Game’s Degeneracy Running Proportional to Polytope’s Redundancy.

For a given set of vertices V ⊆ R^K a Polytope P can be defined as the following set of points:

P = {∑_i=1^|V|λ_iv_i ∈ R^K | ∑_i=1^|V|λ_i = 1; λ_i ≥ 0; v_i ∈ V}

Polytope is an intersection of boundaries that separate the space into two distinct areas. If a polytope is to be defined as an intersection of half spaces, then for a matrix M ∈ R^mxn, and a vector b ∈ R^m, polytope P is defined as a set of points

P = {x ∈ Rⁿ | M_x ≤ b}

Switching over to a two-player game, (A, B) ∈ R^mxn2_>0, the row/column best response polytope P/Q is defined by:

P = {x ∈ R^m | x ≥ 0; xB ≤ 1}

Q = {y ∈ Rⁿ | Ay ≤ 1; y ≥ 0}

The polytope P, corresponds to the set of points with an upper bound on the utility of those points when considered as row strategies against which the column player plays.

An affine combination of points z₁,….z_k in some Euclidean space is of the form ∑_i=1^kλ_iz_i, where λ₁, …, λ_k are reals with ∑_i=1^kλ_i= 1. It is called a convex combination, if λ_i ≥ 0 ∀ i. A set of points is convex if it is closed under forming convex combinations. Given points are affinely independent if none of these points are an affine combination of the others. A convex set has dimension d iff it has d + 1, but no more, affinely independent points.

A polyhedron P in R^d is a set {z ∈ R^d | C_z ≤ q} for some matrix C and vector q. It is called full-dimensional if it has dimension d. It is called a polytope if it is bounded. A face of P is a set {z ∈ P | c^⊤z = q₀} for some c ∈ R^d, q₀ ∈ R, such that the inequality c^⊤z ≤ q₀ holds for all z in P. A vertex of P is the unique element of a zero-dimensional face of P. An edge of P is a one-dimensional face of P. A facet of a d-dimensional polyhedron P is a face of dimension d − 1. It can be shown that any nonempty face F of P can be obtained by turning some of the inequalities defining P into equalities, which are then called binding inequalities. That is, F = {z ∈ P | c_iz = q_i, i ∈ I}, where c_iz ≤ q_i for i ∈ I are some of the rows in C_z ≤ q. A facet is characterized by a single binding inequality which is irredundant; i.e., the inequality cannot be omitted without changing the polyhedron. A d-dimensional polyhedron P is called simple if no point belongs to more than d facets of P, which is true if there are no special dependencies between the facet-defining inequalities. The “best response polyhedron” of a player is the set of that player’s mixed strategies together with the “upper envelope” of expected payoffs (and any larger payoffs) to the other player.

Nondegeneracy of a bimatrix game (A, B) can be stated in terms of the polytopes P and Q as no point in P has more than m labels, and no point in Q has more than n labels. (If x ∈ P and x has support of size k and L is the set of labels of x, then |L ∩ M| = m − k, so |L| > m implies x has more than k best responses in L ∩ N. Then P and Q are simple polytopes, because a point of P, say, that is on more than m facets would have more than m labels. Even if P and Q are simple polytopes, the game can be degenerate if the description of a polytope is redundant in the sense that some inequality can be omitted, but nevertheless is sometimes binding. This occurs if a player has a pure strategy that is weakly dominated by or payoff equivalent to some other mixed strategy. Non-simple polytopes or redundant inequalities of this kind do not occur for “generic” payoffs; this illustrates the assumption of nondegeneracy from a geometric viewpoint. (A strictly dominated strategy may occur generically, but it defines a redundant inequality that is never binding, so this does not lead to a degenerate game.) Because the game is nondegenerate, only vertices of P can have m labels, and only vertices of Q can have n labels. Otherwise, a point of P with m labels that is not a vertex would be on a higher dimensional face, and a vertex of that face, which is a vertex of P, would have additional labels. Consequently, only vertices of P and Q have to be inspected as possible equilibrium strategies. Algorithmically, if the input is a nondegenerate bimatrix game, and output is an Nash equilibria of the game, then the method employed for each vertex x of P − {0}, and each vertex y of Q − {0}, if (x, y) is completely labeled, the output then is the Nash equilibrium (x · 1/1^⊤x, y · 1/1^⊤y).

