particularly if interest rates have to rise to finance deficits caused by more consumption in the present if countries do not want their exchange rate to depreciate. On the view that deficits are a sign of success, an important distinction needs to be made between types of capital inflows. If the capital flows are autonomous, such as foreign direct investment, the argument is plausible, but if they are “accommodating” in the form of loans from the banking system or the sale of securities to foreign governments and international organizations, the probable need to raise interest rates will again have real effects by reducing investment and output domestically.

Banking and Lending/Investment. How Monetary Policy Becomes Decisive? Some Branching Rumination.

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Among the most notoriously pernicious effects of asset price inflation is that it offers speculators the prospect of gain in excess of the costs of borrowing the money to buy the asset whose price is being inflated. This is how many unstable Ponzi financing structures begin. There are usually strict regulations to prevent or limit banks’ direct investment in financial instruments without any assured residual liquidity, such as equity or common stocks. However, it is less easy to prevent banks from lending to speculative investors, who then use the proceeds of their loans to buy securities or to limit lending secured on financial assets. As long as asset markets are being inflated, such credit expansions also conceal from banks, their shareholders and their regulators the disintermediation that occurs when the banks’ best borrowers, governments and large companies, use bills and company paper instead of bank loans for their short-term financing. As long as the boom proceeds, banks can enjoy the delusion that they can replace the business of governments and large companies with good lending secured on stocks.

In addition to undermining the solvency of the banking system, and distracting commerce and industry with the possibilities of lucrative corporate restructuring, capital market inflation also tends to make monetary policy ineffective. Monetary policy is principally the fixing of reserve requirements, buying and selling short-term paper or bills in the money or inter-bank markets, buying and selling government bonds and fixing short-term interest rates. As noted in the previous section, with capital market inflation there has been a proliferation of short-term financial assets traded in the money markets, as large companies and banks find it cheaper to issue their own paper than to borrow for banks. This disintermediation has extended the range of short-term liquid assets which banks may hold. As a result of this it is no longer possible for central banks, in countries experiencing capital market inflation, to control the overall amount of credit available in the economy: attempts to squeeze the liquidity of banks in order to limit their credit advances by, say, open market operations (selling government bonds) are frustrated by the ease with which banks may restore their liquidity by selling bonds or their holdings of short-term paper or bills. In this situation central banks have been forced to reduce the scope of their monetary policy to the setting of short-term interest rates.

Economists have long believed that monetary policy is effective in controlling price inflation in the economy at large, as opposed to inflation of securities prices. Various rationalizations have been advanced for this efficacy of monetary policy. For the most part they suppose some automatic causal connection between changes in the quantity of money in circulation and changes in prices, although the Austrian School of Economists (here, here, here, and here) tended on occasion to see the connection as being between changes in the rate of interest and changes in prices.

Whatever effect changes in the rate of interest may have on the aggregate of money circulating in the economy, the effect of such changes on prices has to be through the way in which an increase or decrease in the rate of interest causes alterations in expenditure in the economy. Businesses and households are usually hard-headed enough to decide their expenditure and financial commitments in the light of their nominal revenues and cash outflows, which may form their expectations, rather than in accordance with their expectations or optimizing calculations. If the same amount of money continues to be spent in the economy, then there is no effective reason for the business-people setting prices to vary prices. Only if expenditure in markets is rising or falling would retailers and industrialists consider increasing or decreasing prices. Because price expectations are observable directly with difficulty, they may explain everything in general and therefore lack precision in explaining anything in particular. Notwithstanding their effects on all sorts of expectations, interest rate changes affect inflation directly through their effects on expenditure.

The principal expenditure effects of changes in interest rates occur among net debtors in the economy, i.e., economic units whose financial liabilities exceed their financial assets. This is in contrast to net creditors, whose financial assets exceed their liabilities, and who are usually wealthy enough not to have their spending influenced by changes in interest rates. If they do not have sufficient liquid savings out of which to pay the increase in their debt service payments, then net debtors have their expenditure squeezed by having to devote more of their income to debt service payments. The principal net debtors are governments, households with mortgages and companies with large bank loans.

