Liberalism.

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In a humanistic society, boundary conditions (‘laws’) are set which are designed to make the lives of human beings optimal. The laws are made by government. Yet, the skimming of surplus labor by the capital is only overshadowed by the skimming by politicians. Politicians are often ‘auto-invited’ (by colleagues) in board-of-directors of companies (the capital), further enabling amassing buying power. This shows that, in most countries, the differences between the capital and the political class are flimsy if not non-existent. As an example, all communist countries, in fact, were pure capitalist implementations, with a distinction that a greater share of the skimming was done by politicians compared to more conventional capitalist societies.

One form of a humanistic (!!!!!????) government is socialism, which has set as its goals the welfare of humans. One can argue if socialism is a good form to achieve a humanistic society. Maybe it is not efficient to reach this goal, whatever ‘efficient’ may mean and the difficulty in defining that concept.

Another form of government is liberalism. Before we continue, it is remarkable to observe that in practical ‘liberal’ societies, everything is free and allowed, except the creation of banks and doing banking. By definition, a ‘liberal government’ is a contradiction in terms. A real liberal government would be called ‘anarchy’. ‘Liberal’ is a name given by politicians to make people think they are free, while in fact it is the most binding and oppressing form of government.

Liberalism, by definition, has set no boundary conditions. A liberal society has at its core the absence of goals. Everything is left free; “Let a Darwinistic survival-of-the-fittest mechanism decide which things are ‘best'”. Best are, by definition, those things that survive. That means that it might be the case that humans are a nuisance. Inefficient monsters. Does this idea look far-fetched? May it be so that in a liberal society, humans will disappear and only capital (the money and the means of production) will survive in a Darwinistic way? Mathematically it is possible. Let me show you.

Trade unions are organizations that represent the humans in this cycle and they are the ways to break the cycle and guarantee minimization of the skimming of laborers. If you are human, you should like trade unions. (If you are a bank manager, you can – and should – organize yourself in a bank-managers trade union). If you are capital, you do not like them. (And there are many spokesmen of the capital in the world, paid to propagate this dislike). Capital, however, in itself cannot ‘think’, it is not human, nor has it a brain, or a way to communicate. It is just a ‘concept’, an ‘idea’ of a ‘system’. It does not ‘like’ or ‘dislike’ anything. You are not capital, even if you are paid by it. Even if you are paid handsomely by it. Even if you are paid astronomically by it. (In the latter case you are probably just an asocial asshole!!!!). We can thus morally confiscate as much from the capital we wish, without feeling any remorse whatsoever. As long as it does not destroy the game; destroying the game would put human happiness at risk by undermining the incentives for production and reduce the access to consumption.

On the other hand, the spokesmen of the capital will always talk about labor cost contention, because that will increase the marginal profit M’-M. Remember this, next time somebody talks in the media. Who is paying their salary? To give an idea how much you are being fleeced, compare your salary to that of difficult-to-skim, strike-prone, trade-union-bastion professions, like train drivers. The companies still hire them, implying that they still bring a net profit to the companies, in spite of their astronomical salaries. You deserve the same salary.

Continuing. For the capital, there is no ‘special place’ for human labor power LP. If the Marxist equation can be replaced by

M – C{MoP} – P – C’ – M’

i.e., without LP, capital would do just that, if that is optimizing M’-M. Mathematically, there is no difference whatsoever between MoP and LP. The only thing a liberal system seeks is optimization. It does not care at all, in no way whatsoever, how this is achieved. The more liberal the better. Less restrictions, more possibilities for optimizing marginal profit M’-M. If it means destruction of the human race, who cares? Collateral damage.

To make my point: Would you care if you had to pay (feed) monkeys one-cent peanuts to find you kilo-sized gold nuggets? Do you care if no human LP is involved in your business scheme? I guess you just care about maximizing your skimming of the labor power involved, be they human, animal or mechanic. Who cares?

There is only one problem. Somebody should consume the products made (no monkey cares about your gold nuggets). That is why the French economist Jean-Baptiste Say said “Every product creates its own demand”. If nobody can pay for the products made (because no LP is paid for the work done), the products cannot be sold, and the cycle stops at the step C’-M’, the M’ becoming zero (not sold), the profit M’-M reduced to a loss M and the company goes bankrupt.