Advertisement

Defaultable Bonds. Thought of the Day 133.0

Defaultable bonds are bonds that have a positive possibility of default.  Most corporate bonds and some government bonds are defaultable.  When a bond defaults, its coupon and principal payments will be altered.  Most of the time, only a portion of the principal, and sometimes, also a portion of the coupon, will be paid. A defaultable (T, x) – bond with maturity T > 0 and credit rating x ∈ I ⊆ [0, 1], is a financial contract which pays to its holder 1 unit of currency at time T provided that the writer of the bond hasn’t bankrupted till time T. The set I stands for all possible credit ratings. The bankruptcy is modeled with the use of a so called loss process {L(t), t ≥ 0} which starts from zero, increases and takes values in the interval [0, 1]. The bond is worthless if the loss process exceeds its credit rating. Thus the payoff profile of the (T, x) – bond is of the form

1_{{LT ≤ x}}

The price P(t, T, x) of the (T, x) – bond is a stochastic process defined by

P(t, T, x) = 1_{{LT ≤ x}}e^{−∫_tT f(t, u, x)du}, t ∈ [0, T] —– (1)

where f (·, ·, x) stands for an x-forward rate. The value x = 1 corresponds to the risk-free bond and f(t, T, 1) determines the short rate process via f(t, t, 1), t ≥ 0.

The (T, x) – bond market is thus fully determined by the family of x-forward rates and the loss process L. This is an extension of the classical non-defaultable bond market which can be identified with the case when I is a singleton, that is, when I = {1}.

The model of (T, x) – bonds does not correspond to defaultable bonds which are directly traded on a real market. For instance, in this setting the bankruptcy of the (T, x₂) – bond automatically implies the bankruptcy of the (T, x₁) – bond if x₁ < x₂. In reality, a bond with a higher credit rating may, however, default earlier than that with a lower one. The (T, x) – bonds are basic instruments related to the pool of defaultable assets called Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs), which are actually widely traded on the market. In the CDO market model, the loss process L(t) describes the part of the pool which has defaulted up to time t > 0 and F(L_T), where F as some function, specifies the CDO payoff at time T > 0. In particular, (T, x) – bonds may be identified with the digital-type CDO payoffs with the function F of the form

F(z) = F_x(z) := 1_[0,x](z), x ∈ I, z ∈ [0,1]

Then the price of that payoff p_t(F_x(L_T)) at time t ≤ T equals P(t, T, x). Moreover, each regular CDO claim can be replicated, and thus also priced, with a portfolio consisting of a certain combination of (T, x) – bonds. Thus it follows that the model of (T, x) – bonds determines the structure of the CDO payoffs. The induced family of prices

P(t, T, x), T ≥ 0, x ∈ I

will be a CDO term structure. On real markets the price of a claim which pays more is always higher. This implies

P(t, T, x₁) = p_t(Fx₁(L_T)) ≤ p_t(F_x2(L_T)) = P(t, T, x₂), t ∈ [0, T], x₁ < x₂, x₁, x₂ ∈ I —– (2)

which means that the prices of (T, x) – bonds are increasing in x. Similarly, if the claim is paid earlier, then it has a higher value and hence

P(t, T₁, x) = p_t(F_x(L_T1)) ≥ p_t(F_x(L_T2)) = P(t, T₂, x), t ∈ [0, T₁], T₁ < T₂, x ∈ I —– (3)

which means that the (T, x) – bond prices are decreasing in T. The CDO term structure is monotone if both (2) and (3) are satisfied. Surprisingly, monotonicity of the (T, x) – bond prices is not always preserved in mathematical models even if they satisfy severe no-arbitrage conditions.

Energy Trading: Asian Options.

Consider a risky asset (stock, commodity, a unit of energy) with the price S(t), where t ∈ [0, T], for a given T > 0. Consider an option with the payoff

F_u = Φ(u(·), S(·)) —– (1)

This payoff depends on a control process u(·) that is selected by an option holder from a certain class of admissible controls U. The mapping Φ : U × S → R is given; S is the set of paths of S(t). All processes from U has to be adapted to the current information flow, i.e., adapted to some filtration F_t that describes this information flow. We call the corresponding options controlled options.

For simplicity, we assume that all options give the right on the corresponding payoff of the amount F_u in cash rather than the right to buy or sell stock or commodities.