With or without capital market inflation, higher interest rates have never constrained government spending because of the ease with which governments may issue debt. In the case of indebted companies, the degree to which their expenditure is constrained by higher interest rates depends on their degree of indebtedness, the available facilities for additional financing and the liquidity of their assets. As a consequence of capital market inflation, larger companies reduce their borrowing from banks because it becomes cheaper and more convenient to raise even short- term finance in the booming securities markets. This then makes the expenditure of even indebted companies less immediately affected by changes in bank interest rates, because general changes in interest rates cannot affect the rate of discount or interest paid on securities already issued. Increases in short-term interest rates to reduce general price inflation can then be easily evaded by companies financing themselves by issuing longer-term securities, whose interest rates tend to be more stable. Furthermore, with capital market inflation, companies are more likely to be over-capitalized and have excessive financial liabilities, against which companies tend to hold a larger stock of more liquid assets. As inflated financial markets have become more unstable, this has further increased the liquidity preference of large companies. This excess liquidity enables the companies enjoying it to gain higher interest income to offset the higher cost of their borrowing and to maintain their planned spending. Larger companies, with access to capital markets, can afford to issue securities to replenish their liquid reserves.

If capital market inflation reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy against product price inflation, because of the reduced borrowing of companies and the ability of booming asset markets to absorb large quantities of bank credit, interest rate increases have appeared effective in puncturing asset market bubbles in general and capital market inflations in particular. Whether interest rate rises actually can effect an end to capital market inflation depends on how such rises actually affect the capital market. In asset markets, as with anti-inflationary policy in the rest of the economy, such increases are effective when they squeeze the liquidity of indebted economic units by increasing the outflow of cash needed to service debt payments and by discouraging further speculative borrowing. However, they can only be effective in this way if the credit being used to inflate the capital market is short term or is at variable rates of interest determined by the short-term rate.

Keynes’s speculative demand for money is the liquidity preference or demand for short-term securities of rentiers in relation to the yield on long-term securities. Keynes’s speculative motive is ‘a continuous response to gradual changes in the rate of interest’ in which, as interest rates along the whole maturity spectrum decline, there is a shift in rentiers’ portfolio preference toward more liquid assets. Keynes clearly equated a rise in equity (common stock) prices with just such a fall in interest rates. With falling interest rates, the increasing preference of rentiers for short-term financial assets could keep the capital market from excessive inflation.

But the relationship between rates of interest, capital market inflation and liquidity preference is somewhat more complicated. In reality, investors hold liquid assets not only for liquidity, which gives them the option to buy higher-yielding longer-term stocks when their prices fall, but also for yield. This marginalizes Keynes’s speculative motive for liquidity. The motive was based on Keynes’s distinction between what he called ‘speculation’ (investment for capital gain) and ‘enterprise’ (investment long term for income). In our times, the modern rentier is the fund manager investing long term on behalf of pension and insurance funds and competing for returns against other funds managers. An inflow into the capital markets in excess of the financing requirements of firms and governments results in rising prices and turnover of stock. This higher turnover means greater liquidity so that, as long as the capital market is being inflated, the speculative motive for liquidity is more easily satisfied in the market for long-term securities.

Furthermore, capital market inflation adds a premium of expected inflation, or prospective capital gain, to the yield on long-term financial instruments. Hence when the yield decreases, due to an increase in the securities’ market or actual price, the prospective capital gain will not fall in the face of this capital appreciation, but may even increase if it is large or abrupt. Rising short-term interest rates will therefore fail to induce a shift in the liquidity preference of rentiers towards short-term instruments until the central bank pushes these rates of interest above the sum of the prospective capital gain and the market yield on long-term stocks. Only at this point will there be a shift in investors’ preferences, causing capital market inflation to cease, or bursting an asset bubble.