However, individual companies can sell products, as long as there are other companies in the world still paying LP somewhere. Companies everywhere in the world thus still have a tendency to robotize their production. Companies exist in the world that are nearly fully robotized. The profit, now effectively skimming of the surplus of MoP-power instead of labor power, fully goes to the capital, since MoP has no way of organizing itself in trade unions and demand more ‘payment’. Or, and be careful with this step here – a step Marx could never have imagined – what if the MoP start consuming as well? Imagine that a factory robot needs parts. New robot arms, electricity, water, cleaning, etc. Factories will start making these products. There is a market for them. Hail the market! Now we come to the conclusion that the ‘system’, when liberalized will optimize the production (it is the only intrinsic goal) Preindustrial (without tools):

M – C{LP} – P – C’ – M’

Marxian: M – C{MoP, LP} – P – C’ – M’

Post-modern: M – C{MoP} – P – C’ – M’

If the latter is most efficient, in a completely liberalized system, it will be implemented.

This means

1) No (human) LP will be used in production

2) No humans will be paid for work of producing

3) No human consumption is possible

4) Humans will die from lack of consumption

In a Darwinistic way humanity will die to be substituted by something else; we are too inefficient to survive. We are not fit for this planet. We will be substituted by the exact things we created. There is nowhere a rule written “liberalism, with the condition that it favors humans”. No, liberalism is liberalism. It favors the fittest.

It went good so far. As long as we had exponential growth, even if the growth rate for MoP was far larger than the growth rate for rewards for LP, also LP was rewarded increasingly. When the exponential growth stops, when the system reaches saturation as it seems to do now, only the strongest survive. That is not necessarily mankind. Mathematically it can be either one or the other, without preference; the Marxian equation is symmetrical. Future will tell. Maybe the MoP (they will also acquire intelligence and reason somewhere probably) will later discuss how they won the race, the same way we, Homo Sapiens, currently talk about “those backward unfit Neanderthals”.

Your ideal dream job would be to manage the peanut bank, monopolizing the peanut supply, while the peanut eaters build for you palaces in the Italian Riviera and feed you grapes while you enjoy the scenery. Even if you were one of the few remaining humans. A world in which humans are extinct is not a far-fetched world. It might be the result of a Darwinian selection of the fittest.

Post-Foundationalism Versus Anti-Foundationalism. Thought of the Day 58.0

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In the words of Judith Butler,

the point is not to do away with foundations, or even to champion a position which goes under the name of antifoundationalism: Both of these positions belong together as different versions of foundationalism and the sceptical problematic it engenders. Rather, the task is to interrogate what the theoretical move that establishes foundations authorizes, and what precisely it excludes or forecloses.

The notion of contingent foundations, proposed by Butler as an alternative framing, could best be described as an ontological weakening of the status of foundation without doing away with foundations entirely. It is on its account, that what came to be called post-foundationalism should not be confused with anti-foundationalism. What distinguishes the former from the latter is that it does not assume the absence of any ground; what it assumes is the absence of an ultimate ground, since it is only on the basis of such absence that grounds, in the plural, are possible. The problem is therefore posed not in terms of no foundations (the logic of all- or -nothing), but in terms of contingent foundations. Hence, post-foundationalism does not stop after having assumed the absence of a final ground and so it does not turn into anti-foundationalist nihilism, existentialism or pluralism, all of which would assume the absence of any ground and would result in complete meaninglessness, absolute freedom or total autonomy. Nor does it turn into a sort of post-modern pluralism for which all meta-narratives have equally melted into air, for what is still accepted by post-foundationalism is the necessity for some grounds.

What becomes problematic as a result is not the existence of foundations (in the plural) but their ontological status – which is seen now as necessarily contingent. This shift in the analysis from the ‘actually existing’ foundations to their status – that is to say, to their conditions of possibility – can be described as a quasi-transcendental move. Although implicitly present in Spivak’s notion of a ‘perpetually rehearsed critique’ as well as in Butler’s notion of ‘interrogation’, this quasi-transcendental turn is made explicit by Ernesto Laclau who, starting from the post-foundational premise that ‘the crisis of essentialist universalism as a self-asserted ground has led our attention to the contingent grounds (in the plural) of its emergence and to the complex process of construction’, comes to the conclusion that ‘[t]his operation is, sensu stricto, transcendental: it involves a retreat from an object to its conditions of possibility’.