Consider a risky asset with the price S(t). Let T > 0 be given, and let g : R → R and f : R × [0, T] → R be some functions. Consider an option with the payoff at time T

F_u = g(∫₀^T u(t) f (S(t), t)dt) —– (2)

Here u(t) is the control process that is selected by the option holder. The process u(t) has to be adapted to the filtration F_t describing the information flow. In addition, it has to be selected such that

∫₀^T u(t)dt = 1

A possible modification is the option with the payoff

F_u = ∫₀^T u(t) f(S(t), t)dt + (1 – ∫₀^T u(t)dt) f(S(T), T)

In this case, the unused u(t) are accumulated and used at the terminal time. Let us consider some examples of possible selection of f and g. We denote x⁺ =^∆ max(0, x)

Important special cases are the options with g(x) = x, g(x) = (x − k)⁺, g(x) = (K − x)⁺,

g(x) = min(M, x), where M > 0 is the cap for benefits, and with

f(x, t) = x, f(x, t) = (x − K)⁺, f(x, t) = (K − x)⁺ —– (3)

or

f(x, t) = e^r(T−t)(x − K)⁺, f(x, t) = e^r(T−t)(K − x)⁺ —– (4)

where K > 0 is given and where r > 0 is the risk-free rate. Options (3) correspond to the case when the payments are made at current time t ∈ [0, T], and options (4) correspond to the case when the payment is made at terminal time T. This takes into account accumulation of interest up to time T on any payoff.

The option with payoff (2) with f(x, t) ≡ x represents a generalization of Asian option where the weight u(t) is selected by the holder. It needs to be noted that an Asian option , which is also called an average option, is an option whose payoff depends on the average price of the underlying asset over a certain period of time as opposed to at maturity. The option with payoff (2) with g(x) ≡ x represents a limit version of the multi-exercise options, when the distribution of exercise time approaches a continuous distribution. An additional restriction on |u(t)| ≤ const would represent the continuous analog of the requirement for multi-exercise options that exercise times must be on some distance from each other. For an analog of the model without this condition, strategies may approach delta-functions.

These options can be used, for instance, for energy trading with u(t) representing the quantity of energy purchased at time t for the fixed price K when the market price is above K. In this case, the option represents a modification of the multi-exercise call option with continuously distributed payoff time. For this model, the total amount of energy that can be purchased is limited per option. Therefore, the option holder may prefer to postpone the purchase if she expects better opportunities in future.

Forward, Futures Contracts and Options: Top Down or bottom Up Modeling?

The simulation of financial markets can be modeled, from a theoretical viewpoint, according to two separate approaches: a bottom up approach and (or) a top down approach. For instance, the modeling of financial markets starting from diffusion equations and adding a noise term to the evolution of a function of a stochastic variable is a top down approach. This type of description is, effectively, a statistical one.

A bottom up approach, instead, is the modeling of artificial markets using complex data structures (agent based simulations) using general updating rules to describe the collective state of the market. The number of procedures implemented in the simulations can be quite large, although the computational cost of the simulation becomes forbidding as the size of each agent increases. Readers familiar with Sugarscape Models and the computational strategies based on Growing of Artificial Societies have probably an idea of the enormous potentialities of the field. All Sugarscape models include the agents (inhabitants), the environment (a two-dimensional grid) and the rules governing the interaction of the agents with each other and the environment. The original model presented by J. Epstein & R. Axtell (considered as the first large scale agent model) is based on a 51 x 51 cell grid, where every cell can contain different amounts of sugar (or spice). In every step agents look around, find the closest cell filled with sugar, move and metabolize. They can leave pollution, die, reproduce, inherit sources, transfer information, trade or borrow sugar, generate immunity or transmit diseases – depending on the specific scenario and variables defined at the set-up of the model. Sugar in simulation could be seen as a metaphor for resources in an artificial world through which the examiner can study the effects of social dynamics such as evolution, marital status and inheritance on populations. Exact simulation of the original rules provided by J. Epstein & R. Axtell in their book can be problematic and it is not always possible to recreate the same results as those presented in Growing Artificial Societies. However, one would expect that the bottom up description should become comparable to the top down description for a very large number of simulated agents.

The bottom up approach should also provide a better description of extreme events, such as crashes, collectively conditioned behaviour and market incompleteness, this approach being of purely algorithmic nature. A top down approach is, therefore, a model of reduced complexity and follows a statistical description of the dynamics of complex systems.

Forward, Futures Contracts and Options: Let the price at time t of a security be S(t). A specific good can be traded at time t at the price S(t) between a buyer and a seller. The seller (short position) agrees to sell the goods to the buyer (long position) at some time T in the future at a price F(t,T) (the contract price). Notice that contract prices have a 2-time dependence (actual time t and maturity time T). Their difference τ = T − t is usually called time to maturity. Equivalently, the actual price of the contract is determined by the prevailing actual prices and interest rates and by the time to maturity. Entering into a forward contract requires no money, and the value of the contract for long position holders and strong position holders at maturity T will be