This suggests a new financial instability hypothesis, albeit one that is more modest and more limited in scope and consequence than Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis. During an economic boom, capital market inflation adds a premium of expected capital gain to the market yield on long-term stocks. As long as this yield plus the expected capital gain exceed the rate of interest on short-term securities set by the central bank’s monetary policy, rising short-term interest rates will have no effect on the inflow of funds into the capital market and, if this inflow is greater than the financing requirements of firms and governments, the resulting capital market inflation. Only when the short-term rate of interest exceeds the threshold set by the sum of the prospective capital gain and the yield on long-term stocks will there be a shift in rentiers’ preferences. The increase in liquidity preference will reduce the inflow of funds into the capital market. As the rise in stock prices moderates, the prospective capital gain gets smaller, and may even become negative. The rentiers’ liquidity preference increases further and eventually the stock market crashes, or ceases to be active in stocks of longer maturities.

At this point, the minimal or negative prospective capital gain makes equity or common stocks unattractive to rentiers at any positive yield, until the rate of interest on short-term securities falls below the sum of the prospective capital gain and the market yield on those stocks. When the short-term rate of interest does fall below this threshold, the resulting reduction in rentiers’ liquidity preference revives the capital market. Thus, in between the bursting of speculative bubbles and the resurrection of a dormant capital market, monetary policy has little effect on capital market inflation. Hence it is a poor regulator for ‘squeezing out inflationary expectations’ in the capital market.

Open Market Operations. Thought of the Day 93.0

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It can be argued that it would be much more democratic if the Treasuries were allowed to borrow directly from their central bank. By electing a government on a program, we would know what deficit it intends to run and thus how much it will be willing to print, which in the long run is a debate about the possible level of inflation. Instead, it has been argued that decisions made on democratic grounds might be unstable as they are affected by elections. However, the independence of central banks is also serving the interest of commercial bankers as we argue now.

In practice, the central bank buys and sells bonds in open market operations. At least it is always doing so with short term T-bonds as part of the conventional monetary policy, and it might decide sometimes to do it as well with longer maturity T-bonds as part of the unconventional monetary policy. This blurs the lines between a model where the central bank directly finances the Treasury, and a model where this is done by commercial banks since they result in the same final situation. Indeed, before an open market operation the Treasury owes central bank money to a commercial bank, and in the final situation it owes it to the central bank itself, and the central bank money held by the commercial bank has been increased accordingly.

The commercial bank has accepted to get rid of an IOU which bears interest, in exchange of a central bank IOU which bears no interest. However the Treasury will never default on its debt, because the state also runs the central bank which can buy an infinite amount of T-bonds. Said differently, if the interest rates for short term T-bonds start to increase as the commercial banks become more and more reluctant to buy these, the central bank needs to buy as many short-term bonds as necessary to ensure the short term interest rates on T-bonds remain at the targeted level. By using these open market operations a sovereign state running a sovereign currency has the means to ensure that the banks are always willing to buy T-bonds, whatever the deficit is.

However, this system has a drawback. First when the commercial bank bought the T-bond, it had to pretend that it was worried the state might never reimburse, so as to ask for interests rates which are at least slightly higher than the interest rate at which they can borrow from the central bank, and make a profit on the difference. Of course the banks knew they would always be reimbursed, because the central bank always stands ready to buy bonds. As the interest rates departed from the target chosen by the central bank, the latter bought short term bonds to prevent the short term rate from increasing. In order to convince a commercial bank to get rid of a financial instrument which is not risky and which bears interest, the only solution is to pay more than the current value of the bond, which amounts to a decrease of the interest rate on those bonds. The bank thus makes an immediate profit instead of a larger profit later. This difference goes directly into the net worth of the banker and amounts to money creation.

To conclude, we reach the same stage as if the Treasury had sold directly its bond to the central bank, except that now we have increased by a small amount the net worth of the bankers. By first selling the bonds to the commercial banks, instead of selling directly to the central bank, the bankers were able to realize a small profit. But this profit is an immediate and easy one. So they have on one side to pretend they do not like when the Treasury goes into debt, so as to be able to ask for the highest possible interest rate, and secretly enjoy it since either they make a profit when it falls due, or even better immediately if the central bank buys the bonds to control the interest rates.