The Differentiated Hyperreality of Baudrillard

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A sense of meaning for Baudrillard connotes a totality that is called knowledge and it is here that he differs significantly from someone like Foucault. For the latter, knowledge is a product of relations employing power, whereas for the former, any attempt to reach a finality or totality as he calls fit is always a flirtation with delusion. A delusion, since the human subject would always aim at understanding the human or non-human object, and, in the process the object would always be elusive since, it being based on signifiers would be vulnerable to a shift in significations. The two key ideas of Baudrillard are simulation and hyperreality. Simulation accords to representation of things such that they become the things represented, or in other words, representations gain priority over the “real” things. There are certain orders that define simulations viz. signs get to represent objective reality, signs veil reality, signs masking the absence of reality and signs turning into simulacra, since they have relation to reality thus ending up simulating a simulation. In Hegarty‘s reading of Baudrillard, there happen to be three types of simulacra each with a distinct historical epoch. The first is the pre-modern period, where the image marks the place for an item and hence the uniqueness of objects and situations marks them as irreproducibly real. The second is the modern period characterized by industrial revolution signifying the breaking down of distinctions between images and reality because of mass reproduction of copies or proliferation of commodities thus risking the essential existence of the original. The third is the post-modern period, where simulacra precedes the original and the distinction between reality and representation vanishes implying only the existence of simulacra and relegating reality as a vacuous concept. Hyperreality defines a condition wherein “reality” as known gets substituted by simulacra. This notion of Baudrillard is influenced by Canadian communication theorist and rhetorician Marshall McLuhan. Hyperreality with its insistence of signs and simulations fit perfectly in the post-modern era and therefore highlights the inability or shortcomings of consciousness to demarcate between reality and the phantasmatic space. In a quite remarkable analysis of Disneyland, Baudrillard (166-184) clarifies the notion of hyperreality, when he says,

The Disneyland imaginary is neither true nor false: it is a deterrence machine set in order to rejuvenate in reverse the fiction of the real. Whence the debility, the infantile degeneration of this imaginary. It’s meant to be an infantile world, in order to make us believe that adults are everywhere, in the “real” world and to conceal the fact that real childishness is everywhere, particularly among those adults who go there to act the child in order to foster illusion of their real childishness.

Although his initial ideas were affiliated with those of Marxism, he differed from Marx in his epitomizing consumption as the driving force of capitalism as compared to latter’s production. Another issue that was worked out remarkably in Baudrillard was historicity. Agreeing largely with Fukuyama’s notion of the end of history after the collapse of the communist block, Baudrillard only differed by placing importance on the idea of historical progress to have ended and not history necessarily. He forcefully makes the point of ending of history as also the ending of dustbins of history. His post-modern stand differed significantly with that of Lyotard’s in one major respect, despite finding common grounds elsewhere. Despite showing growing aversion to the theory of meta-narratives, Baudrillard, unlike Lyotard, reached a point of pragmatic reality within the confines of an excuse laden notion of universality that happened to be in vogue.

Baudrillard has been at the receiving end with some very extreme, acerbic criticisms directed at him. His writings are not just obscure, but also fail in many respects like defining certain concepts he employs, totalizing insights that have no substantial claim to conjectures, and often hinting strongly at apodicticity without paying due attention to the rival positions. This extremity reaches a culmination point when he is cited as a purveyor of reality-denying irrationalism. But not everything is to be looked at critically in his case and he does enjoy an established status as a transdisciplinary theorist, who, with his provocations have put traditional issues regarding modernity and philosophy in general at stake by providing insights into a better comprehensibility of cultural studies, sociology and philosophy. Most importantly, Baudrillard provides for autonomous and differentiated spaces in cultural, socio-economic and political domains by an implosive theory that cuts across boundaries of various disciplines paving the way for a new era in philosophical and social theory at large.