(−1)^p (S(T)−F(t,T)) (1)

where p = 0 for long positions and p = 1 for short positions. Futures Contracts are similar, except that after the contract is entered, any changes in the market value of the contract are settled by the parties. Hence, the cashflows occur all the way to expiry unlike in the case of the forward where only one cashflow occurs. They are also highly regulated and involve a third party (a clearing house). Forward, futures contracts and options go under the name of derivative products, since their contract price F(t, T) depend on the value of the underlying security S(T). Options are derivatives that can be written on any security and have a more complicated payoff function than the futures or forwards. For example, a call option gives the buyer (long position) the right (but not the obligation) to buy or sell the security at some predetermined strike-price at maturity. A payoff function is the precise form of the price. Path dependent options are derivative products whose value depends on the actual path followed by the underlying security up to maturity. In the case of path-dependent options, since the payoff may not be directly linked to an explicit right, they must be settled by cash. This is sometimes true for futures and plain options as well as this is more efficient.

Yield Curve Dynamics or Fluctuating Multi-Factor Rate Curves

The actual dynamics (as opposed to the risk-neutral dynamics) of the forward rate curve cannot be reduced to that of the short rate: the statistical evidence points out to the necessity of taking into account more degrees of freedom in order to represent in an adequate fashion the complicated deformations of the term structure. In particular, the imperfect correlation between maturities and the rich variety of term structure deformations shows that a one factor model is too rigid to describe yield curve dynamics.

Furthermore, in practice the value of the short rate is either fixed or at least strongly influenced by an authority exterior to the market (the central banks), through a mechanism different in nature from that which determines rates of higher maturities which are negotiated on the market. The short rate can therefore be viewed as an exogenous stochastic input which then gives rise to a deformation of the term structure as the market adjusts to its variations.

Traditional term structure models define – implicitly or explicitly – the random motion of an infinite number of forward rates as diffusions driven by a finite number of independent Brownian motions. This choice may appear surprising, since it introduces a lot of constraints on the type of evolution one can ascribe to each point of the forward rate curve and greatly reduces the dimensionality i.e. the number of degrees of freedom of the model, such that the resulting model is not able to reproduce any more the complex dynamics of the term structure. Multifactor models are usually justified by refering to the results of principal component analysis of term structure fluctuations. However, one should note that the quantities of interest when dealing with the term structure of interest rates are not the first two moments of the forward rates but typically involve expectations of non-linear functions of the forward rate curve: caps and floors are typical examples from this point of view. Hence, although a multifactor model might explain the variance of the forward rate itself, the same model may not be able to explain correctly the variability of portfolio positions involving non-linear combinations of the same forward rates. In other words, a principal component whose associated eigenvalue is small may have a non-negligible effect on the fluctuations of a non-linear function of forward rates. This question is especially relevant when calculating quantiles and Value-at-Risk measures.

In a multifactor model with k sources of randomness, one can use any k + 1 instruments to hedge a given risky payoff. However, this is not what traders do in real markets: a given interest-rate contingent payoff is hedged with bonds of the same maturity. These practices reflect the existence of a risk specific to instruments of a given maturity. The representation of a maturity-specific risk means that, in a continuous-maturity limit, one must also allow the number of sources of randomness to grow with the number of maturities; otherwise one loses the localization in maturity of the source of randomness in the model.

An important ingredient for the tractability of a model is its Markovian character. Non-Markov processes are difficult to simulate and even harder to manipulate analytically. Of course, any process can be transformed into a Markov process if it is imbedded into a space of sufficiently high dimension; this amounts to injecting a sufficient number of “state variables” into the model. These state variables may or may not be observable quantities; for example one such state variable may be the short rate itself but another one could be an economic variable whose value is not deducible from knowledge of the forward rate curve. If the state variables are not directly observed, they are obtainable in principle from the observed interest rates by a filtering process. Nevertheless the presence of unobserved state variables makes the model more difficult to handle both in terms of interpretation and statistical estimation. This drawback has motivated the development of so-called affine curve models models where one imposes that the state variables be affine functions of the observed yield curve. While the affine hypothesis is not necessarily realistic from an empirical point of view, it has the property of directly relating state variables to the observed term structure.

Another feature of term structure movements is that, as a curve, the forward rate curve displays a continuous deformation: configurations of the forward rate curve at dates not too far from each other tend to be similar. Most applications require the yield curve to have some degree of smoothness e.g. differentiability with respect to the maturity. This is not only a purely mathematical requirement but is reflected in market practices of hedging and arbitrage on fixed income instruments. Market practitioners tend to hedge an interest rate risk of a given maturity with instruments of the same maturity or close to it. This important observation means that the maturity is not simply a way of indexing the family of forward rates: market operators expect forward rates whose maturities are close to behave similarly. Moreover, the model should account for the observation that the volatility term structure displays a hump but that multiple humps are never observed.