The commercial banks will always end up with a part of their assets denominated directly in central bank money, which bears no interest, and T-bonds, which bear interest. If we adopt a consolidated state point of view, where we merge the Treasury and the central bank, then the commercial banks have two types of accounts. Deposits which bear no interests, and saving accounts which generate interests, just like everybody. In order to control the interest rate, the consolidated state shifts the amounts from the interest-less to the interest-bearing account and vice-versa.

Arbitrage, or Tensors thereof…

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What is an arbitrage? Basically it means ”to get something from nothing” and a free lunch after all. More strict definition states the arbitrage as an operational opportunity to make a risk-free profit with a rate of return higher than the risk-free interest rate accured on deposit.

The arbitrage appears in the theory when we consider a curvature of the connection. A rate of excess return for an elementary arbitrage operation (a difference between rate of return for the operation and the risk-free interest rate) is an element of curvature tensor calculated from the connection. It can be understood keeping in mind that a curvature tensor elements are related to a difference between two results of infinitesimal parallel transports performed in different order. In financial terms it means that the curvature tensor elements measure a difference in gains accured from two financial operations with the same initial and final points or, in other words, a gain from an arbitrage operation.

In a certain sense, the rate of excess return for an elementary arbitrage operation is an analogue of the electromagnetic field. In an absence of any uncertanty (or, in other words, in an absense of walks of prices, exchange and interest rates) the only state is realised is the state of zero arbitrage. However, if we place the uncertenty in the game, prices and the rates move and some virtual arbitrage possibilities to get more than less appear. Therefore we can say that the uncertanty play the same role in the developing theory as the quantization did for the quantum gauge theory.

What of “matter” fields then, which interact through the connection. The “matter” fields are money flows fields, which have to be gauged by the connection. Dilatations of money units (which do not change a real wealth) play a role of gauge transformation which eliminates the effect of the dilatation by a proper tune of the connection (interest rate, exchange rates, prices and so on) exactly as the Fisher formula does for the real interest rate in the case of an inflation. The symmetry of the real wealth to a local dilatation of money units (security splits and the like) is the gauge symmetry of the theory.

A theory may contain several types of the “matter” fields which may differ, for example, by a sign of the connection term as it is for positive and negative charges in the electrodynamics. In the financial stage it means different preferances of investors. Investor’s strategy is not always optimal. It is due to partially incomplete information in hands, choice procedure, partially, because of investors’ (or manager’s) internal objectives. Physics of Finance

 

 

Conjuncted: Banking – The Collu(i)sion of Housing and Stock Markets

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There are two main aspects we are to look at here as regards banking. The first aspect is the link between banking and houses. In most countries, lending of money is done on basis of property, especially houses. As collateral for the mortgage, often houses are used. If the value of the house increases, more money can be borrowed from the banks and more money can be injected into society. More investments are generally good for a country. It is therefore of prime importance for a country to keep the house prices high.

The way this is done, is by facilitating borrowing of money, for instance by fiscal stimulation. Most countries have a tax break on mortgages. This, while the effect for the house buyers of these tax breaks is absolutely zero. That is because the price of a house is determined on the market by supply and demand. If neither the supply nor the demand is changing, the price will be fixed by ‘what people can afford’. Imagine there are 100 houses for sale and 100 buyers. Imagine the price on the market will wind up being 100000 Rupees, with a mortgage payment (3% interest rate) being 3 thousand Rupees per year, exactly what people can afford. Now imagine that government makes a tax break for buyers stipulating that they get 50% of the mortgage payment back from the state in a way of fiscal refund. Suddenly, the buyers can afford 6 thousand Rupees per year and the price on the market of the house will rise to 200 thousand Rupees. The net effect for the buyer is zero. Yet, the price of the house has doubled, and this is a very good incentive for the economy. This is the reason why nearly all governments have tax breaks for home owners.

Yet, another way of driving the price of houses up is by reducing the supply. Socialist countries made it a strong point on their agenda that having a home is a human right. They try to build houses for everybody. And this causes the destruction of the economy. Since the supply of houses is so high that the value drops too much, the possibility of investment based on borrowing money with the house as collateral is severely reduced and a collapse of economy is unavoidable. Technically speaking, it is of extreme simplicity to build a house to everybody. Even a villa or a palace. Yet, implementing this idea will imply a recession in economy, since modern economies are based on house prices. It is better to cut off the supply (destroy houses) to help the economy.

The next item of banking is the stock holders. It is often said that the stock market is the axis-of-evil of a capitalist society. Indeed, the stock owners will get the profit of the capital, and the piling up of money will eventually be at the stock owners. However, it is not so that the stock owners are the evil people that care only about money. It is principally the managers that are the culprits. Mostly bank managers.

To give you an example. Imagine I have 2% of each of the three banks, State Bank, Best Bank and Credit Bank. Now imagine that the other 98% of the stock of each bank is placed at the other two banks. State Bank is thus 49% owner of Best Bank, and 49% owner of Credit Bank. In turn, State Bank is owned for 49% by Best Bank and for 49% by Credit Bank. The thing is that I am the full 100% owner of all three banks. As an example, I own directly 2% of State Bank. But I also own 2% of two banks that each own 49% of this bank. And I own 2% of banks that own 49% of banks that own 49% of State Bank. This series adds to 100%. I am the full 100% owner of State Bank. And the same applies to Best Bank and Credit Bank. This is easy to see, since there do not exist other stock owners of the three banks. These banks are fully mine. However, if I go to a stockholders meeting, I will be outvoted on all subjects. Especially on the subject of financial reward for the manager. If today the 10-million-Rupees salary of Arundhati Bhatti of State Bank is discussed, it will get 98% of the votes, namely those of Gautum Ambani representing Best Bank and Mukesh Adani of Credit Bank. They vote in favor, because next week is the stockholders meeting of their banks. This game only ends when Mukesh Adani will be angry with Arundhati Bhatti.

This structure, placing stock at each other’s company is a form of bypassing the stock holders

– the owners – and allow for plundering of a company.

There is a side effect which is as beneficial as the one above. Often, the general manager’s salary is based on a bonus-system; the better a bank performs, the higher the salary of the manager. This high performance can easily be bogus. Imagine the above three banks. The profit it distributed over the shareholders in the form of dividend. Imagine now that each bank makes 2 million profit on normal business operations. Each bank can easily emit 100 million profit in dividend without loss! For example, State Bank distributes 100 million: 2 million to me, 49 million to Best Bank and 49 million to Credit Bank. From these two banks it also gets 49 million Rupees each. Thus, the total flux of money is only 2 million Rupees.

Shareholders often use as a rule-of thumb a target share price of 20 times the dividend. This because that implies a 5% ROI and slightly better than putting the money at a bank (which anyway invests it in that company, gets 5%, and gives you 3%). However, the dividend can be highly misleading. 2 million profit is made, 100 million dividend is paid. Each bank uses this trick. The general managers can present beautiful data and get a fat bonus.

The only thing stopping this game is taxing. What if government decides to put 25% tax on dividend? Suddenly a bank has to pay 25 million where it made only 2 million real profit. The three banks claimed to have made 300 million profit in total, while they factually only made 6 million; the rest came from passing money around to each other. They have to pay 75 million dividend tax. How will they manage?! That is why government gives banks normally a tax break on dividend (except for small stockholders like me). Governments that like to see high profits, since it also fabricates high GDP and thus guarantees low interest rates on their state loans.

Actually, even without taxing, how will they manage to continue presenting nice data in a year where no profit is made on banking activity?

Fractional Reserve Banking. An Attempt at Demystifying.

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FRB is a technique where a bank can lend more money than it has itself available (‘deposited’ by clients). Normally, a ratio is 9:1 is used, money lent vs. the base product of banking.

This base product used to be gold. So, a bank could issue 9 times more ‘bank notes’ (‘rights to gold’) than it had gold in its vault. Imagine, a person comes with a sack of 1 kilo of gold. This person gets a note from the bank saying “you have deposited 1 kilo of gold in my bank. This note can be exchanged for that 1 kilo of gold any time you want”. But it can legally give this same note to 8 more people! 9 notes that promise 1 kilo of gold for every kilo of gold deposited. Banks are masters of promising things they in no way whatsoever can ever fulfill. And, everybody knows it. And, still we trust the banks. It is an amazing mass denial effect. We trust it, because it gives us wealth. This confidence in the system is what is, actually, essential in the economy. Our civilization depends on the low-morality of the system and our unwavering confidence in it. You are allowed to lie even if the lie is totally and utterly obvious and undeniably without a shred of doubt a lie.

In modern times, the gold standard has been abandoned, because it limits the game. Countries with the most advanced financial structures are the richest. Abandoning the gold standard creates enormous wealth. Rich, advanced nations, therefore, have abandoned the gold standard. In modern banks, no longer gold, but money itself is the base. That is, the promissory notes promise promissory notes. It is completely air. Yet, it works, because everybody trusts it’ll work.

Moreover, banks no longer issue bank notes themselves, except the central bank. The ‘real’ money of the central bank is called ‘base money’ (M0 or ‘Tier 1’) and serves as ‘gold’ in modern banks. The ‘bank notes’ from the bank promise bank notes from the central bank.

Banks use this base money no longer to directly print money (bank notes), but something that is equivalent, namely to lend money to their clients by just adding a number on their account. This, once again, works because everybody trusts it works. But is has become even thinner than air. It is equal to vacuum. There is no physical difference whatsoever anymore between having money and not having it. If I have 0 on my account, or 10000000000000000 rupees, I have the same size information on the computer of my bank. The same number of bytes (however many they may be). I just hope that one day a tiny random fluctuation occurs in their computer and sets me the first bit to a ‘1’ (unless it is the ‘sign’ bit, of course!). Nobody would notice, since there is nowhere money disappearing in the world. Simply more vacuum has been created.

But, it gets even worse. This newly created ‘money’ (the number on an account of bank A) can be deposited in other banks (write a cheque, deposit it, or make a bank transfer to bank B). In this other bank B, it can again be used as a base for creating money by adding a number to peoples’ bank account. As long as a certain amount of base money (M0, or ‘Tier 1’) is maintained. As a side mark, note that bankers do not understand the commotion of the people in calling their rewards astronomical, since they know – in contrast to the people that think that money represents earning based on hard work – that money is vacuum. Giving a bonus to the manager in the form of adding a couple of zeros to her account in her own bank is nothing but air. The most flagrant case of self-referential emptiness is the bank that was bought with its own money.

In this way, the money circulating in the economy can be much larger than the base money (of the central bank). And, all this money is completely air. The amount of money in the world is utterly baseless. Since it is air, moreover an air-system that is invented to facilitate the creation of wealth, we can intervene in the system in any way we want, if we see that this intervention is needed to optimize the creation of wealth. Think of it like this: the money and the money system was invented to enable our trade to take place. If we see that money no longer serves us (but we, instead, seem to serve the money) and decide to organize this trade in another way, we can do so without remorse. If we want to confiscate money and redistribute it, this is morally justified if that is what it takes to enable the creation of wealth.

Especially since, as will be shown, there is no justice in the distribution. It is not as if we were going to take away hard-earned money from someone. The money is just accumulated on a big pile. Intervention is adequate, required and justified. Not intervening makes things much worse for everybody.

Important to make this observation: All money thus circulating in the world is borrowed money. Money is nothing less and nothing more than debt. Without lending and borrowing, there is no debt and there is no money. Without money, there is no trade and no economy. Without debt, the economy collapses. The more debt, the bigger the economy. If everybody were to pay back his/her debt, the system would crash.

Anyway, it is technically not possible to pay back the money borrowed. Why? Because of the interest rates.

Interest is the phenomenon that somebody who lends money – or actually whatever other thing – to somebody that borrows it, wants more money back than it gave. This is impossible.

To give you an example. Imagine we have a library, and this library is the only entity in the world that can print books. Imagine it lends books to its customers and after one week, for every book that it lent out, it wants two back. For some customers it may still be possible. I may have somehow got the book from my neighbor (traded it for a DVD movie?), and I can give the two books the library demands for my one book borrowed. But that would just be passing the buck around; now my neighbor has to give back to the library two books, where he has none. This is how our economy works. And, to explain you what the current solution is of our society is that the library says “You don’t have two books? Don’t worry. We make it a new loan. Two books now. Next week you can give us four”. This is the system we have. Printing money (‘books’) is limited to banks (‘libraries’). The rest borrow the money and in no way whatsoever – absolutely out of the question, fat chance, don’t even think about it – is it possible to give back the money borrowed plus the interest, because this extra money simply does not exist, nor can it be created by the borrowers, because that is reserved to the lenders only. Bankrupt, unless these lenders refinance our loans by new loans.

When explaining this to people, they nearly always fervently oppose this idea, because they think that with money new wealth can be created, and thus the loan can be paid back including the interest, namely with the newly created wealth. This, however, is wrong thinking, because wealth and the commodity used in the loan are different things.
Imagine it like this: Imagine I lend society 100 rupees from my bank with 3% interest. The only rupees in circulation, since I am the only bank. Society invests it in tools for mining with which they find a mother lode with 200 million tons of gold. Yet, after one year, I want 103 rupees back. I don’t want gold. I want money! If they cannot give me my rightful money, I will confiscate everything they own. I will offer 2 rupees for all their possessions (do they have a better offer somewhere?!). I’ll just print 2 extra rupees and that’s it. Actually it is not even needed to print new money. I get everything. At the end of the year, I get my 100 rupees back, I get the gold and mining equipment, and they still keep a debt of 1 rupee.

A loan can only be paid back if the borrower can somehow produce the same (!) commodity that is used in the loan, so that it can give back the loan plus the interest. If gold is lent, and the borrower cannot produce gold, he cannot give back the gold plus interest. The borrower will go bankrupt. If, on the other hand, chickens or sacks of grain are borrowed, these chickens or grain can be given back with interest.

Banks are the only ones that can produce money, therefore the borrowers will go bankrupt. Full stop.

To say it in another way. If we have a system where interest is charged on debt, no way whatsoever can all borrowers pay back the money. Somebody has to go bankrupt, unless the game of refinancing goes on forever. This game of state financing can go on forever as long as the economy is growing exponentially. That is, it is growing with constant percentage. The national debt, in terms of a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP) remains constant, if we continuously refinance and increase the debt, as long as the economy GDP grows steadily too. The moment the economy stagnates, it is game over! Debt will rise quickly. Countries will go bankrupt. (Note that increasing debt is thus the result of a stagnating economy and not the other way around!).

The way the system decides who is going bankrupt, is decided by a feed-back system. The first one that seems to be in trouble has more difficulty refinancing its loans (”You have low credit rating. I fear you will not give me back my books. I want a better risk reward. It is now three books for every book borrowed. Take it or leave it! If you don’t like it, you can always decide to give me my books now and we’ll call it even”).

Thus, some countries will go bankrupt, unless they are allowed to let the debt grow infinitely. If not, sooner or later one of them will go bankrupt. In other words, the average interest rate is always zero. One way or another. If x% interest is charged, about x% go bankrupt. To be more precise, y% of the borrowed money is never returned, compensating for the (100 − y%) that do return it with x% profit. In a mathematical formula: (1 − y/100) × (1 + x/100) = 1, or y = 100x/(100 + x). This percentage goes bankrupt. For example, if 100% interest is charged, 50% goes bankrupt.

To take it to the extreme. If the market is cautious – full of responsible investors – and decides to lend money only to ‘stable’ countries, like Germany, which lately (times are changing indeed) has a very good credit rating from the financial speculators, even these ‘stable’ countries go bankrupt. That is, the weakest of these stable countries. If only money is borrowed to Germany, Germany goes bankrupt. Apart from the technical mathematical certainty that a country can only have a positive trade balance – essential in getting a good credit rating – if another country has a negative trade balance (the sum, being a balance, is always zero). Germany needs countries like Greece as much as it despises them.

Well, in fact, this is not true. A country does not – nay, it cannot – go bankrupt for money borrowing. Not if it is an isolated country with its own currency, being also the currency in which the money is borrowed. It can simply print money. That is because the money is their own currency based on their own economy!!!

Forward, Futures Contracts and Options: Top Down or bottom Up Modeling?

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The simulation of financial markets can be modeled, from a theoretical viewpoint, according to two separate approaches: a bottom up approach and (or) a top down approach. For instance, the modeling of financial markets starting from diffusion equations and adding a noise term to the evolution of a function of a stochastic variable is a top down approach. This type of description is, effectively, a statistical one.

A bottom up approach, instead, is the modeling of artificial markets using complex data structures (agent based simulations) using general updating rules to describe the collective state of the market. The number of procedures implemented in the simulations can be quite large, although the computational cost of the simulation becomes forbidding as the size of each agent increases. Readers familiar with Sugarscape Models and the computational strategies based on Growing of Artificial Societies have probably an idea of the enormous potentialities of the field. All Sugarscape models include the agents (inhabitants), the environment (a two-dimensional grid) and the rules governing the interaction of the agents with each other and the environment. The original model presented by J. Epstein & R. Axtell (considered as the first large scale agent model) is based on a 51 x 51 cell grid, where every cell can contain different amounts of sugar (or spice). In every step agents look around, find the closest cell filled with sugar, move and metabolize. They can leave pollution, die, reproduce, inherit sources, transfer information, trade or borrow sugar, generate immunity or transmit diseases – depending on the specific scenario and variables defined at the set-up of the model. Sugar in simulation could be seen as a metaphor for resources in an artificial world through which the examiner can study the effects of social dynamics such as evolution, marital status and inheritance on populations. Exact simulation of the original rules provided by J. Epstein & R. Axtell in their book can be problematic and it is not always possible to recreate the same results as those presented in Growing Artificial Societies. However, one would expect that the bottom up description should become comparable to the top down description for a very large number of simulated agents.

The bottom up approach should also provide a better description of extreme events, such as crashes, collectively conditioned behaviour and market incompleteness, this approach being of purely algorithmic nature. A top down approach is, therefore, a model of reduced complexity and follows a statistical description of the dynamics of complex systems.

Forward, Futures Contracts and Options: Let the price at time t of a security be S(t). A specific good can be traded at time t at the price S(t) between a buyer and a seller. The seller (short position) agrees to sell the goods to the buyer (long position) at some time T in the future at a price F(t,T) (the contract price). Notice that contract prices have a 2-time dependence (actual time t and maturity time T). Their difference τ = T − t is usually called time to maturity. Equivalently, the actual price of the contract is determined by the prevailing actual prices and interest rates and by the time to maturity. Entering into a forward contract requires no money, and the value of the contract for long position holders and strong position holders at maturity T will be

(−1)p (S(T)−F(t,T)) (1)

where p = 0 for long positions and p = 1 for short positions. Futures Contracts are similar, except that after the contract is entered, any changes in the market value of the contract are settled by the parties. Hence, the cashflows occur all the way to expiry unlike in the case of the forward where only one cashflow occurs. They are also highly regulated and involve a third party (a clearing house). Forward, futures contracts and options go under the name of derivative products, since their contract price F(t, T) depend on the value of the underlying security S(T). Options are derivatives that can be written on any security and have a more complicated payoff function than the futures or forwards. For example, a call option gives the buyer (long position) the right (but not the obligation) to buy or sell the security at some predetermined strike-price at maturity. A payoff function is the precise form of the price. Path dependent options are derivative products whose value depends on the actual path followed by the underlying security up to maturity. In the case of path-dependent options, since the payoff may not be directly linked to an explicit right, they must be settled by cash. This is sometimes true for futures and plain options as well as this is more efficient.